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This dissertation explores the effects of inter-governmental transfers on 
macroeconomic stability, evaluating the case of Peru, which experienced a large increase 
in transfers to local governments from 2001 to 2010, linked to the fiscal revenue from the 
development of natural resources.  
The findings indicate that, although the surge in transfers in Peru is not an 
imminent threat on macroeconomic stability, it created a fiscal risk through two main 
channels. First, the reduction in the fiscal space of the central government to conduct 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy, since it shares with sub-national governments an increased 
proportion of its revenue from corporate income tax on extractive industries, which is the 
tax that grew most in Peru over the last decade and is also the most volatile. And second, 
 
 
the high increase of local expenditures due to increased transfers from the central 
government, which is a manifestation of the flypaper effect. This increased local 
expenditure contributed to a larger share of local government participation in the general 
government. In turn, this increased participation contributed to put pressure on the central 
government to allocate more funds to local governments when transfers fell. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the results also show that local governments in Peru do not reduce 
their fiscal effort in terms of own taxation in response to the high increase in transfers.  
This dissertation builds on the literature on the link between decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability, with particular reference to the allocation of the fiscal revenue 
from the development of natural resources among levels of government, which is an 
important issue in many countries around the world, in the context of the high rise in 
commodity prices of the last decade. It provides lessons related to the consequences of 
sharing a large proportion of the fiscal revenue from the development of natural resources 
with sub-national governments, as well as policy options for Peru to improve its 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
During the last decade and in spite of the recession of 2008-2009, the world has 
experienced a period of high economic growth led by developing countries, which has 
contributed to increase the availability of resources for public expenditures. Much of this 
fiscal revenue bonanza has been associated with the boom in commodity prices, and in 
many countries public funds linked to natural resources are automatically allocated to 
subnational governments (SNG) through inter-governmental transfers. My interest is to 
assess the effect of these transfers on SNG from the perspective of macroeconomic 
stability. In particular, I intend to evaluate whether transfers, in particular those based on 
natural resources, constitute a fiscal risk through two main channels: (1) The reduction in 
the fiscal space of the central government to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy due to 
the higher participation of SNG in the public sector; and (2) The fiscal decisions of SNG 
in response to transfers, which may create the need to allocate increasing funds to them. 
I focus on the case of Peru, where transfers to SNG associated to natural resources 
such as minerals and hydrocarbons have been experiencing high growth and volatility 
between 2001 and 2010. These funds, which are not linked to new expenditure 
responsibilities at the subnational level, are mostly allocated to the local level of 
government, which has higher fiscal autonomy than the regional level. The funds are 
disbursed on the basis of devolution: money flows to where resources are extracted. Also, 
SNG are only restricted to allocate most of these funds for public investment.  
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This dissertation is organized as follows. In this chapter I introduce the problem, 
describing the salient issues related to decentralization and transfers in Peru. I also 
summarize the main questions, findings and conclusions of this dissertation.  
In the second chapter I review the relevant literature, describing the theoretical 
and empirical channels through which transfers affect macroeconomic stability. This 
includes the assessment of the effects of transfers on the finances of SNG, along with the 
analysis of the particular case of transfers based on natural resources.  
In the third chapter I describe in more detail the latest decentralization process in 
Peru, with particular attention to the characteristics of the system of transfers to SNG. In 
the fourth chapter I review the salient studies related to the topic of this dissertation on 
Peru. In the fifth chapter I present the leading questions and methodology, focusing first 
on a descriptive analysis of the effect of transfers on Peru’s general government; and then 
on the effect of transfers on the fiscal decisions of Peru’s local level of government, using 
both descriptive and econometric analysis.  
The sixth chapter presents the results of my research, followed in the seventh 
chapter by conclusions, policy implications and recommendations.  
In the context of the growth in commodity prices of the last decade and the 
distribution of the fiscal rent from natural resources among levels of government, I expect 
this dissertation to shed light on the effects of transfers on macroeconomic stability. The 
conclusions and implications of this research provide lessons to gain a better 
understanding of the decentralization process and improve its design not only in Peru, but 




The motivation for this research is the extraordinary growth in transfers to local 
governments (LLGG) in Peru during the past decade, depicted in Figure 1.1. Indeed, 
between 2001 and 2010, transfers to LLGG at constant 2002 prices in Peruvian Soles 
(S/.) increased more than 5 times, at an annual rate of 21 percent.
1
  
Figure 1.1 – Central government transfers to Peru’s LLGG – 1998 – 2010 
 
The main source of this growth has been public revenue from the development of 
natural resources. In Figure 1.1 this type of transfers is called “natural resources and 
customs”, and is also labeled “fragmentary transfers”, following Herrera (2008), because 
the revenues are not allocated to all SNG, but only to those from where the resources are 
                                                 
1
 Table A1.1 in Annex 1 presents the yearly inflation and average yearly exchange rate (Peruvian S./ per 
US dollar) between 1998 and 2010. The average yearly inflation for the series was less than 3 percent, and 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budgets obtained from National Accounting Office (NAO) - Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) - Peru
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exploited. Fragmentary transfers have grown enormously, but they are also subject to 
high volatility: between 2001 and 2007 they increased at an annual rate of 66 percent in 
constant terms. However, three years later they declined 22 percent.  
The two other types of transfers to LLGG shown in Figure 1.1 are 
“FONCOMUN” (Spanish abbreviation for “Municipal Compensation Fund”) and 
“Earmarks and other transfers”. FONCOMUN has traditionally been the main source of 
revenue for local governments, and as its name suggests, it is intended to serve to 
equalize income. It derives most of its funds from two percentage points of the national 
value added tax (VAT), whose growth is relatively stable and follows closely the 
country’s economic performance. “Earmarks and other transfers” includes transfers with 
conditionality; programs that have been reassigned to LLGG; donations; incentive-based 
grants; and discretional lump-sum grants from the central government that have grown 
significantly in 2009 and 2010 to compensate for the reduction in the other two transfers, 
especially fragmentary transfers, due to the economic slowdown of 2009.  
This extraordinary growth in transfers to LLGG elicits a number of questions 
related to what Bird (1999), describes as the effects of transfers on the policy outcomes of 
government activity: allocative efficiency, which inquires how these funds are spent; 
distributional equity, related to how money is shared among SNG; and macroeconomic 
stability, which assesses whether transfers create fiscal risks. These three analytical 
standpoints are important and can often be intertwined. In this dissertation, however, the 
focus is to explore the implications of the growth in transfers from the perspective of 
macroeconomic stability.  
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Decentralization and macroeconomic stability 
The threat of transfers on macroeconomic stability is that when they are the 
dominant source of funding of SNG, they can alter the perception about the levels of 
local expenditure that can be sustained, stimulating what is known as the “soft budget 
constraint”, by which “an entity can expand its expenditures without itself facing the full 
cost” (Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack, 2001). This can result in a higher participation of 
SNG in the general government, often at the expense of the central government; an 
increase in the total size of the public sector; and/or a higher probability of financial 
bailouts from the central government (Rodden, 2002).  
There are three main channels through which this occurs (Rodden, 2003): first, 
larger grants tend to be associated with similar increases in subnational expenditures. The 
empirical literature shows that very little of windfall transfers is absorbed by savings or 
tax reductions, either at the central or the local government; instead, the “flypaper effect” 
prevails, by which “money sticks where it hits” (Hines and Thaler, 1995), meaning that 
increases in transfers translate into similar increases in expenditures of SNG. Second, 
transfers create a “fiscal illusion” by which the link between taxation and benefits breaks. 
Since the money comes from the center, SNG internalize its benefits but not its cost 
(“common pool” problem), and the central government has reduced capacity to monitor 
the use of funds (“principal agent” problem). This fosters less local oversight and 
accountability, which in turn encourages overspending. Third, the higher the vertical 
imbalance that grants create, defined as the ratio of transfers to total income at the 
subnational level, the more SNG are encouraged to spend and borrow when revenues fall, 
in the expectation of a bailout from the central government.  
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The effect of transfers on macroeconomic stability has been highlighted in the 
recent past due to the fiscal costs created by SNG in a number of countries, including in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) the cases of Argentina (2001), Brasil (1999) and 
Colombia (1999). To mitigate these threats the central government has the ability to 
impose restrictions on subnational spending and borrowing (Rodden, 2002). However, 
the challenge is not only to have restrictions enacted, but also to be able to enforce them 
through appropriate monitoring and evaluation of SNG financial management (Parry, 
2007). Those restrictions directly controlled by the central government, such as external 
borrowing, are clearly easier to enforce. Those that depend more on the discretion of the 
local authorities require closer oversight.  
The assignment of revenue from natural resources 
Figure 1.1 above also shows that since 2006 most transfers to LLGG in Peru are 
fragmentary and based on natural resources such as minerals and hydrocarbons. This 
complicates macroeconomic stability since it takes away from the central government a 
large source of funding that is given to SNG with less capacity to handle its inherent 
volatility. This higher volatility vis-à-vis other revenue sources increases the pressure on 
the central government to compensate SNG when transfers fall, and as shown in Figure 
1.1, the costs associated to this decline can be quite high. Also, the unequal distribution 
of fragmentary transfers, which allocates funds to those SNG from which resources are 
extracted, can generate compensatory demands of non-recipients, with a potentially large 
fiscal cost for the central government.  
The assignment of revenue from natural resources among levels of government is 
usually a contentious issue, especially in those countries in which this type of revenue is 
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relatively large (Bahl, 2002). Mc Lure (2003) mentions that if SNG were to choose 
“behind the veil of ignorance” without knowing the allocation of natural resources among 
them, a central collection and distribution of these revenues would be optimal. But once 
the veil is lifted and everyone knows its allocation, those regions with more resources 
will demand a large share of revenues.  
From an efficiency and distributional standpoint, producing SNG should be 
reimbursed for the local costs associated with the exploitation of natural resources, 
including any environmental and social damage. This means that the relevant question 
concerns the distribution of the rent net of costs of exploitation. From a macroeconomic 
perspective, although it tends to be politically infeasible, the most desirable arrangement 
is centralization of net natural resource revenue, assigning other tax bases to SNG, 
combined with a transfer system that addresses the goals of fiscal decentralization. An 
alternative is to assign a small fraction of natural resource bases to producing SNG, with 
safeguards to deal with their inherent volatility. The least preferred scheme is revenue 
sharing of taxes from natural resources, because it fully transmits the volatility of the 
revenue source (Ahmad and Mottu, 2002); as shall be seen revenue sharing is the current 
arrangement in Peru.  
Mainly due to political pressure most countries allocate a share of the revenue 
from natural resources on a devolution basis, transferring funds to those SNG from which 
resources are extracted. Indeed, due to the boom in commodity prices and associated 
investment in extractive industries during the last decade, the volume of such transfers 
has increased significantly across the world. In this regard, the case of Peru is interesting 
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since the share of public revenue of its SNG from natural resources is relatively high 
(Morgandi, 2008).  
Decentralization in Peru 
Peru is a unitary country, which means that SNG have restricted fiscal autonomy 
relative to federal countries, and it has traditionally been highly centralized (IADB, 1997; 
Carranza and Tuesta, 2003). Indeed, relative to the seven largest countries in LAC 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, also known as LAC-
7), Peru is the second most centralized country after Chile and the latest one to have 
initiated a major decentralization effort, which began in 2001. The country’s estimated 
population of 29.5 million (2010) has concentrated since the 1940s in the capital, Lima, 
which holds around one-third of the total. Peru is divided in three geographic “natural 
zones”: the more prosperous and populated Coast; the under-developed and deprived 
Highlands, from which residents have tended to emigrate during the past 60 years, 
especially to the Coast; and the relatively unpopulated and also poor Rainforest, which 
comprises most of the country’s territory.  
Since the first constitution the country has been politically organized in 
departments, provinces and districts, based on the administrative divisions of the colonial 
period. In the Constitution of 1979, which followed a military government, the term 
“region” was introduced to replace the previous “departments” as the intermediate level 
of government. Regions were defined as de-concentrated units of the central government. 
At the local level, however, autonomy was reinstated, including regular elections of 
mayors since 1981.  
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Peru has 26 regions or departments.
2
 The local level is composed of “provinces” 
and “districts”; this division is formalized since the Constitution of 1823 and has its 
origins in the French model of municipalities. Provinces are larger units within a region, 
each of which includes a provincial capital and a variable number of districts. The 
provincial capital has jurisdiction over its own area (operating as another district), but it 
also has functions over the whole province (Alvarado, 2003). By the end of 2010 there 
were 1834 LLGG, divided into 195 provincial capitals and 1639 districts.  
Throughout the country’s independent history, decentralization efforts were made 
by civil governments, being later reversed by autocratic rulers (Carranza and Tuesta, 
2003). At the regional level, there was a strong decentralization effort during the first 
García Administration (1985-90). In 1988, the government enacted a Regionalization 
Law that created twelve regions based on the forced integration of the existing 
departments. These regions had broad delegated attributions, but limited autonomy. 
During the last months of the first García Administration there was a hurried transfer of 
functions to these new regional governments, which was incomplete and influenced by 
the ongoing political and economic developments, namely, the internal conflict against 
the terrorist movement “Shining Path” and hyperinflation, respectively. The Fujimori 
Administration (1990-2000) focused successfully on tackling these major problems and 
stopped the process of regional consolidation. After President Fujimori dissolved 
Congress in 1992, the regions were definitively suppressed (Carranza and Tuesta, 2003).  
                                                 
2
 Includes the city of Lima, whose mayor is the head of both the province of Lima and the regional 
government of Metropolitan Lima; and the city of El Callao (next to the city of Lima), which holds a mayor 
who presides the province of El Callao, and a regional president who presides the regional government of 
El Callao, both different authorities with separate functions over the same geographical area. 
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From 1992 and until the demise of President Fujimori in 2000, the increasing 
autocracy coincided with a more centralist configuration of the State. A Transitory 
Counsel of Regional Administration (CTAR after its name in Spanish) was created in 
each historic department, as a de-concentrated unit of the central government that 
executed regional expenditures. Each CTAR did not have own resources or tax functions, 
although it did have technical, budgetary and administrative autonomy to execute its 
expenditure functions, under the supervision of the central government. In 1993 a new 
Constitution was approved, which was ambiguous in terms of decentralization, although 
it left the door open to future legal developments (Carranza and Tuesta, 2003).  
At the local level, since 1981 and for the first time local elected authorities began 
to execute newly assigned functions, which included the regulation of local transport, 
territorial conditioning and the capacity to manage their user fees (Flores, 2005). Initially 
there was a timid decentralization of resources to LLGG, which created fiscal 
imbalances. Hence, in 1985 municipalities gathered around the newly formed 
“Association of Municipalities of Peru” (AMPE, after its name in Spanish) to demand an 
increase in transfers. This led to the assignment of funds that replaced the residual grants 
that were being annually authorized in the general budgets. They included two points of 
Peru’s VAT; the toll tax, vehicle tax and the tax on bets; and the “Glass of Milk” social 
program, financed with Treasury funds.  
Following President Fujimori’s self-coup in 1992, the central government not 
only eliminated the regional governments, but it also restructured in 1993 the municipal 
tax system, taking away some sources of income of LLGG. Indeed, it eliminated and 
reduced tax bases; established exonerations; and modified the distribution of the VAT 
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and the vehicle tax, creating the “FONCOMUN”, whose formula favors rural districts in 
detriment of urban provincial municipalities (particularly the Municipality of Lima), 
many of which were governed at the time by opposition parties.  
The Constitution of 1993 recognizes as municipal resources those stemming from 
FONCOMUN and from the “canon.” The latter is defined as the participation of SNG in 
the income generated from the development of natural resources in their territories.
3
 This 
participation was initially 20 percent of the corporate income tax on companies dedicated 
to the development of natural resources, and began to be distributed to municipalities on 
a devolution basis in 1996.  
Latest push for decentralization 
The demise of the Fujimori Administration due to a corruption scandal in 
November 2000 brought a renaissance of democracy to Peru along with renewed popular 
pressure for decentralization. Since then the latest decentralization process has begun, 
which can be characterized by two major developments. First, the Toledo Administration 
(2001-06) led a Constitutional reform that created in March 2002 a legitimate 
intermediate level of government, the “regional governments” (RRGG), over the 
structure of the functioning CTARs. The first election of “regional presidents” took place 
in December 2002; they serve four-year terms with the possibility of reelection.
4
 
President Toledo also spearheaded the approval of a legislative package between 2002 
and 2004, which set the roadmap for an effective decentralization of resources, functions 
                                                 
3
 The Constitution of 1979 also recognized the participation of SNG in the exploitation of natural resources 
in their territories. 
4
 Mayors of LLGG also serve four-year terms which coincide with the period of regional presidents, with 
the possibility of reelection. 
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and programs to regional and local governments, under the principles of fiscal neutrality, 
gradualism, and stimulation of economic competitiveness.   
The compliance with this roadmap of decentralization has proceeded at a slow 
pace. A condition for the transfer of tax bases to RRGG has been the creation of 
“regions,” which are defined as the political and administrative union of two or more of 
the existing departments. In a referendum held in October 2005, however, the population 
of 15 out of 16 of Peru’s departments where the elections took place rejected the 
proposals to create regions; since then there has been relatively little effort to push for 
what is called as “regionalization.” Moreover, the ambitious agenda to transfer 
expenditure functions to RRGG has mostly meant a formal recognition of the 
responsibilities that were already undertaken by the former CTARs as de-concentrated 
agencies of the central government: the central ministries have been reluctant to increase 
funding and human resources to the RRGG. Hence, most of the budget of RRGG is 
determined by the central government, and largely earmarked to payroll, especially in 
education and health. In turn, RRGG do not collect taxes and their own resources are 
limited to user fees, which yield little revenue. All this leaves limited autonomy to 
regional authorities, except in those regions that receive high transfers associated to 
natural resources.  
Figure 1.2 shows transfers to RRGG since they have been functioning as a 
legitimate intermediate level of government (2003 to 2010). As can be seen earmarks are 
by far the largest category, although its importance has reduced from almost 90 percent 
on average during the first cohort of regional presidents (2003 to 2006) to around 75 
percent on average during the second cohort (2007 to 2010). Similar to what is shown in 
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Figure 1.1 for LLGG, fragmentary transfers have almost doubled their participation 
between the same two periods, although the participation of RRGG is smaller than for 
LLGG. Lastly, “other transfers” have also increased significantly between both periods, 
although from a low base: in 2009-10 most of this category is explained by compensatory 
transfers from the central government due to the economic slowdown of 2009.  
Figure 1.2 - Central government transfers to Peru’s RRGG – 2003 to 2010 
 
The initial push of the latest decentralization effort focused on the newly created 
RRGG, partly neglecting the local level of government, which has more autonomy 
(Casas, 2006). Starting in 2004 the central government has de-concentrated to LLGG 
some programs related to rural highways, social infrastructure, alimentary and nutrition 
projects, with transfers earmarked to these functions (included in “earmarks and other 


































































Earmarks Natural resources and customs (fragmentary transfers) Other transfers
Source: own elaboration based on RRGG budgets obtained from NAO-MEF 
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decentralization process has mostly benefited LLGG, and it is related to the surge in 
fragmentary transfers shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.  
To a large degree this development traces back to July 2001, a few days before 
the end of the transitional Administration of President Paniagua (November 2000 to July 
2001), when the Peruvian Congress enacted the “Canon Law”.
5
 This law increases the 
participation of SNG in the corporate income tax stemming from the development of 
natural resources from 20 to 50 percent, and defines the rules for the distribution of these 
resources among the SNG of each producing department. It comprises resources 
generated by mining, gas, hydro-energy, forestry and fishing activities. In the case of gas 
the resources include the “perquisite”, which is an increasing fixed percentage of the sale 
value of the extracted gas. The canon law excludes oil, which preserves its own 
distribution regime specific to each producing department, and whose origin dates back 
to the 1970s with successive amendments.  
The canon law is often overlooked in the description of the formal steps in Peru’s 
current decentralization process, but as suggested in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, it has been of 
crucial importance to explain the growth of transfers to SNG, especially LLGG, after 
2001. Between 2005 and 2010 over 70 percent of the average resources transferred to 
LLGG under the label “fragmentary transfers” in Figure 1.1 are linked to the categories 
included in the canon law. This is depicted in Figure 1.3, which opens the categories 
included in Figure 1.1 under the label “fragmentary transfers to LLGG”. 
 
                                                 
5
 Peruvian Law No. 27506 of July 10, 2001. See Table A-1 in Annex 1 for a description of all transfer 
systems to LLGG in Peru.  
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Figure 1.3 - Transfers under “natural resources and customs” – 2001 to 2010 
 
The categories related to the canon law are “mining canon”, “gas canon” and 
“other canon”, while two other fragmentary transfers linked to natural resources were 
introduced in 2004: the “mining perquisite” is an increasing fixed percentage of the sale 
value of the extracted mineral; and the “Focam perquisite” is a transfer for the right of 
way of the Camisea gas pipeline. Salient among these categories is the “mining canon”, 
with an average of 57.1 percent of total fragmentary transfers during this period and a 
peak of 70 percent in 2007. The “oil canon and sobrecanon” (average of 12.3 percent of 
total fragmentary transfers during this period) and “gas canon” (average of 11.7 percent) 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budgets obtained from NAO-MEF
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included in this category because it is also a fragmentary transfer.
6
 The main restriction 
on the use of fragmentary transfers is that they need to be allocated mostly to public 
investment, although the stringency of this requirement differs according to each type of 
transfer and has been gradually relaxed throughout the past decade.  
The legal framework has contributed to the extraordinary growth in fragmentary 
transfers, but two other important factors help explain it as well. First, the increase in 
commodity prices during the world economic expansion of mid-2003 to mid-2008, which 
was especially sharp in products related to the mining industry. This tendency has 
resumed since the end of the economic slowdown of 2009, and has been mostly linked to 
the high demand for raw materials from other developing countries, especially China.  
The second factor is the strong increase of Peru’s economy, which had an average 
annual real growth rate of 5 percent between 1998 and 2010, being the best performer 
among the LAC-7 countries during this period. This high economic growth has been 
partly explained by private investment and exports in extractive industries, attracted by 
the higher yields offered by commodity prices and the large mineral and hydrocarbon 
reserves of Peru, in a context of macroeconomic prudence and stability on the part of 
Peruvian national authorities.  
As a result, public revenue has grown significantly. Figure 1.4 shows the 
evolution of internal tax collection in Peru in constant 2002 S/. during 1998-2010. As can 
be seen, the tax that has grown most in this period is “mining and hydrocarbons corporate 
                                                 
6
 It corresponds to 2 percent of total import duty for the provincial and district LLGG where the customs 
agency is located (1 percent in the case of the LLGG of the city-port of El Callao, through which most 
import operations of Peru take place). 
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income tax”, although from a low base, of which the participation of mining has been on 
average 85 percent: it grew at an annual rate of 28.6 percent in constant terms, with “rest 
of income tax” a far second with 10.7 percent. It is also the most volatile tax: The ratio of 
its standard deviation to its mean during this period is 1.11, while for the second most 
volatile, which is also “rest of income tax”, is 0.47.  
Figure 1.4 - Tax collection in Peru by major components – 1998 to 2010 
 
As previously mentioned, 50 percent of the corporate income tax on mining and 
gas activities is automatically transferred to SNG by mandate of the canon law. This 
means that the tax that has grown most and has been most volatile during the past decade 
happens to also be the one on which the central government can only manage half of its 
collection. As a consequence, the central government loses fiscal room to maneuver in 
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order to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy, while SNG, especially LLGG, need to 
cope with large and volatile transfers that may create incentives to overspend in the 
expectation of even larger transfers from the central government.  
To summarize, two broad developments have characterized Peru’s latest 
decentralization effort: first, the creation of RRGG, along with the formal transfer of 
functions and programs, especially to RRGG, without a thorough estimation of the 
necessary resources to execute these functions and the associated transfer of funds. 
Second, and more important in terms of fiscal effect, the large increase in fragmentary 
transfers (mostly linked to mining and hydrocarbons) to those SNG, especially LLGG, 
from which the natural resources are extracted, without associated expenditure 
responsibilities other than the allocation to public investment.
7
 This dissertation will 
evaluate whether this second development has created fiscal risks in Peru.  
Leading research questions 
As shown in Chapter 2, the literature on decentralization has extensively theorized 
and documented the dangers on macroeconomic stability of large increases in transfers to 
SNG without clearly defined expenditure responsibilities. Are these dangers materializing 
in Peru? Are fiscal transfers a threat to macroeconomic stability?  
This is a question that has not been thoroughly explored for the case of Peru. As 
analyzed in Chapter 5, previous studies have focused on the quality of information of 
debt of LLGG (World Bank, 2006; and Moron, 2010); the determinants of fiscal results 
of LLGG (Moron, 2010); and the effect of transfers on LLGG own revenue collection 
                                                 
7
 This characterization of the evolution of Peru’s latest decentralization process is based on the analysis by 
Mendoza (2008).  
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(Alvarado, 2003; Aguilar and Morales, 2006; Rabanal and Melgarejo, 2006; Aragon and 
Galloso, 2006; Ruhling, 2008; Vega, 2008; Llempen and Velazquez, 2009; CAF, 2010; 
and Canavire-Bacarreza, Martínez-Vásquez and Sepúlveda, 2011). In contrast, the effect 
of transfers on expenditures of LLGG in Peru, through an assessment of the flypaper 
effect, has been relatively ignored: only Aragon (2009) analyzes the issue, although using 
information from 1998 to 2001, well prior to the recent surge in transfers. In turn, no 
study integrates these different dimensions through the assessment of the effect of 
transfers on macroeconomic stability.  
In this regard, there are two main channels through which the growth in transfers 
associated to natural resources can become a fiscal risk in Peru: (1) The reduction in the 
fiscal space of the central government to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy due to the 
higher participation of SNG in the public sector; and (2) The fiscal decisions of SNG in 
response to transfers in terms of own revenue collection and expenditure, which in turn 
affects their fiscal balance, accumulated savings and indebtedness, and may create the 
need to allocate increasing funds to them. 
With respect to the first channel, transfers to SNG between 2003 and 2010 have 
been growing at an annual rate that is 30 percent higher than that of central government 
tax collection (including customs) (17 percent vs. 13 percent on average per year, 
respectively), with almost all of the additional increase funneled to LLGG. This means 
that the share of expenditures of the central government in total expenditures of the 
general government (the latter defined as the addition of central, regional and local 
governments), should have been declining relative to the share of SNG during the past 
decade, and/or maintaining its size through debt financing. In either case this entails that 
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the central government has fewer tax resources at its disposal as a share of the general 
government, which decreases its room to maneuver to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy.  
This first channel will be analyzed through a descriptive analysis of the evolution 
of Peru’s general government, between 2001 and 2010. The main questions that will be 
assessed for the case of Peru are the following:  
1. Has the share of the central government in the general government spending 
been reduced between 2001 and 2010 in response to the surge in transfers to SNG?  
2. Has the size of the general government increased relative to GDP?  
This section provides a measure of the increase in the size of the public sector 
following the large increase in transfers to SNG. As will be seen, the size of the public 
sector has increased relative to gross domestic product (GDP), and the challenge for the 
central government is to continue contributing to address the goals of the decentralization 
process without increasing transfers in a manner that reduces much further its available 
resources for counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
The second channel through which transfers can become a fiscal risk for Peru 
refers to the response of SNG to the surge in transfers of the past decade. The analysis 
will focus on LLGG, rather than RRGG, mainly because transfers to LLGG grew much 
more than for RRGG; and LLGG are much more numerous and have more fiscal 
autonomy than RRGG, since they collect their own taxes, receive a larger share of 
transfers without earmarks, and control much more of their expenditures: this makes 
them more difficult to monitor, and hence riskier from a fiscal standpoint.  
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In particular, I will assess the following three questions:  
3. Have LLGG in aggregate worsen their fiscal position in response to the surge 
in transfers?  
This section will take advantage of the official classifications of LLGG according 
to size, needs and resources that the Government of Peru has introduced during the last 
few years, in order to describe the response of fiscal aggregates of municipalities (own 
resources, expenditures, fiscal balance, savings and indebtedness) to transfers. In 
particular, I will track the evolution of indicators of fiscal dependence of LLGG from 
transfers; the allocation of what is known is Peru as “ordinary resources” from the central 
government during the economic slowdown of 2009 according to the classification of 
municipalities by the amount of resources and main type of transfer they received; and 
the use that LLGG make of each source of income in current and capital expenditure.  
As will be seen, although the fiscal response of municipalities to transfers does 
not constitute an immediate threat to macroeconomic stability in Peru, it has increased the 
fiscal risks from the decentralization process due to the pro-cyclical response of LLGG 
expenditure to transfers. This response is partly disguised by the fact that the allocation of 
the mining canon since 2007 is made in the middle of the budget year, which gives little 
time to LLGG that receive large mining transfers to spend those funds within the same 
budget year. However, municipalities do react strongly to transfers, albeit with a lag for 
those that receive large transfers from mining canon, which puts pressure on the central 
government to maintain the flow of resources to LLGG in the event of a cyclical decline 
in transfers, which happened in 2009 and 2010 in the context of the international crisis.  
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4. Do LLGG reduce their fiscal effort in Peru in response to transfers in the form 
of a reduction in own revenue collection?  
This is a question that has been thoroughly studied in Peru, with inconclusive 
evidence. The issue is labeled “fiscal sloth” stemming from the assumption that local 
authorities reduce their effort to collect own revenues, in the form of local taxes and other 
own income, in response to the increase in transfers. The contribution of this dissertation 
is to focus on different categories of LLGG, to assess the problem of fiscal sloth in those 
municipalities where it matters most in terms of participation in total municipal own 
revenue collection. I will conduct a descriptive and econometric assessment of the effect 
of transfers on LLGG fiscal effort, comparing municipalities that received a surge in 
transfers, especially from natural resources, to those that did not.  
The results show that fiscal sloth is not a relevant problem in Peruvian 
municipalities. Indeed, there is evidence that LLGG that are main cities and receive more 
transfers increase their own tax collection in response to transfers, partly because a large 
proportion of grants linked to natural resources are earmarked to public investment, 
which gives LLGG an incentive to increase own resources to fund current expenditures.   
5. Do LLGG increase their expenditure substantially in response to transfers, 
exhibiting what is known as the flypaper effect? 
This section will analyze in depth the preliminary descriptive findings from 
question 3, assessing econometrically the response of LLGG expenditure to transfers and 
the existence of the flypaper effect. My main interest is to assess the reaction of 
expenditures to transfers according to the volume and type of transfers that LLGG 
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receive, to determine whether municipalities that received large transfers from natural 
resources increased their expenditures substantially in response to them.  
The results confirm the strong effect of transfers on municipal expenditure, with 
LLGG displaying a flypaper effect. In the case of municipalities in which the main source 
of transfers is linked to mining, the flypaper effect is present with one year lag. This is 
linked to the low budget execution in 2007, which in turn is explained by the high 
increase in mining transfers that year; the change in the allocation rules of the mining 
canon, which since 2007 is disbursed in a single installment in the middle of the budget 
year; and the renovation of mayors at the start of that year, with a low reelection rate, 
which entailed a learning curve for the newly elected authorities.  
As will be described in Chapter 5, the conventional wisdom in Peru is that local 
authorities do not spend enough of their budget. This perception is partly strengthened by 
the developments of 2007, which in turn led to a number of studies assessing the 
determinants of expenditure efficiency of LLGG in Peru, including Herrera and Francke 
(2007), Aragon and Casas (2008), and Loayza, Rigolini and Calvo (2011).  
This dissertation takes a different approach from those studies, building on the 
vast international literature on the flypaper effect and the link between decentralization 
and macroeconomic stability, to show that LLGG in Peru do respond strongly to 
transfers, albeit with a lag, especially in the case of municipalities with high transfers 
from mining. In turn, this creates a fiscal risk to the central government through the 
pressure to maintain a steady flow of transfers to SNG.   
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In terms of policy implications, the case of Peru provides lessons to improve its 
decentralization process and informs other countries that are evaluating to share the fiscal 
revenue from the development of natural resources among levels of government. This 
dissertation illustrates the consequences of sharing a high proportion of this rapidly 
growing and volatile fiscal revenue from the standpoint of macroeconomic stability, a 
decision that is intrinsically political but is very difficult to reverse once it is established. 
These consequences are informed by the literature on the “soft budget constraint” and can 
generate fiscal risks such as those that materialized in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia 
during the decade of 1990. Although not part of the empirical analysis, the dissertation 
also discusses the effects of the large increase in transfers from the standpoint of 
efficiency and equity, within the context of Peru’s current decentralization process.   
The policy recommendations highlight the importance of assessing and 
communicating the fiscal risks related to the recent surge in transfers. In this regard, there 
are a number of reforms that can be considered: 1. Improve the reports of budget 
execution of SNG, which are currently compared to the annual budgets including 
accumulated savings, hence stimulating higher spending; 2. Strengthen the capacity of 
the central government to monitor the compliance of fiscal rules by SNG according to 
their different characteristics, focusing on LLGG with high debt and high growth of 
transfers and expenditures; and 3. Modify the rules by which mining transfers are 
allocated to SNG during the budget cycle, in order to allow for better budget planning at 
the subnational level throughout the year.  
The next section will assess the state of the knowledge on the effect of transfers 
on macroeconomic stability.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
This section reviews the literature on the effect of transfers on macroeconomic 
stability, which in turn guides the evaluation of the case of Peru that provides the 
motivation for this dissertation. First it is necessary to clarify definitions on 
decentralization and an understanding of the main drivers of the process.  
What is decentralization? 
Decentralization can be broadly defined as the process of devolution of political, 
economic and administrative power from the central to the intermediate and local levels 
of government (Carranza and Tuesta, 2003). A key feature of a decentralized country is 
that SNG can make autonomous decisions (Baskaran, 2009), which usually entails that 
subnational authorities are elected by the citizens of their respective jurisdiction (World 
Bank, 1999). This is to be distinguished from a process of deconcentration, which is the 
redistribution of decision making among different levels within the central government; 
or delegation, which is the transfer of responsibilities and power from the central 
government to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central 
government but ultimately accountable to it (Prud’homme, 1995). In turn, countries can 
be defined as more or less decentralized depending on their position along the continuum 
of autonomous decisions that SNG can make (Baskaran, 2009).  
Fiscal decentralization in particular refers to the definition of responsibilities for 
revenues, transfers, expenditures, financial management and indebtedness among the 
different levels of government, including institutional management of inter-governmental 
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fiscal relationships (Carranza and Tuesta, 2003). Decentralization is often understood to 
describe both the process by which the central government transfers responsibilities to 
SNG; and the state that results in a decentralized system (Prud’homme, 1995). It is 
important to distinguish these two dimensions to understand the trade-offs of alternative 
sequences of a decentralization process, in order to approach the desired outcomes and 
avoid unwanted results (Bahl and Martínez-Vázquez, 2006). 
Why do countries decentralize? 
Decentralization is a complex and evolving process that is deeply intertwined 
with the history, cultural heritage and geography of each particular country (Stein, 1998; 
Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005). Hence, it is difficult to make generalizations about the 
drivers of this process. This said, during the past 35 years there has been a world-wide 
trend toward decentralization of government, which has gone hand in hand with 
processes of democratization. The main cases in point are the regions of LAC and the 
former Soviet bloc, which have moved toward decentralization during the last few 
decades, and happen to also be regions whose countries have been veering toward 
democratic systems of government.  
This trend, which is analyzed by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), typically implies 
that democratization tends to elicit at the subnational level demands for increased 
regional and local political autonomy. This leads to the creation of the institutions of 
decentralization, which entails the establishment of legitimate subnational authorities in 
laws and/or constitutional amendments. In turn, these authorities demand greater fiscal 
autonomy, increasing fiscal decentralization, which is usually measured as the proportion 
of subnational expenditure in total public expenditure. Also, countries that have 
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traditionally been federal tend to stay that way and even increase their own fiscal 
decentralization. Certainly this trend does not occur in every country, and other structural 
forces are also important to explain why countries decentralize. In this regard, income per 
capita, territorial size, population, the degree of ethnic fractionalization and a 
decentralized population are all positively correlated with higher fiscal decentralization 
(Oates, 1972; IADB, 1997; Panizza, 1999; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2005).  
Dimensions of analysis of decentralization 
From an institutional standpoint, decentralization brings elected officials closer to 
citizens, and is viewed as a way to improve governance through four main channels 
(Beasley, Faguet and Tommasi, 2003): (i) Reduction in power and interference of the 
central government; (ii) Making the public sector more accountable through increased 
transparency and oversight; (iii) Responding better to people’s needs; and (iv) Improving 
the targeting of public benefits to disadvantaged groups. Hence, decentralization works 
better, making government more effective and responsive, under conditions of openness, 
competition, transparency and strength of civil society. The threat is that when these 
conditions are not met, decentralization can foster the emergence of local ruling elites, 
patronage and corruption.  
In seeking to improve governance, decentralization changes the pattern of fiscal 
relations among levels of government, altering the incentives and accountability 
structures of politicians and public officials. This highlights the importance of an 
appropriate definition of intergovernmental fiscal relations as a condition for a successful 
decentralization initiative.  
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In turn, economists have traditionally evaluated decentralization using the three 
dimensions of public finance described by Bird (1999): allocative efficiency, 
distributional equity and macroeconomic stability. In this regard, it is through the channel 
of allocative efficiency that fiscal decentralization is expected to bring most welfare 
benefits. Indeed, the Decentralization Theorem introduced by Oates (1972) lays out the 
proposition that in the absence of economies of scale or inter-jurisdictional externalities, 
the decentralized provision of public goods and services will typically improve welfare 
relative to the central government, reflecting better the preferences and conditions of the 
citizens of the particular jurisdiction. The magnitude of these welfare gains depends on 
the heterogeneity in demands and costs across jurisdictions (Oates, 1999).  
In the cases of distributional equity and macroeconomic stability, however, the 
responsibility to conduct these dimensions should mainly be of the central government, 
which has the resources and coordination capacity to exercise them. In the first case, 
SNG are limited by the capacity of households to move. Hence, any subnational 
redistribution program may attract poor households and expel wealthy ones, making the 
program fiscally unattainable and generating inefficiencies. This said, the central 
government can improve redistribution in a decentralized country through the appropriate 
definition of a system of intergovernmental transfers that takes into account the 
differential fiscal capacity and expenditure needs of SNG.  
With respect to macroeconomic stability, SNG lack the capacity to conduct 
monetary and exchange rate policy, and due to their small and open nature any 
subnational fiscal stabilization package is likely to have spillover effects on other SNG, 
and likely would be most effective if coordinated with the central government, increasing 
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transaction costs (IADB, 1997; Oates, 1999). This implies that the central government 
should be the main entity responsible for macroeconomic stability and requires ample 
fiscal resources to conduct this function. Hence, intergovernmental transfers should be 
kept to the essential minimum to fund clearly defined expenditure responsibilities of 
SNG, plus any equalization system that is deemed necessary.  
On the other hand, when expenditures of SNG tend to be financed through their 
own taxes, then decentralization brings the taxpayer closer to expenditure decisions of 
their local authorities. This may result in a closer oversight of the allocation of funds and 
a more responsible fiscal behavior of subnational authorities (World Bank, 1999). 
Consequently, it is desirable that a process of fiscal decentralization fosters to the extent 
possible the fiscal autonomy of SNG.  
The above discussion brings to the fore the economic arguments for the 
assignment of expenditures and revenues among levels of government. In this regard 
there are two important considerations. One is the presence of externalities, which 
requires the assignment of public responsibilities to the level of government best able to 
internalize them: SNG should be responsible for all forms of spending that do not inflict 
an externality (Oates, 1972), which entails that they can assume a wide array of 
expenditure responsibilities.  
A second consideration refers to scale economies: some types of government 
activities might be organized at lower cost if they are undertaken on a larger scale. This 
applies to a number of expenditures, such as national defense, but it is particularly 
relevant for the assignment of revenues. Indeed, there are scale advantages to assign most 
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major taxes, with the exception of levies on immobile structures (land and property), to 
the central government.  
This often leads to a situation in which the expenditure responsibilities of SNG far 
outweigh their own taxes, creating what is called a vertical fiscal imbalance in SNG, or 
“pre-transfer fiscal deficits” (Ter-Minassian, 1997a). There are also horizontal 
imbalances, both because the capacity to collect own revenues differs across jurisdictions 
due to the distribution of tax bases; and also because SNG face different demand and cost 
pressures to meet their assigned expenditure responsibilities (Ter-Minassian, 1997a).  
The vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances are both important rationales for the 
creation of intergovernmental transfers. Another key argument for transfers is the 
implementation of centrally determined standards for public services. These objectives, 
however, can be conflicting: while imbalances are better targeted through lump-sum 
grants, central standards tend to be associated to conditionality. Hence, different 
combinations of grants tend to be used. Other goals of transfers include the correction of 
spillovers, and enhancement of tax effort and expenditure efficiency (Ahmad and Searle, 
2005). In general, a transfer system should set a clear mandate for the provision of 
services, giving adequate resources to SNG along with flexibility to make their own 
decisions, while being held accountable for results. The design should also be embedded 
of simplicity, objectivity and transparency (Bird, 1999).  
Following Ahmad and Searle (2005) the typology of transfers includes: (i) 
Revenue sharing, which is the distribution of central taxes among levels of government 
using pre-determined formulas. SNG tend to have autonomy in the use of these funds, 
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which are useful to correct vertical imbalances. (ii) Special purpose grants intend to 
follow planning objectives of the central government and correct spillovers. They can be 
open-ended (related to current expenditures), or close-ended (specific projects). These 
grants can be conditional and include matching requirements from SNG; they can reduce 
subnational accountability if they rely excessively on earmarks, and in developing 
countries they can be difficult to monitor due to poor local financial information. (iii) 
Equalization transfers are unconditional grants aimed at allowing SNG to provide access 
to comparable levels of public services. The best equalization method compensates for 
differential expenditure needs and revenue capacities of SNG, although it is intensive in 
information, making it difficult to implement in most developing countries.  
With respect to debt, allowing SNG to borrow has potential benefits, including the 
possibility of expanding their capacity to provide infrastructure projects at the 
subnational level, and deepening the domestic capital market at the national level. 
However, this requires strict monitoring and control from the central government in order 
to avoid potential financial difficulties of SNG that may induce costly bail-outs from 
national taxpayers. In this regard, as shown by Singh and Plekhanov (2005), the control 
from the central government should increase with the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance 
of SNG, given that an increasing proportion of the resources that will be used to repay the 
local debt will come from national taxpayers.  
The capacity of the central government to monitor and control SNG indebtedness 
can often be impaired by the poor quality of fiscal information at the subnational level 
(Bird, 1999). Indeed, the implementation of an IFAS in SNG tends to be scarce and 
costly (Tanzi, 2002; Parry, 2007); financial statements of SNG are usually not 
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comprehensive (Parry, 2007; Ahmad, Albino-War and Singh, 2005); the structure of 
public accounts among levels of government is rarely uniform; and in many developing 
countries they are not audited regularly and properly (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). 
Hence, the central government should also consider the imposition of certain standards of 
fiscal transparency when allowing SNG to borrow.  
The potential costs of fiscal decentralization may arise from multiple reasons that 
are mainly related to weaknesses in the political framework of SNG and the coordination 
of inter-governmental relationships, as well as a sequencing of the decentralization of 
responsibilities to SNG that does not take into account sound institutional and economic 
principles. For example, the lack of appropriate subnational governance mechanisms may 
induce SNG authorities to benefit interest groups instead of local society at large, 
fostering corruption and an inefficient allocation of resources. Also, a poorly designed 
transfer system may accentuate fiscal disparities among SNG, contributing to a widening 
economic gap that could lead to inefficient internal migration. Below I explore the 
potential costs of decentralization in terms of macroeconomic stability.  
Decentralization and macroeconomic stability – Literature review 
The relationship between decentralization and macroeconomic stability has 
attracted broad attention during the last few decades due to the fiscal crises elicited by 
SNG in a number of countries, including in LAC the cases of Argentina, Brasil and 
Colombia. If poorly conducted, decentralization can generate fiscal imbalances in SNG 
that may force the central government to step in, worsening the national fiscal stance in 
the short run and expanding the size of the State in the long run. The key features of this 
dimension are related to the autonomy of SNG, or their capacity to fund their 
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expenditures with their own taxes; the link between transfers and clearly defined 
expenditure responsibilities associated to them; and the debt autonomy of SNG.  
Conceptually, when local expenditures are mostly financed by local taxation there 
is a clear link between the taxpayer and the spending decisions of the local authority. 
Arguably this leads to increased control, eliciting a size of the decentralized public sector 
that closely matches citizens’ preferences (World Bank, 1999). Also, in a context of high 
population mobility, tax autonomy of SNG elicits competition among jurisdictions, which 
also restricts their size (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980).  
On the other hand, when expenditures of SNG are mostly financed by transfers, 
the high vertical fiscal imbalance may create the following problems:  
1. Since SNG expenditures are largely funded by other jurisdictions, citizens have 
less incentive to control their local authorities; and the central government tends to have 
incomplete information about the use of transfers by SNG. Both situations describe 
principal-agent problems that may stimulate SNG to allocate resources in an inefficient 
manner;  
2. The effect of subnational tax competition is weaker, since local taxes fund only 
a small fraction of SNG expenditure;  
3. Common pool problems may emerge, since each individual jurisdiction has 
incentives to be financed out of the taxes paid by other SNG, increasing expenditures 
beyond their budget constraint in the expectation of additional transfers. This is a version 
of the “soft budget constraint” problem, a concept introduced by Kornai (1979) with 
reference to state-owned companies in the former Soviet bloc (Vigneault, 2005).  
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Hence, high dependence on transfers may lead to soft budget constraints at the 
subnational level, creating fiscal imbalances and/or expanding the size of the public 
sector (Rodden, 2003). This is stimulated, among other factors, if SNG also have high 
debt autonomy (Rodden, 2002); expenditure functions are loosely defined; there is lack 
of transparency with regard to fiscal aggregates of SNG (Bordignon, 2000); the central 
government allocates discretionary transfers; and there is a history of financial bailouts 
by the central government (Stein, 1998).  
These theoretical predictions have been confirmed in a number of empirical 
studies. World Bank (1999) finds that when expenditure decentralization is financed 
through intergovernmental transfers it leads to an increase in the size of the State, while 
when it is funded by own taxes of SNG it reduces it. Moreover, when transfers to SNG 
grow fast, expenditures of SNG tend to grow equally fast, which may generate fiscal 
deficits at the subnational level that are covered by the central government, contributing 
in the short term to macroeconomic instability.  
This does not mean that transfers are inherently bad or should only be a small 
fraction of subnational expenditures. All over the world many SNG have low fiscal 
capacity and can only provide local goods and services through a generous provision of 
transfers. Indeed, Australia is a good example of a country where SNG have large vertical 
fiscal imbalances without this generating macroeconomic instability. But transfers in 
Australia are allocated to clearly defined expenditure functions; borrowing of SNG is 
strictly controlled; and the central government enforces its no-bail-out decision, 
minimizing the incentive problems previously described.   
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In a study focused on LAC countries, Stein (1998) shows that the combination of 
a high vertical fiscal imbalance, discretionary transfers from the central government and 
borrowing autonomy of SNG leads to a larger public sector. The existence of 
discretionary transfers allows the central government to bail out or increase transfers to 
SNG that already have a relatively higher vertical fiscal imbalance. In turn, Rodden 
(2003) also finds for a large and diverse sample of countries that when decentralization is 
funded by local resources, it retards the growth of government; while if it is funded by 
transfers, it leads to faster growth in overall government spending. He also tests for his 
sample the reaction of expenditures to transfers at the subnational level, and finds that it 
is close to 1, meaning that SNG spend virtually every dollar of increased transfers. 
The flypaper effect 
This last finding by Rodden (2003) is a well-studied empirical regularity labeled 
the “flypaper effect” by economist Arthur Okun, since the money that the central 
government sends out, “sticks where it hits” (Hines and Thaler, 1995). Indeed, as 
mentioned by Heyndels and Van Driessche (2002), “how LLGG respond to grant 
windfalls is without any doubt the most analyzed empirical issue in fiscal federalism”.  
Empirical studies of the flypaper effect are based on the median voter model, 
which assumes that the median voter is representative of the community at large, and a 
SNG reflects the preferences of that community. This model, developed by Bradford and 
Oates (1971), predicts that general lump-sum grants have similar (or the same) 
stimulatory effects on SNG spending as an equivalent rise in income in the community. 
This traditional result is depicted in Figure 2.1, taken from Bailey and Connolly (1998), 
which maps the preferences of the median voter between two alternatives, private and 
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public goods. A general lump-sum grant of CD received by the local government shifts 
the budget line from AC (pre-grant) to BD (post-grant), the equilibrium shifting from e1 
to e2. An equivalent increase in the disposable income, equal to AB, of the median voter 
would have the same result as a lump-sum general grant of the same amount. This is 
known as the “equivalence theorem”, since it would also yield the budget line BD with 
equilibrium again at e2 (assuming normal goods). 
















However, the empirical evidence contradicts this theoretical result: there is a large 
difference between the stimulatory effects of an unconditional general lump-sum grant 
and an equivalent increase in individuals’ incomes. Given dE/dG as the rate of change of 
expenditure relative to the rate of change of grants, in the ten papers surveyed by Bailey 
and Connolly (1998) this measure has a wide disparity, varying between 0.25 and 1.00; 
but increases in individuals’ incomes yield the measure dE/dI (where I represents 
income) between 0.05 and 0.10. This result is systematic evidence of the flypaper effect.  
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Source: taken from Bailey and Connolly (1998) 
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In Figure 2.1, ICP represents the income consumption path showing the locus of 
consumption choices arising from the increase in median voter income. However, GCP 
(the grant consumption path) represents the empirical result where receipt of a lump-sum 
grant has a greater stimulatory effect on local government spending than an equivalent 
increase in median voter income, x3 being greater than x2. As mentioned by Bailey and 
Connolly (1998) “a flypaper effect occurs as long as GCP lies below ICP”. 
Most surveys of the flypaper effect focus on possible errors in empirical studies 
and alternative explanations of the phenomenon. With regard to the former, there are 
three main types of errors (Bailey and Connolly, 1998): 1. Misspecification of the type of 
grant; this may be the case with an open-ended matching grant, which has a larger 
stimulatory impact because it also includes a substitution effect (Chernick, 1979). There 
is also a form of endogeneity with this type of transfer, since the amount of the grant 
awarded depends on the grantee’s level of expenditure. 2. Use of an inappropriate 
functional form; using a linear, rather than a logarithmic, functional form may inflate the 
spending response to grants (Becker, 1996). 3. Use of inappropriate or omission of 
appropriate variables; an important variable that is frequently excluded is the 
characteristics of the population, since a given level of service can be achieved using less 
resources for some communities than for others. Two other potentially relevant omitted 
variables are local government’s savings ratio (if SNG save, they overestimate municipal 
expenditures, and hence the flypaper effect), and expenditure on private sector 
alternatives: substantial alternative private sector provision could lead to lower demand 
for public sector provision.  
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Even correcting for these types of errors the flypaper effect persists. There are 
many alternative explanations that try to explain it, but according to Bailey and Connolly 
(1998) …“no single one of them has been verified both theoretically and empirically”. 
As mentioned by Oates (2008), the flypaper effect suggests that the response of public 
officials to the will of the local electorate may not be as straightforward as indicated by 
the median-voter model.  
An interesting explanation of the phenomenon that fits well with the structure of 
incentives in public organizations is that officials have their own set of objectives, 
including the pursuit of budget maximization, which encourages them to spend during the 
budget cycle all the funds they have (Niskanen, 1971). This may be reinforced by the 
yardsticks used by public opinion to judge the performance of public organizations. 
Indeed, in the case of Peru, perhaps the most important measure presented by central 
government authorities, members of Congress and the press to judge the performance of 
SNG is the fraction of budget execution relative to all available resources.  
Another group of explanations relies on the social costs of distortionary taxation. 
Vegh and Vuletin (2011) show that an increase in private income leads to a greater 
demand for both public and private spending; but since public spending requires larger 
tax revenues, which can only be raised by increasing the tax rate, the latter distorts 
private sector´s consumption choices; whereas an increase in transfers provides the 
government with a source of income that is distortion-free. Hence, an increase in 
transfers leads to higher spending than the same increase in private income. The authors 
predict a positive correlation between the flypaper effect and the level of the tax rate, and 
confirm this prediction for a dataset of Argentine provinces and 28 American cities.    
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Notwithstanding the multiple theoretical explanations for the existence of the 
flypaper effect, this is a pervasive phenomenon that, in the words of Rodden (2003), 
“…leads SNG to spend virtually every dollar of increased transfers”. Most studies on the 
flypaper effect focus on alternative theoretical explanations of its occurrence, and/or 
document the phenomenon empirically. However, fewer papers connect the effect 
directly to its implications in terms of macroeconomic stability. Rodden (2003) is a 
notable exception: he shows that the flypaper effect contributes to create macroeconomic 
instability and/or expand the size of the public sector when transfers grow rapidly and 
represent the main source of revenue of SNG. However, he utilizes an international panel 
data that precludes specific country case-studies. In turn, Melo (2002) conducts an 
analysis for Colombia and finds that the flypaper effect is present in levels of high 
vertical fiscal imbalance. She also shows that when transfers fall, SNG expenditures also 
fall when the main source of local revenue comes from own taxes, but they do not fall 
when local income is highly dependent on transfers.  
For the purpose of this dissertation, there are three main questions associated to 
the flypaper effect that have important effects on macroeconomic stability:  
1. Does the central government decrease own expenditures in response to higher 
transfers? The evidence presented in the empirical studies shows that the size of the 
public sector tends to expand, which is frequently due to the fact that the central 
government does not reduce expenditures or even expands them in response to the 
increase in outlays of SNG. This is especially the case when additional transfers to SNG 
are not associated to clearly defined expenditure responsibilities. As shall be seen below, 
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transfers linked to the fiscal revenue from natural resources tend to fall into this category, 
which suggests that they may stimulate an increase in the size of the public sector.  
2. Do SNG decrease own taxes in response to an increase in transfers, a 
phenomenon labeled “fiscal sloth”? As shown by World Bank (1999), the evidence on 
this topic is inconclusive, and the problem may not be as relevant as the response of 
expenditures to transfers, especially in those cases in which SNG have low fiscal capacity 
and own taxation is already low even before large increases in transfers. However, it is to 
be expected that if there is a manifestation of the flypaper effect there is no fiscal sloth, 
and vice versa. On one hand, if there is a strong response of expenditures to transfers 
(flypaper effect), it is likely that a subnational government will expand own taxation in 
order to fund their demand for additional expenditures. On the other hand, if there is not a 
strong response of expenditures to transfers (absence of the flypaper effect), it may be 
revealing that the subnational government does not have a high demand for additional 
expenditures, which means that fiscal sloth is more likely to occur.   
3. Is the response of expenditures symmetric, meaning that decreases in transfers 
induce similar decreases in expenditures? From a theoretical perspective and building on 
the incentive arguments laid out before, one would expect the flypaper effect to operate 
symmetrically if SNG operate under a hard budget constraint, meaning that the threat of 
the central government not to bail out jurisdictions under fiscal stress is credible. In turn, 
as previously mentioned, a hard budget constraint is more credible if the vertical fiscal 
imbalance is not large, discretionary transfers are negligible, debt of SNG is strictly 
controlled and bail out episodes are exceptional.  
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Decentralization of fiscal revenue from natural resources 
The decentralization of fiscal revenue from natural resources (here I refer to 
extractive industries) among levels of government is a politically controversial issue that 
can further complicate macroeconomic stability. It usually entails the assignment of a 
fraction or all of the fiscal revenue from the development of natural resources to SNG on 
a devolution basis, meaning that the revenue is allocated to those jurisdictions from 
where the resources are extracted.  
The strongest economic argument for this sort of allocation refers to the need to 
compensate for the negative social and environmental externalities inflicted by the 
extractive industries on the resource-rich jurisdiction. It can also be justified in order to 
build the necessary public infrastructure to facilitate the operation of extractive industries, 
such as transportation, energy and telecommunications (Bahl, 2002).  
As mentioned by Bahl (2002), other arguments in favor of this type of transfers 
tend to be political. There is the “heritage” argument, by which the resource-rich 
jurisdiction should be compensated for the extraction from its soil of a non-renewable 
resource. A relevant question with this argument is whether the resource is of the 
particular jurisdiction or of the whole nation; moreover, the definition of how much of 
the fiscal revenue should return to the producing region is inherently debatable. Another 
related argument is to maintain political and national unity: in those countries in which 
resource-rich SNG have high autonomy and/or culturally diverse communities, the 
devolution of fiscal revenue from the development of natural resources may be the 
necessary price to pay in order to maintain the country together. This is the case of 
countries like Russia, Indonesia and Nigeria, among other. Lastly, in federal or large 
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unitary countries this type of transfer is the second-best solution in order to avoid the 
creation of own taxes on natural resources by SNG, which can increase distortions and 
preclude private investment.  
On the other hand, there are clear economic arguments against natural resource-
based transfers:  
1. Taxes on natural resources tend to be the most volatile of all revenue sources, 
and the central government is much better equipped to cope with this high volatility, 
since it has more revenue sources than SNG and it can take larger amounts of debt to 
smooth expenditures throughout the economic cycle;  
2. The decentralization of this type of revenue takes away from the central 
government an important source of tax collection, which reduces its room to maneuver to 
conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy; in turn, this may lead to the creation of additional 
national taxes. In addition, as described earlier, the higher vertical fiscal imbalance of 
SNG that are recipient of this type of transfer stimulates soft budget constraints. Both 
avenues tend to create macroeconomic instabilities in the short term and increase the size 
of the public sector in the long run;  
3. Since most natural resources tend to be based in geographically concentrated 
areas, these types of transfers exacerbate inequalities and fiscal disparities, which may 
lead to inter-jurisdictional conflicts; they also put pressure on the central government to 
compensate non-recipient SNG, which may create further macroeconomic imbalances 
and stimulate a bigger size of the public sector;  
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4. From an allocative efficiency standpoint, the transfer of large resources to SNG 
without clearly defined expenditure responsibilities and governance mechanisms can lead 
to corruption and/or the allocation of funds to projects with low social return.  
In this regard, Mc Lure (2003) mentions that if SNG were to choose “behind the 
veil of ignorance”, without knowing the allocation of natural resources among them, a 
central collection and distribution of oil revenues would be optimal. But once the veil is 
lifted and everyone knows its allocation, those regions with more resources will demand 
a large share of revenues. This is indeed what happened in countries such as Argentina, 
Colombia and Peru during the 1990s: in the context of constitutional reforms, SNG 
pushed politically and managed to include their rights to rents from natural resources in 
the Constitution itself (Brosio, 2003).  
Hence, although it tends to be politically unfeasible, from a macroeconomic 
perspective the most desirable arrangement is centralization of net natural resource 
revenue (after compensation for negative environmental and social externalities), 
assigning other tax bases to SNG and a transfer system that addresses the goals of fiscal 
decentralization (Ahmad and Mottu, 2002). An alternative is to assign a small fraction of 
natural resource bases to producing SNG, with safeguards to deal with their inherent 
volatility. The least preferred scheme is revenue sharing of natural resources: as 
mentioned before, it complicates macroeconomic management by taking away large 
amounts of revenue from the central government; and it does not provide stable financing 
to SNG, since it transmits to them the inherent volatility of those revenues. It also does 
not diffuse separatism, since producing regions can do better by keeping all revenues.  
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Ahmad and Mottu (2002) classify arrangements of natural resource revenue 
assignment into four categories, depending on whether the country is unitary or federal. 
Small unitary countries tend to centralize revenues, often because LLGG do not have 
important expenditure responsibilities. Large unitary states (such as Colombia, Indonesia 
and Peru) tend to be more pressed to share revenues with SNG, which leads to difficulties 
in terms of macroeconomic management. The same issues arise in federal countries such 
as Nigeria, where oil revenue is transferred through highly volatile revenue-sharing 
arrangements, leading to major fiscal management problems that these governments 
cannot address for lack of alternative revenue bases. Large federal countries such as 
Canada and the United States assign oil tax bases to SNG (overlapping with the federal 
government), instead of sharing oil revenue collected centrally. This tax assignment, if 
properly controlled in order to preclude disincentives for private investment, may create 
more accountability for SNG, while revenue disparities among regions may be addressed, 
as in Canada, through an equalization transfer system.  
In turn, with respect to the vertical allocation of fiscal revenue between the central 
government and SNG, World Bank (2010) makes the distinction between “oil 
economies” and “economies with oil”, relative to the contribution of the extractive sector 
to the economy. It asserts that in those countries where the contribution of the sector to 
the economy is small (“economies with oil”), the share of the revenue by SNG can be 
larger, since the arguments against decentralization of that rent have less importance. 
Australia is a case in point, where the public rent from natural resources is relatively low 
as a fraction of GDP, and the participation of SNG in this rent is relatively high. On the 
other hand, in countries where the importance of the sector in the economy is large (“oil 
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economies”), the participation of SNG in this rent should be smaller. An example is 
Venezuela, where the public income from oil is large and also highly centralized.  
In this regard there can be a problem of time-consistency with a legal framework 
that shares fiscal revenue from natural resources among levels of government, since it 
may be enacted in a period in which the importance of the extractive industry in the 
economy is low, leading national policy makers to accept a high share of SNG in this 
revenue. However, once the importance of this industry increases, as has happened in a 
number of countries due to the commodity boom of the last decade (including Peru), it 
becomes politically difficult to change the legislation, leaving the central government to 
cope with the drawbacks of sharing with SNG a large fraction of the fiscal revenuefrom 
natural resources.  
There are few international studies that compare the allocation of fiscal revenue 
from natural resources across levels of government. One of them is Morgandi (2008), 
who analyses the issue in 7 countries that are rich in natural resources: Nigeria, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Mexico. The average fiscal rent that 
was shared with SNG in those seven countries, using information for 2006 and 2007, was 
33 percent, which is much less that what was shared in Peru in 2010, which reached 57 
percent. Noteworthy, Bolivia and Brazil, which are neighbor countries of Peru, are the 
only countries in the sample that shared with SNG a higher proportion than Peru (63 and 
69 percent, respectively).     
Similar to the flypaper effect, there is little empirical literature on the relationship 
between decentralization of fiscal revenue from extractive industries and macroeconomic 
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stability. This is surprising, considering that in many countries transfers based on natural 
resources to SNG have been growing significantly during the past decade as a 
consequence of both an increasing world-wide trend in decentralization of government 
and the boom in commodity-based industries. The relative lack of research on this 
relationship may be partly attributed to the fact that the extraordinary growth of this type 
of transfer is a recent phenomenon.  
Linking to the arguments laid out above, the high growth of natural resource 
based transfers to SNG without clearly defined expenditure responsibilities, other than 
their allocation to public investment, may elicit a flypaper effect at the subnational level. 
In turn, the volatility of this type of transfers may induce soft budget constraints, 
especially when SNG have a high vertical fiscal imbalance, low capacity to collect own 
revenue, debt autonomy, there are previous bail-out episodes, and the central government 
can allocate a significant amount of discretionary transfers. This risk is highlighted in 
ECLAC (2009) in the context of the exposure of subnational finances in LAC to the 
world recession of 2009, with special reference to the cases of Bolivia and Peru.  
Brosio and Jimenez (2010) suggest that the earmark of this type of transfer to 
public investment makes it less prone to generate soft budget constraints, since capital 
expenditure is a relatively flexible component of outlays that SNG can adjust downward 
in the event of a reduction in grants. However, assuming the existence of a flypaper 
effect, there is still risk of a soft budget constraint if some of the conditions that lead to it 
are in place. Moreover, the central government may yield to the pressure from SNG to 
maintain or increase the overall level of transfers in the event of a reduction in natural 
resources based grants for a number of reasons, including: 1. Political negotiations in 
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responsive arenas, such as the National Congress; 2. Allocation by SNG of all income not 
related to natural resources to current expenditure, thus increasing their dependence on a 
steady flow of grants; and 3. Need of higher resources by SNG to operate and maintain 
any investments made with transfers based on extractive industries.  
 
Having discussed the current understanding of the link between decentralization 
and macroeconomic stability, with particular reference to the case of decentralization of 
fiscal revenue from natural resources, in the next section I turn to an explanation of the 
key features of the latest fiscal decentralization process of Peru, which is the case study 
for this dissertation.  
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Chapter 3: Key features of Peru’s latest fiscal decentralization 
process 
 
As described in the introduction, Peru is a unitary country in which the 
participation of SNG in the public sector has traditionally been small relative to the LAC-
7 countries, with the exception of Chile. This traditional centralization of government 
started to change in 2001, when the more open democratic environment that followed the 
resignation of President Alberto Fujimori (July 1990 to November 2000) fostered 
demands for increased subnational autonomy. At that time there was a broad political 
consensus to increase the decentralization of government, and the issue is prominently 
included in the “National Accord”, subscribed in March 2002 by Peruvian’s most 
important political parties, which consists of 31 State policies that serve as a guideline for 
the country’s sustainable development and to strengthen its democratic governance.
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The main political push of the decentralization process occurred between 2001 
and 2004, when most of the legal framework that serves as its roadmap was enacted. 
Table A1.2 in Annex 1 summarizes all its salient legal features. In order to lead the 
implementation of the decentralization process, the “Bases of decentralization” Law of 
July 2002 created a “National Council for Decentralization” (NCD) as a central 
government agency with cabinet rank, overseen by representatives from the local, 
regional and central levels of government. The NCD was eventually dissolved in 
December 2006, during the second Administration of President Alan García (2006 to 
2011), and its functions were transferred to a newly created “Decentralization 
                                                 
8
 More reference to the “National Accord” can be found at its website: http://www.acuerdonacional.pe/.  
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Secretariat”, within the Ministerial Council Presidency (PCM in Spanish). This decision 
has been interpreted to have lowered the priority of decentralization in the public agenda 
(see for example PRODES, 2007 and Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana, GPC, 2008).  
Initial focus on Regional Governments 
One of the salient characteristics of the process was a Constitutional Reform in 
March 2002 that created a popularly elected intermediate level of government, the 
“Regional Governments” (RRGG), in the geographic space of the 26 historic departments 
of Peru. The RRGG were established over the administrative structure of what were until 
then the “Transitory Counsels of Regional Administration” (CTAR after their name in 
Spanish), which had been functioning since 1992 as de-concentrated units of the central 
government. The first election of “regional presidents” took place in December 2002. The 
term in office of Regional Presidents lasts four years, and they can run for reelection. 
This is similar for LLGG, and the regional elections have coincided with local elections 
in 2002, 2006 and 2010.  
This Constitutional Reform not only created the RRGG, but it also introduced a 
second intermediate level of government, which is the “Regions”. Each region is 
supposed to be formed by the integration of two or more neighboring RRGG, by means 
of a referendum of the citizens of the involved departments. The creation of regions has 
long been an aspiration of Peru’s policymakers, mainly as a way to gain economic 
efficiency and sustainability through economies of scale in the administration of the 
country’s territory. Indeed, as a precedent to the current decentralization process, the first 
Administration of President Alan García (1985 to 1990) enacted a “Regionalization Law” 
in 1988 that created twelve regions based on the forced integration of the existing 24 
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departments of the interior of the country. The Fujimori Administration eventually 
dissolved these regions in 1992 and established the CTAR over the space of the historic 
departments of Peru.  
Between 2002 and 2004 the successive laws defined a number of incentives for 
the formation of regions. Noteworthy, the “Fiscal Decentralization Decree-Law” of 
February 2004 mentions that upon the formation of any region, it would receive 50 
percent of national taxes collected in its territory.
9
 However, the law also states that 
transferred taxes would substitute the grants that RRGG were already receiving, and 
RRGG cannot receive more taxes than those necessary to comply with their expenditure 
functions. Additionally, the “Incentives for the Integration and Formation of Regions 
Law” of April 2004 provides the guidelines for the formation of regions and adds 
incentives for their formation, including additional transfers from the central government, 
preference for international loans, increased fiscal space for internal credits, and 
procurement incentives for businesses located in the RRGG to be integrated, among 
other.  
In October 2005 a referendum was conducted in Peru’s 16 departments that had 
submitted proposals to integrate into 5 different regions. In 15 of these departments the 
population voted against these proposals (in many of them by a large margin), thus 
preventing the formation of any region. This result is partially explained by the fact that 
the regional presidents did not have incentives aligned with the formation of regions, 
since it would entail the elimination of at least one of the RRGG in order to create the 
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 Each region would also receive additional income if it adopted tax administration measures, in 




government of the newly formed region. A second referendum was scheduled to be held 
in 2009, but it was postponed due to the lack of proposals from the departments. Since 
the decentralization roadmap had as one of its central tenets the formation of regions, this 
outcome represented an important setback for the process. 
The creation of RRGG was accompanied by the enactment in November 2002 of 
the “Organic Law of RRGG”, which defines the characteristics and functions of RRGG. 
This includes an exhaustive list of 185 expenditure functions in the fields of agriculture, 
transport, health and education, among other, along with guidelines for the progressive 
annual transfer of these functions from the central government through an “accreditation” 
process. Since the RRGG were established over the administrative structure of the 
CTAR, many of these expenditure functions were already being exercised when the first 
regional presidents took office in January 2003. However, some of these functions were 
new and/or entailed the transfer of additional financial and administrative resources in 
order to be adequately performed.  
Hence, the central government enacted an “Accreditation System Law” in June 
2004, which intended to certify and strengthen the capacities of SNG to exercise their 
functions and programs, with special attention to RRGG. In spite of some efforts from the 
central government until 2006 to comply with the certification requirements, the process 
has tended to be a validation of the functions that the RRGG were already exercising 
when they were CTAR, with little additional resources or capacity strengthening 
(Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). Moreover, a number of functions of RRGG are shared 
with the central and local levels of government, which has led to overlap and 
inefficiency, especially with respect to public investment.  
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On the revenue front, the Organic Law of RRGG states that a Fiscal 
Decentralization Law would be proposed, which would include the roadmap for the 
transfer of taxes to RRGG within an integral tax reform. Indeed, the “Fiscal 
Decentralization Decree-Law” was enacted in February 2004, although instead of setting 
a roadmap for the transfer of taxes to RRGG, it established that upon the formation of 
regions, each of them would receive 50 percent of central government taxes collected in 
their territory. Since no regions have been created yet, RRGG do not have own sources of 
revenue, except for some fees-for-service that have historically collected around 3 
percent of their total income.  
Hence, the fiscal characteristics of RRGG have not changed dramatically relative 
to the CTAR since their creation in 2002. Almost all of their resources are transferred 
from the central government, and nearly 70 percent of them are earmarked for current 
expenditure, mostly to fund salaries in education and health (see Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1). 
Additionally, regional presidents have little control over their current expenditure, which 
is still largely defined by the central government, with marginal changes with respect to 
the scheme that prevailed with the de-concentrated CTAR.  
RRGG do have more autonomy with respect to public investment, especially 
since 2007, when a national law was passed that decentralized the evaluation and 
approval of public investment projects to SNG. In this regard, a number of important 
investment projects that were being carried out by the central government were 
decentralized to RRGG; and transfers earmarked for public investment have increased 
substantially since 2004, especially those related to natural resources (see Figure 1.2 in 
Chapter 1), in spite of the fact that RRGG receive a smaller proportion of these types of 
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transfers than LLGG. However, the autonomy of regional authorities with respect to 
public investment is somewhat restrained by the existence since 2003 of the process of 
“participatory budgeting”, by which organized civil society participates in the definition 
of priorities for investment, both at the regional and local level of government. In a 
number of RRGG this process of participatory budgeting has been dominated by LLGG, 
which have been successful at extracting resources for their respective jurisdictions, at 
the expense of projects with a regional scope.  
Finally, since almost all the resources of RRGG are transferred by the central 
government, the former have little debt autonomy. Indeed, only a few RRGG have been 
able to obtain loans, using future transfers for repayment, with heavy involvement of the 
central government as guarantor and in the definition of the terms and conditions of 
credits.  
Developments with LLGG 
Given that the effort of the decentralization process centered during its initial 
years on the creation of RRGG and the formation of regions, the local level of 
government received relatively less attention. LLGG have a longer tradition than RRGG 
in Peruvian history as autonomous entities. Indeed, there have been popular elections for 
local authorities since 1981, following the return of democracy. A feature of Peru’s 
municipalities is their division into two levels: “Provinces” and “Districts”. This 
separation has its origins in the Constitution of 1823, only two years after the country’s 
independence, and it is based on the French model of local government organization. 
Provinces are larger units within a region, each of which includes a provincial capital and 
several districts. The provincial government has jurisdiction over the whole province, 
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exercising functions that comprise the geographic space of several districts, and also over 
the provincial capital, where it operates as another district. In turn, each district exercises 
functions over its smaller surface within each province. By the end of 2010 Peru had 
1834 LLGG, divided into 195 provinces and 1639 districts.
10
  
Peru is the country with most LLGG relative to its population of the LAC-7 
countries (Vega, 2008). It had in 2010 an average of 16,064 inhabitants per municipality, 
and the median population is much lower with 4,501 inhabitants per LLGG. This 
relatively high fragmentation allows on one hand a closer proximity to citizens’ needs 
and demands, which is an important goal of decentralization; on the other hand, however, 
it generates too many small administrative units that lack the resources and capacity to 
provide appropriate local public goods and services.  
This is a particular concern in urban areas, which tend to be administered by one 
or even two provinces with a variable number of districts, each of which has 
responsibility for the collection of their own municipal taxes, including the property tax. 
As an example, the city of Lima, which is the country’s capital, is administered by the 
Provincial Municipality of Lima, alongside 42 other districts. The urban area of Lima, in 
turn, is linked to the Provincial Municipality of El Callao, which has 5 additional 
districts. This multiplicity of administrative units in urban areas is also prevalent in the 
cities in the interior of the country, creating coordination problems in the management of 
public works that intend to benefit the whole urban area. It also limits the fiscal capacity 
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 There is another local level of government named “populated centers”, but by the end of 2010 there were 
only 8 of them in the country.  
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of the provincial government and each individual district, since they cannot seize 
economies of scale in the administration of local taxes.  
In this respect, similar to the goal of regionalization, the Peruvian decentralization 
process also intends to gain efficiencies through the integration of LLGG. The legislation 
on this front emerged after the initial efforts of regionalization. Hence, in May 2007 the 
central government enacted the “Promotion for the merging of municipal districts Law” 
and the “Municipal mancommunity Law”. The former gives fiscal incentives through 
additional transfers for the merging of small districts that do not comply with the 
minimum population requirements of the “Territorial organization and demarcation Law” 
of July 2002.
11
 In spite of these fiscal incentives, so far there has not been any merging of 
districts, partly due to the same reason why RRGG have not merged into regions: 
incumbent authorities have no political incentive to give up their positions.  
The “Municipal mancommunity Law” promotes the cooperation of two or more 
LLGG in the execution of public investment projects (PIP) and the provision of services. 
Since the law’s enactment over 200 LLGG have joined efforts forming more than 40 
municipal mancommunities with a variety of goals. However, there are still pending 
reforms in the budget, procurement and investment systems to expedite the execution of 
resources through this mechanism (Pro Decentralization, 2010).  
Different to RRGG, LLGG have their own sources of revenue, which are mainly 
municipal taxes and fee-for-services. These resources provide an important fraction of 
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 Pro Decentralization (2009) shows that according to Peru´s 2007 population census, 48.8% of all LLGG 
should be merged because they do not comply with the minimum population requirement set in the 
“Territorial Organization and Demarcation Law”.   
56 
 
total income in many LLGG, especially in urban areas, albeit the fiscal restrictions due to 
the high municipal fragmentation previously described. Table A1.4 in Annex 1 
summarizes the characteristics of the most important taxes and fees of LLGG. The legal 
framework for municipal taxation has remained largely the same since the enactment of 
the “Municipal Tax Law” in 1993. The current decentralization process has not tackled 
yet the issue of municipal taxation, even though there is room to improve the design of 
local taxes in order to increase municipal own revenue.  
Under the current framework LLGG do not have any legal capacity to modify tax 
rates and/or the tax base (for example, valuation of properties); they only control tax 
administration. In this regard, an institutional innovation of a number of urban LLGG has 
been the creation of “Tax Administration Services” (SAT, after their name in Spanish), 
which are semi-autonomous tax administration agencies that obtain operating revenue 
from a fraction of their tax collection. The SAT also has some degree of administrative 
autonomy, allowing it to keep a stable bureaucracy, which tends to be better paid than 
other municipal employees. The Municipality of Lima created the first SAT of Peru in 
April 1996, and 8 other cities have followed thereafter. Evaluation studies suggest that 
cities with SAT have better tax collection performance than comparable cities without 
SAT (DIE, 2009). 
As a recent development, Peru’s Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) 
started in 2010 two grant schemes called the “Plan of Incentives for the Improvement in 
Municipal Management” (PI) and the “Program for Municipal Modernization” (PMM), 
which transfer funds to LLGG conditional on the adoption of policy measures in fields 
oriented to modernize and make progress to a results approach to public management 
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(more on this below). One of these fields is the improvement of LLGG tax collection. 
This initiative shows a higher priority of municipal taxation in the central government’s 
agenda.  
A milestone of the decentralization process for LLGG was the enactment in May 
2003 of an updated “Organic Law of LLGG”, which defines the characteristics and 
functions of LLGG. Similar to the Organic Law of RRGG, it states the exclusive and 
shared functions of provincial and district governments. It also mentions that transfers to 
LLGG would be doubled between 2004 and 2008, from 6 to 12 percent of the budget of 
the public sector. In this respect, and as expanded later in the text, the central government 
has transferred to LLGG programs that were formerly executed by the central ministries, 
earmarked to rural highways, social infrastructure, and nutrition projects, among other, 
under close supervision from the central government.  
Another important piece of legislation for LLGG is the “Fiscal Decentralization 
Decree-Law” of February 2004, previously mentioned with reference to RRGG, which 
introduces all fiscal rules for SNG, along with requirements to ensure fiscal transparency 
and responsibility. This decree and its regulation, clarifies the nine fiscal rules that apply 
to SNG, along with their concept and methodology of estimation. It also includes a 
transition period in 2006 and 2007 to comply with these rules. Moreover, it states that all 
RRGG and selected LLGG (to be defined between MEF and the NDC) should begin 
multiannual fiscal reports consistent with the National Multiannual Macroeconomic 
Framework. Table 3.1 summarizes Peru’s fiscal rules for SNG, including their temporary 
amendment in 2009-2010 following the international economic crisis (this amendment 
was extended through 2012).  
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Table 3.1 – Fiscal responsibility rules for SNG in Peru 
Fiscal Rule S.D. Nº 144-2005-EF E.D. 108-2009 
1. Total debt stock (TDS) / Net 
current income (CI) 
TDS/CI ≤ 100 percent TDS/CI ≤ 120 percent 
2. Debt service (DS) / CI DS/CI < 30 percent DS/CI < 30 percent 
3. Average primary result (PR) (PRt+PRt-1+PRt-2)/3 > 0 (PRt+PRt-1+PRt-2)/3 > 0 
4. Short-term debt (STD) STD < CI/12 STD/CI < 35 percent 
5. Total debt stock without 
guarantee from the National 
Government (TDSWG) 
TDSWG/CI ≤  45 
percent 
Suspended 
6. Total debt service without 
guarantee from National 
Government (DSWG) 
DSWG/CI ≤ 25 percent Suspended 
7. Non-financial expenditure in 
real terms (NFERT) 
((NFERTt – NFERTt-1) 
/ NFERTt-1) ≤ 3 percent 
Suspended 
8. Consumption expenditure in real 
terms (CERT) 
 ((CERTt – CERTt-1) / 
CERTt-1) < 4 percent 
9. End of term Rule Forbids to incur in current expenditures that imply 
commitments of payment for the following term 
10. Exception rule in case of 
natural disasters 
Does not apply on rule 7 
Source: Government of Peru (2011) based on Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law, Fiscal 
Decentralization Decree Law, Supreme Decree (SD) 144-2005-ED and Emergency Decree (ED) 108-2009. 
 
Given that RRGG are almost entirely funded by transfers, and the central 
government has a tight control over their current expenditures, they tend to comply with 
fiscal rules, since they have relatively little fiscal autonomy. However, the supervision of 
the compliance of LLGG with fiscal rules is more relevant than for RRGG in order to 
prevent fiscal risks for the central government, for two main reasons: first, LLGG have 
more fiscal autonomy than RRGG, since they collect their own sources of revenue and 
have more discretion over their current expenditures; and second, they are much more 
numerous than RRGG, which makes them more difficult to monitor. In this regard, many 
LLGG have not been complying with some of the fiscal rules, including rules number 3 
and 7 in Table 3.1. Additionally, the transition period to comply with the fiscal rules 
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included in the Fiscal Decentralization Decree-Law has never been enforced; neither has 
been the requirement for SNG to conduct fiscal reports consistent with the Multiannual 
Macroeconomic Framework.  
 
With respect to financial administration, Peru’s central government implemented 
for its central ministries since the late 1990s an IFAS, which allows tracking the financial 
transactions of public entities. Given that back then the RRGG were de-concentrated 
agencies of the central government (CTAR), dependent on the Ministry of the 
Presidency, they were automatically included in the IFAS. When the RRGG were created 
in 2002, they naturally inherited the technological infrastructure of the CTAR. Hence, 
there is complete, updated and reliable information on all financial and budgetary 




At the local level, however, the IFAS was installed more gradually, owing to the 
political autonomy of LLGG and the fact that it is more costly and difficult to introduce, 
considering that many municipalities are small and distant, lacking personnel and 
technological equipment. However, by the end of 2007 the IFAS was operative in all 
LLGG, enabling Peru’s central government to have online access since 2008 to all 
budgetary transactions of Peru’s 1834 LLGG. This information is also available online at 
the MEF website, and it has improved the reliability and transparency of municipal fiscal 
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 See http://www.mef.gob.pe.  
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information, contributing to make Peru one of the most advanced developing countries in 
terms of fiscal transparency of SNG.  
The source of budgetary information of Peru’s SNG is MEF’s National 
Accounting Office (NAO), which every year compiles and standardizes the information 
on budget execution of the previous fiscal year, which coincides with the calendar year. 
This information is sent to NAO until every May by all public agencies, including RRGG 
and LLGG. In turn, NAO sends every June for the review of Congress the “General 
Government Financial Statements”, reflecting yearly budget execution and financial 
statements of all agencies of Peru’s government. With the approval of Congress, this 
information is published by October of every year.  
Before 2008, when the IFAS was not yet installed in all municipalities, NAO had 
to rely on the self-reported fiscal information submitted by each LLGG. This had two 
main drawbacks: first, not all LLGG submitted complete and timely information, which 
meant that there were some omissions, averaging around 10 percent of all municipalities 
every year between 1998 and 2007, although the percentage of omissions steadily 
decreased from 20 percent in 1998 to 4 percent in 2007; the omitted LLGG tended to be 
small, rural districts, which had more difficulties submitting the required information. 
Second, in the absence of the IFAS it was harder for the NAO to check the reliability of 
the information submitted by LLGG.  
In this regard, Table 3.2 presents the institutional coverage of LLGG of the NAO 
database since 1998. It also contrasts the information on two of the main transfers to 
LLGG reported both by MEF and the LLGG themselves (FONCOMUN and mining 
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canon). This is a way to assess the reliability of the information submitted by 
municipalities, since it can be compared to the data on transfers that MEF controls. As 
can be seen, these two transfers reported by LLGG are not much lower than the 
information reported by MEF, averaging 94 percent for FONCOMUN between 1998 and 
2007, and 95 percent for the mining canon between 2001 and 2007. Moreover, these 
fractions are every year higher than the proportion of LLGG that submitted information, 
suggesting that the omitted municipalities tend to be smaller than average.  
Table 3.2 – Coverage of LLGG fiscal information in NAO database 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Provincial 
Governments (PPGG) 193 193 193 194 194 194 194 195 195 195 195 195 195
Total District 
Governments (DDGG)
1626 1626 1628 1634 1634 1635 1635 1637 1639 1639 1639 1639 1639
Total LLGG 1819 1819 1821 1828 1828 1829 1829 1832 1834 1834 1834 1834 1834
Total PPGG in NAO 
Database (debt) 179 185 184 183 185 186 191 188 189 194 195 195 195
Total PPGG in NAO 
Database (budget) 178 176 178 182 185 186 191 188 189 194 195 194 195
Coverage of PPGG 
(budget) 92% 91% 92% 94% 95% 96% 98% 96% 97% 99% 100% 99% 100%
Total DDGG in NAO 
Database (debt) 1375 1447 1435 1473 1438 1500 1500 1536 1552 1567 1635 1633 1637
Total DDGG in NAO 
Database (budget) 1300 1380 1390 1462 1438 1501 1518 1550 1551 1568 1632 1624 1628
Coverage of DDGG 
(budget) 80% 85% 85% 89% 88% 92% 93% 95% 95% 96% 100% 99% 99%
LLGG in NAO 
Database (budget) 1478 1556 1568 1644 1623 1687 1709 1738 1740 1762 1827 1818 1823
Coverage of LLGG 
(budget) 81% 86% 86% 90% 89% 92% 93% 95% 95% 96% 100% 99% 99%
Foncomun transfers 
reported by MEF (in 
million of current S./) S/. 1,256 S/. 1,239 S/. 1,399 S/. 1,370 S/. 1,431 S/. 1,597 S/. 1,793 S/. 2,031 S/. 2,388 S/. 2,807 S/. 3,263 S/. 3,015 S/. 3,284
Foncomun transfers 
reported by LLGG (in 
million of current S./) S/. 1,118 S/. 1,134 S/. 1,253 S/. 1,279 S/. 1,329 S/. 1,528 S/. 1,729 S/. 1,957 S/. 2,324 S/. 2,758 S/. 3,257 S/. 3,006 S/. 3,257
Reported coverage (as 
% of transfers) 89% 92% 90% 93% 93% 96% 96% 96% 97% 98% 100% 100% 99%
Mining canon transfers 
reported by MEF (in 
million of current S./) S/. 81 S/. 116 S/. 229 S/. 346 S/. 666 S/. 1,310 S/. 3,868 S/. 3,327 S/. 2,728 S/. 2,360
Mining canon transfers 
reported by LLGG (in 
million of current S./) S/. 75 S/. 108 S/. 219 S/. 324 S/. 646 S/. 1,248 S/. 3,771 S/. 3,341 S/. 2,597 S/. 2,341
Reported coverage (as 
% of mining canon 
transfers) 92% 93% 96% 93% 97% 95% 97% 100% 95% 99%
Source: own elaboration based on data by NAO, MEF
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With respect to accounting standards, until 2008 the economic classification of 
the fiscal information presented by Peru´s NAO needed some adjustments to be 
compatible with international standards, including the Government Finance Statistics 
Manual of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2001). In this regard, the economic 
classification of the budget provides the basis to estimate the fiscal deficit, since it 
distinguishes public income and expenditures according to whether they are of a current, 
capital or financial nature. For this dissertation I performed these adjustments to the 
entire database of LLGG, following the detailed instructions laid out in MEF (2006). In 
2008 and starting in fiscal year 2009, Peru´s NAO modified its accounting regulations to 
make them more akin to international standards. I made these changes for 2009 and 2010 
compatible with the series until 2008 following the guidelines in MEF (2008). Annex 2 
explains the specific adjustments that were made to the fiscal database of LLGG.  
The time period used for analysis is 1998 through 2010, in order to include a few 
years prior to the start of the decentralization process, which began to have fiscal impact 
in 2002. However, there are two salient problems with the fiscal database of LLGG prior 
to 2001: 1. As displayed in Table 3.2 above, there is a relatively higher proportion of 
omitted LLGG; and 2. The available information is not sufficiently disaggregated; for 
example, until 2000 own income of LLGG does not distinguish among the different taxes 
that municipalities collect, or among the different transfers from natural resources that 
they receive. On the expenditure side, it does not disaggregate current and capital 
expenditures according to their specific elements. For these two reasons, in the results 
section below the entire database (1998 to 2010) is only used for descriptive purposes, 
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while the quantitative analysis is performed on the database for which disaggregated data 
is available (since 2001). 
With reference to municipal debt, a study conducted by the World Bank (2006) 
using information for 2003 found problems related to its registration. Indeed, for a 
sample of LLGG the study showed that many municipalities concealed or miss-registered 
much of their debt. However, these obligations were mostly owed to other agencies of the 
central government, such as social security contributions and national taxes, while the 
debt with other creditors was better registered and tended to be paid regularly (especially 
with the banking system). This study was updated in 2010 using information on LLGG 
for 2009 (Moron, 2010), finding that the problem still existed, but it was mostly restricted 
to stocks of older debt, since the IFAS contributed since 2008 to minimize the scope for 
inappropriate accounting practices with respect to public creditors. Hence, despite these 
caveats, the fiscal database on LLGG can in general be considered reliable.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, perhaps the most remarkable feature of the 
evolution of LLGG finances during the past decade, which provides the motivation for 
this dissertation, has been the extraordinary growth in transfers from the central 
government. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, transfers have increased more 
than five times in real terms between 2001 and 2010, at an annual rate of 21 percent in 
constant 2002 S/. This is intimately related to the growth in transfers linked to natural 
resources, especially mining, but it is also explained by the introduction of new grants 
and the growth in other transfers.   
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Table A1.3 in Annex 1 presents the list of all transfers made to LLGG until 2010, 
along with their source of funds, the requirements on their use, their legal base and main 
changes, and their distribution rules. They can be broadly classified into three distinct 
categories: “FONCOMUN”; “Natural resources and customs”; and “Earmarks and other 
transfers”. FONCOMUN is the Municipal Compensation Fund, which has traditionally 
been the main redistributive grant to LLGG; since 2002 municipalities have no 
restrictions on the use of funds from this source (previously they had to allocate them to 
public investment).  
“Natural resources and customs” is a category that is also known as “fragmentary 
transfers”, following Herrera (2008), owing this name to the fact that they are only 
allocated to the LLGG where the activity takes place. It includes the “Canon”, which 
proceeds from taxes, perquisites and permits paid by mining, gas, fishing, forestry and 
hydro-energy exploitation. “Oil canon and over-canon”, which is a transfer based on a 
different tax regime than the other canon, and applies to oil exploitation. Mining 
perquisite, which is a payment made for the exploitation of minerals. The “Fund for 
Socioeconomic Development of Camisea” (FOCAM) perquisite, which is a 
compensation paid to SNG for the right of way of the Camisea Gas pipeline. And the 
participation in custom rent, which is a fraction of import duties allocated to the 
provincial government where the custom agency is placed. Most fragmentary transfers 
need to be allocated to public investment, but since 2005 this restriction has been 
gradually lifted, allowing for a fraction of expenditures on maintenance and pre 
investment studies.  
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“Earmarks and other transfers”, in turn, is mainly composed of a number of 
transfers most of which have predetermined recipients and conditions on the use of funds 
for certain activities. The most traditional such transfer is the “Glass of Milk” program, 
which covers all LLGG and it is earmarked to provide a daily ration of food to vulnerable 
population. This category also includes a number of central government social programs 
that are executed by LLGG, mainly earmarked to road infrastructure, complementary 
food programs, and social and productive infrastructure (described above); in this regard, 
the funding for social programs increased significantly in 2009-10, when in the context of 
the international financial crisis, the central government allocated on a discretional basis 
additional funds for sanitation, transport, social assistance, basic education, urban 
development, management and financial intermediation, and irrigation, among other 
sectors. This funding has been included under a broad category named “ordinary 
resources for LLGG”. In turn, “Other current and capital transfers” includes transfers 
from municipal enterprises, RRGG and other national funds; and donations by 
individuals, corporations, bilateral and multilateral organizations; these transfers also 
tend to be earmarked to specific activities or projects.  
“Earmarks and other transfers” also includes two relatively recent transfer 
systems that intend to stimulate a culture of competition and incentives among SNG. The 
first one is the “Incentive Fund for Regional and Local Investment” or FONIPREL after 
its name in Spanish. It is a competitive Fund, introduced in 2008, which co-finances pre 
investment studies and PIP presented by SNG in priority development sectors. 
FONIPREL clusters regional, provincial and district governments into different groups 
according to their basic unmet needs (BUN) and the volume of transfers they receive 
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from “determined resources” (FONCOMUN and “natural resources and customs”). 
Hence, it provides an official classification that allows distinguishing the heterogeneity 
among LLGG along these categories.  
The second recent transfer system is composed of two joint new programs 
mentioned above, which are the PI and the PMM. They were introduced in 2010, and 
their main goal is to stimulate LLGG to modernize and make progress towards a results 
approach to public management. Both mechanisms allocate funds according to the 
achievement of a number of targets by LLGG, in the areas of municipal taxation; infant 
malnutrition; improvement of public services and infrastructure; and streamlining local 
procedures. These funds group LLGG according to their size, providing a third official 
classification of their heterogeneity.  
Until 2001, when the current decentralization process started, there were five 
main transfers to LLGG: FONCOMUN, which represented in 2001 more than two-thirds 
of total transfers (68 percent); the “Glass of Milk” program, which was the main 
contribution to “Earmarks and other transfers” (19 percent); the mining canon, oil canon 
and over-canon, and participation in custom rent, which back then were the only transfers 
included under “Natural resources and customs” (13 percent). In turn, by 2010 there were 
several more transfers, many of which grew significantly throughout the decade. This 
changed the relative importance of these three broad categories: FONCOMUN fell to 27 
percent in 2010; “natural resources and customs” is the most important category since 
2006, with 38 percent of the total in 2010; and “Earmarks and other transfers” grew 
significantly in 2009-10 in the context of the international financial crisis, surpassing 
FONCOMUN with 35 percent in 2010. 
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In the case of FONCOMUN, even though it grew between 1998 and 2010 at an 
annual rate of almost 9 percent in real terms, it was surpassed by other transfers, many of 
which were reformed and/or created as part of Peru’s current decentralization process. It 
also declined in 2009 due to the international economic crisis, since it derives most of its 
resources from the Municipal Promotion Tax (MPT), which is a two-percent surcharge 
on the Value Added Tax (VAT), which in turn follows closely the country’s economic 
cycle. In 2010 and in spite of the strong economic growth of Peru (8.8 percent in real 
terms), FONCOMUN did not grow so much (6.2 percent in real terms) partly because the 
central government began to subtract from FONCOMUN the devolutions for excess or 
incorrect payments of the MPT (see Table A1.3 in Annex 1 for a detailed explanation). 
As shown in Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1, “natural resources and customs” is the 
category that grew most between 1998 and 2010 at an annual rate of nearly 28 percent in 
constant 2002 S/. Since 2001, the most important transfer has clearly been the mining 
canon, which represented on average around 48 percent of transfers in this category 
during 2001-2010; it is followed in importance by the oil canon and over-canon, with an 
average of around 23 percent of the total; gas canon (12 percent); mining perquisite (9 
percent); and participation in customs rent (7 percent). Both fishing and especially 
forestry canon are relatively unimportant (less than 2 percent on average).  
As described in Table A1.3 in Annex 1, the Canon Law of July 2001 increased 
the participation of SNG in the corporate income tax from the mining industry from 20 to 
50 percent. It also introduced the gas, forestry, fishing and hydro-energy canon. These 
changes began to be implemented in 2002 for the mining, forestry and hydro-energy 
canon; in 2003 for the fishing canon and in 2004 for the gas canon. The successive legal 
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amendments to the Canon Law changed marginally the distribution rules among SNG 
and gradually relaxed the restrictions on the use of funds, maintaining the source of 
funding for the different transfers.   
The “oil canon and over-canon” is the oldest of all transfer systems currently in 
place, tracing its origin back to 1976. Different to the other sectors, this canon has 
particular rules of distribution and utilization in each of the four departments from where 
oil is extracted (Loreto, Piura, Ucayali and Tumbes). In all four cases it is defined as 10 
percent of total oil production value (ad-valorem). The over-canon is an additional 2.5 
percent over the canon, which has the same tax base as the canon in the cases of Loreto 
and Ucayali, and it is applied over the participation in the rent from oil production in 
Piura and Tumbes. These sources of fund did not change between 1998 and 2010, 
although there have been successive legal modifications to the distribution rules among 
SNG, and similar to the other canon, the restrictions on the use of funds have gradually 
been relaxed.  
The “mining perquisite” was created in 2004, and transfers to SNG began in 
2005. It is a payment for exploitation of minerals, based on a percentage of the 
international value of mineral concentrate, which ranges from 1 percent to 3 percent 
increasing with the net value of sales. All proceeds are transferred to SNG. The 
distribution rules have not changed since its creation, although similar to the canon, the 
restrictions on the use of funds have gradually been relaxed.  
In turn, the “FOCAM perquisite” was also created in 2004 and began distribution 
in 2005. It is funded by 25 percent of the gas perquisite of the two lots of the Camisea 
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Gas Project, after the deductions of the gas canon, benefitting SNG in the departments of 
Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Ica and Lima, plus an additional 2.5 percent of the gas 
perquisite for the department of Ucayali. Since its creation it has averaged around 2.6 
percent of “natural resources and customs”. The distribution rules among SNG and the 
restrictions on the use of funds have not changed since its creation.  
Lastly, participation in customs rent is funded by 2 percent of the rent collected 
by each of the country’s customs through import operations; originally established in 
1993, its distribution rules changed in 2001 for all LLGG, and later in 2005 for the 
province of Callao, which is the country’s main port and hence has by far the largest 
custom tax collection. LLGG have fewer restrictions on the use of funds from this 
transfer.   
The category “earmarks and other transfers” has also grown significantly, at an 
annual rate of over 24 percent in constant 2002 S/. between 1998 and 2010. The first 
spike of the category in 2004 is related to the transfer of social programs from the central 
government to LLGG described above. In turn, the extraordinary growth in 2009 is 
mainly explained by discretionary ordinary resources to LLGG, which in the context of 
the international financial crisis increased around 230 percent with respect to 2008. In 
2010 ordinary resources to LLGG fell 33 percent with respect to 2009 (S/. 1,035 million), 
but it was still more than double the amount of 2008, and this reduction was more than 
compensated by the introduction of the PI and PMM (S/. 1,262 million). With respect to 
the other transfers, FONIPREL has averaged around 8 percent of this category since its 
introduction in 2008; the “Glass of Milk” transfer has been nominally frozen since 2006, 
and its importance has fallen significantly, from over 90 percent of this category in 2001 
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(17 percent of total transfers) to 8 percent in 2010 (less than 3 percent of total transfers). 
Lastly, “other current and capital transfers”, which includes transfers from municipal 
enterprises, RRGG, and other national funds, along with donations by individuals, 
corporations, bilateral and multilateral organizations, has averaged around 18 percent of 
this category in 2006-10.   
Table 3.3 presents summary statistics for all transfer systems to LLGG between 
1998 and 2010, ordered by the yearly average amount of each transfer (available 
information is only disaggregated since 2001). “Natural resources and customs” and 
“earmarks and other transfers” grew significantly and they are also highly volatile. On the 
other hand, “FONCOMUN” has grown at a slower rate with lower volatility. Inside the 
first two categories, the transfers that have grown most and also have a high yearly 
average are mining canon, ordinary resources to LLGG and gas canon.  
Indeed, as shown in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, ordinary resources to LLGG grew in 
2009-10 mainly to compensate LLGG for the decline in other regular transfers, 
particularly mining canon, oil canon and over-canon, and FONCOMUN. As shown in 
Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1, in spite of the crisis of 2009 the gas canon and FOCAM 
perquisite never stopped growing: both depend on gas. On the other hand mining canon, 
mining perquisite and oil canon and over-canon decreased significantly in 2009, although 
the latter has lower volatility because it grew much less than mining canon in the 




Table 3.3 – Summary statistics of transfers to LLGG – 1998 to 2010 
 
Similar to FONCOMUN, participation in custom rent has a relatively low 
volatility and also fell in 2009, although it grew at a higher rate. As previously 
mentioned, “Glass of milk” has a relatively high average, but its growth rate is very low, 
which is indicative that it is increasingly losing relevance. “Other transfers to LLGG” 
increased at a high rate, although from a low base, and it has high volatility. FONIPREL 
also grew significantly, although from a low base; and PI & PMM started in 2010.  
 
To summarize, after an initial push until 2005 under the leadership of the NDC, 
Peru´s current decentralization effort has proceeded very gradually, with an initial focus 




Standard deviation (in 
million of current S./)
Yearly average (in 
million of current S./)
St dev/Average
Yearly average growth 
(in real terms)
Total transfers 1998-2010 4086 5283 0.77 17.61%
Natural resources 
and customs
1998-2010 2116 2021 1.05 27.78%
FONCOMUN 1998-2010 827 1994 0.41 8.80%
Earmarks and other 
transfers
1998-2010 1357 1267 1.07 24.27%
Mining canon 2001-2010 1423 1467 0.97 43.35%
Ordinary resources to 
LLGG
2006-2010 982 1321 0.74 35.00%
PI & PMM 2010 1262
Gas canon 2004-2010 281 437 0.64 56.13%
Glass of milk 1998-2010 28 342 0.08 1.55%
Oil canon and over-
Canon
2001-2010 141 308 0.46 10.58%
FONIPREL 2008-2010 153 301 0.51 75.25%
Other transfers to 
LLGG
1998-2010 252 251 1.01 34.11%
Mining perquisite 2005-2010 51 112 0.46 24.02%
Participation in 
customs
2001-2010 51 112 0.46 22.08%
FOCAM perquisite 2005-2010 57 102 0.56 42.35%
Hydro-energy canon 2002-2010 25 88 0.29 12.09%
Fishing canon 2003-2010 13 34 0.37 8.64%
Forestry canon 2002-2010 2 2 0.93 34.97%
Source: own elaboration based on information by NAO-MEF.
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geographic space of the historic departments of Peru. With regard to the intermediate 
level of government the process has entailed two main developments: first, the attempt to 
create regions, as the union of two or more departments, in order to gain efficiencies from 
economies of scale in the administration of the territory. This process suffered an 
important setback in the referendum of 2005, putting on hold not only the formation of 
regions, but also the steps ahead in fiscal decentralization, since the transfer of taxes to 
the intermediate level of government was tied to the process of regional integration. The 
second main development has been the accreditation of the capacity of RRGG to exercise 
their exclusive 185 expenditure functions included in the Organic Law of RRGG. As 
mentioned above, by and large this has meant so far a validation of the functions that the 
RRGG were already exercising when they were CTAR, with little additional resources or 
capacity strengthening from the central government.  
In this context, the local level of government was relatively neglected, at least 
during the first years of the current decentralization process. However, since 2007 there 
have been important policy reforms geared toward LLGG, including the “Promotion for 
the merging of municipal districts Law” and the “Municipal mancommunity Law”; 
FONIPREL, which allocates most of its resources to LLGG; and more recently the PI and 
PMM, which contribute to develop a culture of competition and incentives in LLGG, 
while tackling important issues in municipal management. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
however, the Canon Law of 2001 has in practice been the most important development in 




As shown in the literature review, this extraordinary increase in transfers to SNG, 
without clearly defined expenditure responsibilities, can generate distortions related to 
the effect of transfers on the three traditional functions of government: allocative 
efficiency, distributional equity and macroeconomic stability. Indeed, to some extent the 
creation of FONIPREL, along with the PI and PMM, has been a reaction of Peru´s central 
government to the perceived distortions generated by the canon along those three 
dimensions: FONIPREL allocates more co-financing to SNG that do not receive 
significant canon (distributional equity), and also promotes a better use of investment 
funds, most of which are derived from canon (allocative efficiency). PI and PMM, in 
turn, seek to improve tax collection at the local level, under the assumption that the large 
transfers in canon are decreasing incentives of LLGG to increase their own resources, 
generating “fiscal sloth” (macroeconomic stability); and they also try to generate 
incentives to make a better use of transfers towards centrally defined priorities (allocative 
efficiency), while giving more weight in the targets and transfer rules to SNG with higher 
needs (distributional equity).  
In this dissertation I focus on the analysis of the effects of this extraordinary 
increase in transfers from the perspective of macroeconomic stability, understood as the 
potential of the decentralization process to create fiscal risks. In the next section I review 
the previous studies that have been done on this subject with reference to Peru.  
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Chapter 4: Studies on decentralization and macroeconomic 
stability in Peru 
 
Introduction 
Fiscal decentralization is a complex issue, which brings forth the attention of 
specialists to analyze aspects related to its design, management and effects on 
socioeconomic, governance and fiscal outcomes, among other. In the case of Peru the 
current decentralization process started in 2001, at a time when the country´s fiscal 
condition was relatively uncertain, following the recessionary period of 1998 to 2000, 
and when other countries in the region, noteworthy Brazil, Colombia and Argentina, were 
grappling with the effects of their own decentralization processes on macroeconomic 
stability. Hence, policymakers in Peru, especially at MEF, have been traditionally 
cautious about the transfer of fiscal responsibilities to SNG, seeking to avoid the sort of 
fiscal imbalances that harmed other countries in the region. As described in the literature 
review, these imbalances have been closely related to the transfer of large amounts of 
resources without clearly defined expenditure responsibilities.  
This helps explain the heavy emphasis of Peru´s current decentralization effort on 
fiscal responsibility. Indeed, in the context of the “National Accord” of March 2002, the 
guiding decentralization principles stated by Peru´s central government are “fiscal 
neutrality, gradualism and stimulation of economic competitiveness”. Also, the legal 
framework described in Chapter 3 defined early in the process a set of stringent, 
numerous and even contradictory fiscal rules for SNG (see World Bank, 2006), with the 
goal of maintaining a tight control over their fiscal behavior. Moreover, central 
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government authorities have tended to be reluctant to tackle such issues as the estimation 
and transfer of resources to RRGG to exercise the expenditure functions detailed in the 
Organic Law of RRGG, which is partly due to their potentially high fiscal cost. In fact, 
the roadmap of the fiscal decentralization process was defined in a way that makes it very 
difficult to transfer tax bases to SNG, since for RRGG this is contingent on the formation 
of regions; and for LLGG the topic of revenue mobilization was until recently relatively 
neglected, although the PI and PMM programs described in Chapter 3 show more 
attention to the topic.  
Owing to prudent macroeconomic policies and a favorable international context, 
Peru had a stellar economic performance during the past decade, including the highest 
growth rate of the LAC-7 countries, low inflation and relatively small exchange rate 
volatility, along with a consistent reduction of public debt relative to GDP. All this 
contributed to the award of investment grade on the country’s debt emissions by three 
leading international credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s).  
Hence, given these precedents, the developments with the Canon Law, which 
basically increased from 20 to 50 percent the share of SNG in the corporate income tax 
on extractive industries, and the extraordinary growth in transfers to SNG that ensued, 
especially to LLGG, may come across as a surprise. Indeed, as will be described in 
Chapter 6, this high growth in transfers has altered the distribution of expenditures among 
Peru’s levels of government, especially with respect to public investment. It also created 
a fiscal risk for the central government, which now has less room to maneuver  to 
conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy, since it controls fewer resources; and as the 2009 





 obtaining more resources from the central government, especially in the 
context of economic slowdown.  
In hindsight, the high participation of SNG in the fiscal revenue from natural 
resources given by the Canon Law can be partly explained as a combination of political 
opportunity and time inconsistency. The Law was approved on July 11
th
, 2001, only 17 
days before the end of the transitional Presidency of Valentín Paniagua, who took over in 
November 2000, after having been President of Congress, when President Fujimori 
resigned amidst a widespread corruption scandal. At that time there was a combination of 
a relatively weak Presidency, following the strong rule of the Fujimori Administration; 
increased political demand for decentralization, as part of a more open democratic 
environment; and the fact that the Constitution of 1993 left as a legal requirement the 
regulation of its Article 77, which states in its second paragraph that “It corresponds to 
the respective jurisdictions, conforming to law, to receive an adequate participation in 
the total income and rent obtained by the State in the exploitation of natural resources in 
the form of canon” (see detail in Table A1.3 in Annex 1). The combination of these 
factors provided a window of opportunity that was seized by advocates of 
decentralization.  
The time inconsistency of the canon law has to do with the fact that when it was 
approved in July 2001, international prices of minerals exported by Peru, such as copper, 
silver, gold and zinc, among other, were at a historic low, which in turn discouraged 
private investment in the sector. The low prices prompted demands by SNG for a higher 
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 This phrase borrows from Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2004), who coined the phrase “addiction to 
debt” to describe countries that have repeatedly defaulted on their public debt.  
77 
 
participation in a stream of resources that at the moment was relatively low, and whose 
decentralization did not appear to pose a significant threat to the economic authorities at 
Peru’s MEF. It was difficult to foresee at the time the period of high prices that started in 
2003, which after a brief respite in 2009, has resumed since 2010. Indeed, had the prices 
been in 2001 at the average of the past five years, the decisions regarding the share of 
SNG in the canon might have been different.  
Review of studies on Peru 
Peru’s current decentralization effort has attracted considerable attention from 
specialists, in particular the developments related to the large increase in transfers to SNG 
linked to natural resources. The studies include overall assessments of the process,
14
 
along with the effects of decentralization on the functions of government as defined by 
Bird (1999): economic efficiency, distributional equity and macroeconomic stability.  
On the first topic, in an analysis of the efficiency of municipal expenditure and its 
determinants, Herrera and Francke (2007) find that transfers of FONCOMUN and canon 
have a negative effect on expenditure efficiency of a number of categories of LLGG, 
which were classified by the authors using conglomerate analysis techniques.  
In turn, Aragon and Casas (2008) find that those LLGG that report lack of 
specific public management skills in topics such as project management, accounting, 
finance, planning and coordination, tend to have less capacity to execute public 
investment; they also show that more experience tends to improve the execution capacity 
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 Assessments of Peru’s decentralization process include Carranza and Tuesta (2003), Ahmad and García 




of LLGG, using as a proxy the reelection of mayors. An important assumption of this 
paper is that transferred funds ought to be spent when they are received, because of their 
opportunity cost, even though this would likely violate Peru’s fiscal rule that constrained 
until 2008 the yearly growth of non-financial LLGG expenditure to 3 percent. Indeed, the 
authors mention that …“generally, fiscal decentralization implies transfer of resources to 
SNG with the explicit mandate of increasing local expenditure”; in the context of the 
international financial crisis of 2009, they state that …“the current political speech is to 
exercise pressure over regional and local authorities so that they increase their public 
investment”.  
This last point suggests that Peru´s policy makers generally expect SNG to 
immediately spend windfall transfers, an assumption that is reinforced in news articles in 
major newspapers, along with popular indicators used by members of Congress.
15
 This is 
partly related to a feature in Peru´s budget process, by which every year SNG have two 
budgets as their reference for execution: first they have the Institutional Opening Budget 
or PIA after its name in Spanish, which is the budget proposal that is reviewed and 
approved by each SNG legislature and by the National Congress, with the expected 
available resources during the budget year. Their second reference is the Modified 
Institutional Budget or PIM after its name in Spanish, which is the budget that accounts 
for the true availability of resources of each entity once the budget year starts. An 
important characteristic is that PIA and PIM tend to differ significantly each year in 
SNG, mainly for two reasons: first, the PIM incorporates throughout the year 
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supplementary credits, which are resources that were not adequately forecasted during 
budget preparation; and second, the PIM also incorporates what is known as “statement 
balances”, which are funds that were not executed during the previous years that are 
automatically incorporated once a new budget year starts. These funds apply to the 
budget category known as “determined resources”, which include most of the transfers 
(FONCOMUN, natural resources and customs and FONIPREL, among other) along with 
own resources of LLGG.   
The most popular yardstick used in Peru, including MEF, to evaluate budget 
execution refers to the PIM.
16
 This sets a high bar on SNG that receive large transfers 
from natural resources, generating incentives to spend as much as possible of available 
resources during each budget year. For example, a frequent target of criticism due to low 
budget execution is the Regional Government of Áncash, which receives the largest 
proportion of mining canon in Peru (26 percent of the total in 2010, see GPC, 2011, for 
information on budget execution by RRGG); as expected, Áncash´s PIM in 2010 was the 
largest of all RRGG, with more than double the amount of resources of the following 
RRGG; however, its budget execution against this PIM was “only” 41 percent, which 
was the lowest in the country, a performance that, as previously mentioned, is often 
criticized in the press. By the same token, the executed budget of Áncash was also the 
highest in the country, 60 percent higher than the second RRGG in line; and the annual 
average growth of Áncash´s executed budget between 2006 and 2010, which reached 98 
percent (almost double each year), was also the highest in the country (excluding the city 
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 As mentioned above, FONIPREL, for example, has as one of its performance criteria to evaluate projects 
presented by SNG since late 2009 the indicator of budget execution against PIM of each entity, clustering 
SNG in groups with similar PIM.   
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of Lima, which as a RRGG has grown from a low base). As will be analyzed in Chapter 
6, the extraordinary increase in expenditure execution of the Regional Government of 
Áncash is also repeated in most LLGG that received large increases in transfers, 
especially from natural resources. Indeed, it can be considered a remarkable achievement 
that SNG with low technical capacities relative to the central government are able to 
increase expenditures at such high rates, raising questions about the quality and 
transparency of these outlays.  
This feature of Peru´s budget, along with the framework of fiscal rules, which 
until 2008 imposed a limit on the yearly growth of non-financial expenditure in constant 
terms of 3 percent,
17
 suggests that SNG have to operate under contradictory pressures: on 
one hand the expectation is to comply with the PIM, which entails for places like Áncash 
an effort of budget execution even more extraordinary than the one they are already 
displaying; and on the other hand, the requirement to comply with the strict limits on the 
growth of expenditures set by the fiscal rules, in a context of large transfers.  
Linking to the flypaper effect introduced above in the literature review, a key 
feature in this discussion is the degree of dependence on transfers of SNG: when most 
resources come from grants, the accountability of local authorities to their constituencies 
and the link in each jurisdiction with the median-voter gets blurred, and the expectation 
of bailout in case of fiscal strain increases. Moreover, in localities with high poverty that 
suddenly receive extraordinary amounts of transfers, which is the case of many of the 
LLGG where extractive activity takes place, the pressure to spend those funds as soon as 
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 Since 2009 this was modified to a limit of 4 percent on the growth of government consumption 
expenditure in constant terms.   
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possible is high. Hence, the assumption that creates the puzzle of the flypaper effect, by 
which local authorities should behave as representatives of the median-voter, whose 
propensity to spend windfall income is low, does not capture the complexity of the 
situation of many of these LLGG, which receive most of their funds from transfers, and 
whose inhabitants themselves may have a high propensity to consume windfall income 
due to their poverty. In turn, the more discretion SNG have in the use of transfers, the 
more need of technical assistance and oversight mechanisms from the central government 
to reduce the scope for inefficient expenditure, corruption, and/or fiscal behavior that puts 
pressure on national fiscal policy.   
As a complement to the papers by Herrera and Francke (2007) and Aragon and 
Casas (2008), Huanqui (2010) finds that when Peru´s LLGG have more technical 
capacities, their expenditure tends to be more efficient; she concludes that transferring 
resources without first strengthening technical capacities tends to lead to inefficient 
expenditure.  
Lastly, Loayza, Rigolini and Calvo (2011) analyze the leading factors affecting 
the ability of Peruvian LLGG to execute their allocated budget, measured as annual 
budget execution over available budget, which is in turn separated into its current and 
capital components. The authors also base their analysis on the premise that is has been a 
disappointment that LLGG have not been able to use fully their allocated budgets. They 
use an unbalanced panel of 1,688 LLGG between 2007 and 2009. The authors divide the 
factors that affect the ability of LLGG to execute their budget into four categories: the 
budget size; local capacity (proxied by population, education of population, and 
proportion of white-collar personnel in LLGG); local needs (measured by poverty rate 
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and percent of urban population); and political economy constraints (proxied by 
percentage of winning votes of the elected mayor in the 2006 elections, and whether the 
mayor was reelected in 2006). Their basic estimation methodology is ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) with robust standard errors, clustered by province.  
As expected, they find that a larger allocated budget is significantly related to a 
lower execution rate, with a larger effect on capital than current expenditures. With 
respect to local capacity, they find that LLGG with larger populations, whose population 
has higher education, and with a higher proportion of white-collar personnel, have higher 
execution rates. In terms of local needs, LLGG with higher poverty rates and lower 
degree of urbanization have higher budget execution. Lastly, with respect to political 
economy constraints, in those LLGG where the mayor is elected with a larger share of the 
vote, budget execution is higher, and mayors who get reelected execute a higher 
proportion of their available budget (especially their capital budget) in the first year of 
their second administration relative to incoming mayors.   
The authors conclude that increasing LLGG budgets without increasing local 
capacity is not wise policy. They also analyze important determinants of budget 
execution rates that are also used in this dissertation, such as local needs and political 
economy constraints. However, they base their analysis on the premise that LLGG should 
execute their entire allocated budget, which can be contrary to the median-voter theorem 
that is the basis of the “flypaper effect”. Moreover, by using as dependent variable the 
rate of budget execution with respect to the PIM, which includes the “statement balances” 
of previous years, they fail to properly acknowledge the high increase of budget 
execution in real terms of LLGG in recent years; and by not analyzing in detail the 
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evolution and timing of the allocation rules of natural-resources based transfers 
(particularly mining transfers), they also do not provide a clear picture of the evolution of 
LLGG finances. These topics are tackled in this dissertation.   
 
On the issue of distributional equity, Herrera (2008) analyses how to redesign 
Peru´s transfers system, incorporating horizontal equity criteria in the distribution of 
resources, using a methodology based on the estimation of tax capacity and expenditure 
needs of SNG. The author focuses his interest on LLGG, which concentrated 80 percent 
of transfers to SNG in 2006. As cited above, he makes a classification of transfers 
according to being “integral”, when they reach all LLGG (includes FONCOMUN and 
Glass of Milk), and “fragmentary”, which are only allocated to the SNG where the 
economic activity takes place (mainly natural resources and customs). He goes on to 
show that the latter, which have grown considerably to become the main source of 
funding of LLGG, makes Peru´s transfer system regressive, allocating more resources to 
the least poor departments. The author proposes a system of transfers that compensates 
based on tax capacity and expenditure needs, which would entail a reallocation of most of 
the current grants from natural resources.  
It needs to be mentioned that although Herrera’s proposal may be desirable from a 
distributional perspective, it has low political feasibility since, as one would expect, those 
SNG that are beneficiary of windfall revenues from natural resources, are strongly 
against changes in the current rules that would take away resources from them. Indeed, a 
number of proposals presented to Congress to redistribute the fiscal revenue from natural 
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resources following equalization criteria, or even intending to stabilize those transfers to 
reduce their inherent volatility, have systematically been rejected by lawmakers (see 
World Bank, 2006).  
In Government of Peru (2011) there is also an official acknowledgement of the 
unequal development opportunities generated by the allocation of transfers from natural 
resources among SNG. It shows that the Gini coefficient of these transfers per capita in 
2009 was 0.79, which indicates a high concentration of transfers in communities that 
reside in the area of influence of the extractive activity, which is something to be 
expected from the allocation rules of the canon: 10 percent of LLGG had per capita 
transfers between S./ 600 and S./ 16.000 per year, while 50 percent of LLGG had per 
capita transfers of less than S./ 100. It also mentions that 90 percent of the natural 
resources transfers in 2001-10 concentrated in 11 of the 24 departments of the country; in 
turn, the 5 departments with most transfers of this sort have on average 35 percent of 
poverty, while the 9 departments with least transfers have on average 49 percent of 
poverty.   
Indeed, due to the enormous differences in the allocation of fiscal rent from 
natural resources among SNG in Peru, the distributional issue has gained relevance in the 
past few years. It is a topic that is closely related to the effects of extractive industries on 
local communities, which has generated an escalation of conflicts during the last few 
years. According to an estimate by Monge, Portocarrero, Viale and García (2008), using 
information of Peru´s “People´s Advocate Office” for August 2008, 55 percent of total 
recorded conflicts were of a socio-environmental nature related to extractive industries, 
up from only 8 percent in January 2005. The motivations for these conflicts include 
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pollution, displacement of other economic activities, disagreements on the terms of the 
compensation by private companies to local communities, and increasingly, tensions over 
the distribution of fiscal transfers among SNG. An example of the latter has been the 
dispute between the neighboring departments of Moquegua and Tacna in June 2008, in 
the south of Peru, over the share of each department in the distribution of the canon from 
a mining company in the border of the two departments. The dispute led to a prolonged 
and conflictive strike with a high economic and social cost. This type of conflicts can be 
labeled as “wars of abundance”, since they involve departments with relatively high 
socio-economic indicators that yet struggle to define which gets more resources, in this 
case from the mining canon.  
 
With respect to the effect of transfers on macroeconomic stability in Peru, which 
is the topic of this dissertation, studies have focused on analysis of the indebtedness of 
LLGG and the quality of debt information; the compliance of SNG with fiscal rules; 
determinants of fiscal results of SNG; and the effect of transfers on the generation of own 
revenues at the local level. Only one paper analyses the flypaper effect in Peru (Aragón, 
2009), but during 1998 to 2001, which is prior to the recent surge in transfers to SNG.  
As mentioned above, World Bank (2006) makes a detailed study of the 
indebtedness of LLGG and financial management practices at the local level of 
government. Using information for 2003, it finds that consolidated debt of LLGG had 
reached 1.5 percent of GDP during that year, up from 0.9 percent in 1998, and it was 
concentrated in a few large LLGG, most of them in Lima, which could increase the risk 
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of moral hazard. Although this figure was manageable from a macroeconomic 
perspective, it signaled evidence of over-indebtedness, especially since in 2003 46 
percent of LLGG were not complying with the first fiscal rule, which set a limit of debt 
over current income of less than 100 percent. Indeed, that year 90 percent of LLGG did 
not comply with at least one of the fiscal rules included in Peru´s legal framework.  
An important contribution of the study is a survey in 43 deliberately chosen 
LLGG to assess the quality of debt accounting and financial management practices. The 
survey found that most creditors of municipal debt were other public sector entities, such 
as the National Tax Administration Agency (SUNAT after its name in Spanish), the 
Pension Normalization Office (ONP) and the Health Insurance (ESSALUD), along with 
domestic providers and contractors, and only 5 percent of total debt was with the banking 
system. Also, as much as 98 percent of non-banking municipal debt was in arrears, 
especially with other public entities, and many of the surveyed municipalities deemed 
much of the intra-State debt as unpayable, turning it into a disguised financial bailout.  
The problem was related to poor accounting and financial management practices, 
which concealed and/or registered inappropriately much of municipal debt, under-
estimating the true indebtedness of LLGG. This situation restrained the capacity of many 
municipalities to access financial markets, since banks demand the regularization of debts 
and compliance with fiscal rules as a lending condition. In turn, it is difficult to comply 
with fiscal rules without assisting LLGG in tackling the problem of accumulated debt and 
correcting poor accounting practices.   
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The study also notes that the legal framework for fiscal responsibility of SNG in 
Peru was precipitated in a rather disorderly fashion, ending up with an accumulation of 
fiscal rules that are inconsistent with each other, and which are also very numerous (eight 
at the time), making them complicated for compliance and evaluation. It also warns about 
the need to identify and correct other factors of the decentralization process beyond debt 
management, which can press on LLGG indebtedness, including the unbalances between 
income and responsibilities at the local level, or the enormous inequalities created by 
transfers of canon and perquisite among similarly sized municipalities.    
Moron (2010) conducts a study on fiscal performance of LLGG in Peru, in which 
he starts by updating the problems with municipal debt found in World Bank (2006). In a 
survey for a sub-sample of 17 of the LLGG analyzed by that study, the author also found 
in most municipalities problems with the stock of debt, which tends to be inherited from 
previous administrations, and it is concentrated in arrears with public creditors: SUNAT, 
ONP and, to a lower degree, ESSALUD. He also uncovered poor financial management 
practices, including the under-registration of debt interests and penalties and lack of 
recognition of debts from previous administrations. Moreover, most of the surveyed 
LLGG ignored the existence of fiscal rules, and only those municipalities that intended to 
acquire debt with banks knew about them. Noteworthy, the introduction of the IFAS in 
all LLGG in 2007 reduced significantly the scope for poor financial management, 
restricting it to a problem with the historic stock of municipal debt. Hence, the IFAS has 
proved to be an important contribution to fiscal transparency at the local level of 
government in Peru, and the main challenge ahead in many LLGG is related to the 
regularization of the stock of debt, mainly with public creditors.  
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The author goes on to evaluate the compliance of LLGG with the seven most 
relevant fiscal rules during 2003-2008, which as described in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 was 
a period of extraordinary growth in transfers. He finds that, notwithstanding the problems 
with the registration of stocks described above, there was a significant improvement in 
the observation of rule number 1 (debt over current income less than 100 percent), with 
98 percent of LLGG complying with it in 2008.  
However, in spite of the extraordinary growth in transfers, the author found that a 
growing number of LLGG did not comply with rule number 3 (average primary result of 
past three years should be positive), with 52 percent of municipalities not observing this 
indicator in 2008. Also, only 25 percent of LLGG complied that year with rule number 7, 
by which non-financial public expenditure should not grow more than 3 percent per year. 
These two fiscal rules are related and suggest that LLGG have been reacting to windfall 
transfers by increasing their expenditures in a similar fashion, to the point of even 
surpassing their total income.  
The paper also assesses the determinants of fiscal performance of LLGG by 
running an econometric model proposed by Braun and Llach (2008), which uses as 
dependent variable primary result over net current income of each municipality. The 
explanatory variables are of structural, macroeconomic, institutional and political type. It 
uses a panel of 1380 LLGG (75 percent of the total) between 2003 and 2008. The 
explanatory variables are “compliance with debt-related fiscal rules”, which is 
instrumented to correct endogeneity; the macroeconomic variable is a calculation of 
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district GDP per capita built by the authors, to capture the economic cycle,
18
 lagged one 
year since the distribution of mining canon is made the year following its collection; the 
structural variable is population density; the institutional variables are vertical fiscal 
imbalance and earmarking; and the political variables are electoral year (captured by a 
time-dummy); removal of mayors from office; coincidence between national and local 
political party; and a categorical variable measuring number of years in office.  
The author finds that compliance with fiscal rules favors fiscal performance; 
among the political variables, removal of mayors from office and experience in office 
have both negative and statistically significant sign, the latter signaling that as mayors 
gain experience they improve their expenditure capacity, thus worsening the fiscal 
balance; while coincidence between national and local political parties is not significant. 
With respect to the rest of variables, GDP per capita has a positive and significant effect 
on fiscal outcomes with diminishing returns (the square of the variable has a negative 
sign); and population density has a positive and significant effect. Noteworthy, vertical 
fiscal imbalance has negative sign and is statistically significant, signaling that as LLGG 
become more dependent on transfers, their fiscal performance worsens. Lastly, earmarks 
have a positive and significant sign, which means that as the proportion of transfers with 
defined allocation increases (LLGG have less discretion over transfers), fiscal 
performance improves.   
This paper provides an important background for this dissertation, by evaluating 
some of the determinants of the fiscal performance of LLGG in Peru. However, it does 
                                                 
18
 Official figures of GDP are only available at the department level.  
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not conduct an integral assessment of the effect of transfers on macroeconomic stability, 
analyzing the effect of the growth of transfers on the capacity of the central government 
to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Neither does it analyze the effect of transfers on 
own income and expenditures of LLGG, which is crucial to understand the performance 
of their primary result. Moreover, since it uses information until 2008, it does not capture 
the effect of the international crisis of 2009-2010 on local finances. These are gaps that 
this dissertation fills.   
A third paper on this topic is Leyton and Revilla (2008), who analyze the 
determinants of indebtedness in the 42 districts of the city of Lima. They show that in 
2006, 14 districts did not comply with fiscal rule number one, having more debt than 
current income. Similar to the findings in Moron (2010), fiscal rules did not have an 
influence on indebtedness in Lima. Using information for 2006, they build an 
econometric model using as dependent variable debt over current income, and as 
explanatory variables transfers per capita, existence of an internal local development 
plan, existence of a concerted local development plan (which is elaborated with 
participation of representatives of the community), the human development index and the 
existence of an operative plan. As expected, they find that transfers increase the ratio of 
debt over current income. They also find that the existence of a concerted local 
development plan reduces it, which suggests that the inclusion of the citizenry in local 
planning can promote more transparency in debt management, hence inducing fiscal 
responsibility.  
Lastly, Table 4.1 below shows official estimates of the compliance of LLGG with 
fiscal rules between 2005 and 2009, taken from Government of Peru (2011). As 
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mentioned in Moron (2010), most LLGG do not present indebtedness problems, but there 
is high non-compliance with the rule of positive average primary result over the past 
three years (rule number 3), which reaches 69.2 percent of incompliance in 2009; and 
with the new rule introduced in 2009, in the context of the international financial crisis, 
by which growth in consumption expenditure, in constant terms, should be less than 4 
percent (rule number 8), with 73.3 percent of incompliance. The latter has an even higher 
rate of non-compliance than the rule on expenditure that prevailed until 2008, which was 
more stringent and set the limit on the annual growth of non-financial expenditure in 
constant terms to 3 percent. As mentioned before, this signals a high rate of growth of 
public expenditure of LLGG as a response to the large increase in transfers, which even 
led to a progressive worsening of the average primary result of most LLGG in recent 
years. In Chapter 6 I analyze these developments and their relation with the recent growth 
in transfers to LLGG.   
Table 4.1 – Compliance of LLGG with fiscal rules (as fraction of total LLGG) 
Fiscal rules 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Yes No NA Yes No NA Yes No NA Yes No NA Yes No NA 
1. TDS/CI 90.1 4.7 5.2 92.3 2.6 5.1 94.1 2 3.9 97.9 1.7 0.4 94.4 4.7 0.9 
2. DS/CI 91.8 3.1 5.2 93.2 1.7 5.1 96.1 0 3.9 99.5 0.2 0.4 98.3 0.9 0.9 
3. PR 75.9 8.6 15.5 66.7 19.3 14.1 66 21.9 12.1 51.6 40 8.3 26.1 69.2 4.7 
4. STD 41.9 52.9 5.2 54.6 40.3 5.1 52.5 43.5 4.1 38.2 61.4 0.4 68 31.1 0.9 
5. TDSWG 68.6 26.2 5.2 78.7 16.1 5.1 85.8 10.3 3.9 86.8 12.9 0.4 Suspended 
6. DSWG 58.2 36.6 5.2 69.4 25.4 5.1 96 0.1 3.9 99.3 0.3 0.4 Suspended 
7. NFERT 57.8 31.8 10.4 12.3 78.6 9.1 35 56.8 8.2 24.9 71 4.1 Suspended 
8. CERT  25.6 73.3 1.1 
Source: taken from Government of Peru (2011). For reference of each fiscal rule, see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. 
 
Although there is only one paper that assesses the flypaper effect in LLGG in 
Peru (Aragon, 2009), and using information for 1998-2001, which is prior to the boom in 
transfers that started in 2003, there are at least 8 papers studying the effect of transfers on 
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local revenues. Indeed, different to most other countries, which have focused on the 
expenditure response to transfers in the context of the evaluation of the flypaper effect, in 
Peru there has been much interest in assessing the hypothesis of what has been labeled 
“fiscal sloth”, by which LLGG reduce their tax effort in response to transfers.  
Alvarado (2003) has been a pioneer of this type of work. In her paper she 
provides a rich description of the fiscal characteristics of LLGG in 2000 and 2001, 
classifying them into two basic variables: population and proportion of urban households, 
and their interaction with local revenue (taxes and user charges). As expected, taxes have 
mainly an urban nature, representing around 20 percent of total resources in highly 
populated and urban districts, diminishing for other scales and representing a negligible 
amount in small and rural areas. Something similar occurs with user charges, although 
the elasticity is much lower. In her description she finds that small LLGG in which 
transfers represent close to 90 percent of total resources tend to have higher indebtedness 
per capita, a result consistent with the theorized effects of large vertical fiscal imbalances, 
which foster over-indebtedness. Also, districts that receive large unexpected transfers 
tend to use FONCOMUN for current expenditures, expanding the size of government. 
This is especially critical in small, rural districts, which have little own resources to 
finance current expenditures following negative shocks in transfers. The author tests two 
econometric models for the year 2003, assessing the effect of transfers first on fiscal 
effort, and second on capital expenditures financed by own resources. She finds evidence 
that transfers reduce fiscal effort, with more effect on taxes than on user charges, and also 
tend to free own local revenue for current expenditures.  
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Aragón and Gayoso (2005) focus on the causal relationship between transfers and 
fiscal effort, building a simple model that predicts that higher transfers increase local 
public expenditure, which in turn reduces marginal political revenues of higher 
expenditures (which enter with diminishing returns), lowering the incentives for own 
fiscal effort. In this model, the negative relationship between transfers and fiscal effort 
decreases with the initial level of local expenditure: the higher the level of initial 
expenditure, the lower the trade-off between transfers and fiscal effort.  
The authors test these predictions using information for 2000 and 2001. The 
econometric model measures tax collection per capita against the amount of transfers 
received, using a first-difference model and applying it to three clusters of LLGG 
classified according to their initial level of expenditure per capita. Since the 
FONCOMUN allocation formula assigns more weight to rural municipalities, which tend 
to have low fiscal capacity and hence low fiscal effort, the authors use as an exogenous 
variable an additional transfer distributed during 2000 to a group of LLGG, which was 
not related to local fiscal effort but to population size. Consistent with their model, the 
authors find a negative relationship between transfers and fiscal effort at the local level, 
and a diminishing effect as the initial level of LLGG expenditure increases.  
Aguilar and Morales (2005) test the effect of transfers on economic activity, and 
expand on the theoretical factors that affect local government own revenue: the tax base 
and the fiscal effort. The tax base depends on production, income and wealth of a district, 
while fiscal effort is a function of the capacity and incentives of LLGG to collect own 
revenue. The incentives, in turn, can be inversely related to the funds that municipalities 
obtain from alternative sources, such as transfers, donations and credit operations (the 
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latter can also lead to higher tax effort to repay the debt). Hence, own revenues are 
modeled as a function of the production level (GDP, only available at the department 
level); the district’s wealth (proxied by degree of urbanization, only available at the time 
for 1993); own-resource collection capacity (not included; it is assumed to be proxied by 
the capacity to obtain credit and donations); transfers from the central government; credit 
operations; and donations. They also include multiplicative dummies for each region, and 
a dummy to control for the effect of natural disasters: the “El Niño” climate phenomenon 
of 1998 and the earthquake of 2001.  
The authors use the MEF database during 1998-2002, working with a balanced 
panel of 1,032 LLGG (56 percent of the total; transfers to districts excluded from the 
sample represent around 20 percent of total transfers). They work with variables in levels 
and constant 1994 S./. They find a positive relationship between transfers and local 
effort: each additional S./ in transfers increases own-revenue in a range of between 0.11 
S./ (fixed effects) and 0.44 S./ (random effects). In all specifications, donations also have 
a positive and significant effect, while for credit operations the results are not uniform, 
but tend to be positive and small. In the case of the regional dummy variables, 11 out of 
24 regions showed a positive effect of transfers on tax effort (in 3 cases statistically 
significant); 11 showed a negative effect (3 statistically significant); and in 2 regions the 
effect changed with the specification (ambiguous). The authors cannot identify common 
characteristics among regions in which the effect is positive or negative.  
Rabanal and Melgarejo (2006) also assess fiscal effort through a panel regression 
model using fixed and random effects with a balanced panel dataset for 1999-2004 (1,106 
local governments); it includes as dependent variable own collected real revenue per 
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capita of LLGG, as a function of all transfers, including as control variables department 
gross real value added per capita and dummy variables multiplicative of total local 
transfers to distinguish local governments that receive “Mining” and “Oil” canon. The 
information is taken from the MEF database. The authors find that transfers have a 
positive effect on own-revenue collection (a “complementary effect”), although tax effort 
diminishes for LLGG recipients of the “mining” and especially the “oil” canon.  
In his PhD dissertation, Ruhling (2008) studies the property tax in Peru, 
conducting a qualitative study to assess whether there is a substitution effect of transfers 
on property tax. Using survey techniques, he rejects a substitution effect in the majority 
of the 36 municipalities he assessed. His argument is that mayors react to a whole set of 
different incentives in the face of increasing transfers, with many engaging in increasing 
collection of the property tax. He provides a thorough analysis of the operation of this 
levy, showing how the central government controls the rates and most of the base of the 
tax, leaving to LLGG the tax registry and the administration. His research suggests an 
environment that has traditionally lacked predictability for municipalities, in which 
transfers are “a patchwork of political liabilities of the past rather than connected with 
thorough compensation or service improvement functions”. The surveys conducted in the 
36 municipalities with annual tax revenues above S./ 300.000 provide a rich assessment 
of the problems, incentives and constraints faced by mayors in different types of 
municipalities, along with innovative strategies to conduct tax administration.  
Llempén and Velásquez (2009) evaluate the response of district municipalities to 
transfers from canon and over-canon. The authors tested a panel model during 2003-2007 
that assessed the effect of canon and over-canon transfers on different types of own 
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resources, controlling by population, urbanity and population size, among other variables. 
They also used propensity score matching, comparing LLGG in terms of population, 
urbanity, poverty and executed budget in 2001 and 2007. The results of the panel model 
indicate that canon and over-canon transfers have a significant and negative effect on 
total own income, and user-fees, while the propensity score matching estimation finds a 
negative average also for own taxes, especially in 2007, which is when canon and over-
canon transfers to LLGG reached their highest level.   
Vega (2008) reproduces the analysis of Alvarado (2003) for 2005, and also finds a 
significant substitution effect of transfers on own revenues of LLGG, but with a lower 
coefficient than Alvarado (-0.04 vs. -0.35). He also finds a higher effect on taxes than on 
fees for service (-0.071 vs. -0.022). However, when the author reproduces the analysis of 
Aguilar and Morales (2005) for the years 2001 to 2005, he also finds a positive and 
significant effect of transfers on own revenues.  
In turn, CAF (2010) mentions that adding basic controls that influence tax 
collection such as the level of GDP or poverty, there is not a significant statistical 
relationship between natural resource-based transfers and tax collection. Hence, beyond 
the fact that local tax collection in Peru is very low, there is no evidence of a different 
effect between LLGG with and without canon.   
Lastly, Canavire-Bacarreza, Martinez-Vázquez and Sepúlveda (2011) assess the 
determinants of own revenue collection in LLGG in Peru, using a panel of 192 provincial 
governments (PPGG) and 1630 district governments (DDGG) between 2006 and 2008. 
They point that theory is not conclusive on the size of the final effect of transfers on 
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LLGG tax effort, and the empirical evidence suggests it could be either positive or 
negative. They test econometric models that alternatively use as dependent variable total 
own revenue and tax revenue of LLGG in per capita terms, and as explanatory variables 
they include total transfers, extractive transfers and FONCOMUN separately, and a 
number of control variables including proportion of population by age cohort, population, 
area, poverty, illiteracy, GDP/capita, population in agriculture, employed population, 
regional dummies, and proportion of skilled to total workers in each LLGG. They test 
separately for all LLGG and for PPGG and DDGG, and given the large number of 
municipalities that do not collect any own taxes, they use a Tobit censored model and 
random effect panel regressions excluding the LLGG with 0 values.  
Their results show for the most part a positive relationship between transfers and 
total own revenue and tax revenue of LLGG, and in particular for transfers from 
extractive industries, except for some specifications for FONCOMUN transfers that 
present a negative and statistically significant sign. This positive effect has a higher and 
more significant coefficient for non-tax own revenue vis-à-vis tax revenue of LLGG. The 
control variables tend to conform to expectations: GDP/capita is positive but not 
consistently significant; poverty is negative and significant; population in agriculture is 
negative and significant; and population is positive and significant, although not for all 
specifications.   
All these studies on the effect of transfers, and in particular of natural-resource 
based transfers, on own revenues of LLGG point to contradictory evidence, with results 
depending on the underlying assumptions, database and model specification. A concern 
that is generally absent in these papers relates to the relative relevance of this topic. 
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Indeed, in the context of the literature review on the relationship between decentralization 
and macroeconomic stability, most international studies have focused on the expenditure 
response to transfers, rather than the effect of transfers on own collection, as part of the 
assessment of the flypaper effect.  
This said, the response of local taxes and user fees to transfers is an important 
topic, especially considering that one of the pillars of fiscal decentralization is the ability 
of SNG to be able to finance at the margin their expenditures with their own revenues. 
However, since most LLGG in Peru are small and with high needs, their potential tax 
base is very limited. Hence, given the current legal framework for local taxation, even if 
most LLGG reach their potential collection, it will not represent a large increase in their 
income, and they will still be heavily dependent on transfers. In this context, the analysis 
of whether transfers have a positive or negative effect on own revenue collection of 
LLGG is more relevant in urban settings, where the potential tax collection is higher and 
can make a difference in the provision of much needed public goods and services. This 
requires an analysis of the effect of transfers on own revenues of LLGG depending on 
their differential characteristics, which will be conducted below in the results section.   
As mentioned above it is surprising that in spite of the profligacy of studies on the 
effects of transfers on local taxation, there is only one paper on the flypaper effect. In 
effect, Aragón (2009) evaluates the hypothesis first proposed by Hamilton (1986) that the 
flypaper effect is partly attributed to costly taxation: the more costly it is for local 
authorities to collect own revenue, the more likely they will be to finance more of their 
expenditures out of transfers. Using the same database described in Aragón and Gayoso 
(2005) for the years 1998 to 2001, the author finds that those LLGG that reported to have 
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a tax registry during those years had a lower propensity to spend their transfers, resulting 
in a smaller flypaper effect. Although this paper is conceptually interesting as part of the 
theoretical literature on the determinants of the flypaper effect, its conclusions are not 
clearly linked to the effect of transfers on macroeconomic stability, and the time series is 
dated, since it is prior to the recent boom in transfers to SNG in Peru.  
 
To summarize, the studies on the link between decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability provide useful precedents to this dissertation, along with gaps 
that this dissertation intends to fill. They have partly focused on issues related to 
compliance with fiscal rules and quality of debt data of LLGG; along with determinants 
of fiscal results of LLGG (World Bank, 2006; Moron, 2010; Government of Peru, 2011; 
Leyton and Revilla, 2008). These studies, however, do not provide a thorough analysis of 
the effect of transfers on macroeconomic stability, which entails on one hand an 
assessment of their effect on the fiscal space of the central government to conduct 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy, and on the other hand an analysis of the response of own 
revenue collection and expenditures to transfers at the local level of government. This 
second point is important, since the analysis of fiscal results and indebtedness of LLGG 
is not sufficient to understand the potential fiscal risk that transfers can create, for 
example by inducing a reduction in local revenues and/or an unsustainable growth in 
expenditures.  
In turn, there has been a strong interest on the effect of transfers on revenue 
collection of LLGG, also labeled “fiscal sloth” (Alvarado, 2003; Aguilar and Morales, 
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2006; Rabanal and Melgarejo, 2006; Aragon and Galloso, 2006; Ruhling, 2008; Vega, 
2008; Llempen and Velazquez, 2009; CAF, 2010; and Canavire-Bacarreza et al, 2011). 
As stated above, this issue is clearly important, but for the purposes of this dissertation 
there are some caveats about the reviewed studies: first, they do not frame the issue 
within the broader context of the effect of fiscal sloth on macroeconomic stability, which 
could be done by signaling in which LLGG this phenomenon is relatively more 
important, and hence they have higher risk of running out of own resources to finance 
their expenditures in the event of sudden decreases in transfers. Second, and related to 
this topic, none of these papers provides a differential assessment of the response of 
LLGG to transfers considering the high heterogeneity of municipalities in Peru (although 
Canavire-Bacarreza et al distinguish between PPGG and DDGG); and lastly, these 
studies have focused on the revenue response to transfers but do not analyze the response 
of expenditures, as part of the assessment of the flypaper effect.  
With respect to the last point, only one paper was found that assesses the flypaper 
effect in Peru (Aragon, 2009). However, similar to what is found in much of the literature 
review, the author concentrates on developing a theoretical model that intends to explain 
the flypaper effect, but he does not provide a link to the macroeconomic implications of 
his findings, and the database he uses is dated, since it is prior to the surge in transfers 
that started in Peru in 2003.  
Having reviewed the literature on Peru, along with an identification of the 
research gaps this dissertation intends to fill, in the next section I develop the leading 
questions and methodology that is used to analyze the effect of transfers on 
macroeconomic stability.  
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Chapter 5: Leading research questions and methodology 
 
Introduction 
The focus of this dissertation is to assess the effect of the large increase in 
transfers to SNG in Peru on fiscal aggregates from the standpoint of macroeconomic 
stability, with particular attention to the effect of transfers based on natural resources on 
the local level of government.  
SNG can create fiscal risks to the central government even if their debt situation 
appears to be under control. Indeed, the volatility of transfers based on natural resources 
means that in the event of a sharp reduction in grants, as happened in Peru in 2009, the 
central government may be pressured to allocate more funds to SNG to maintain a level 
of expenditure that grew significantly as a pro-cyclical response to the sharp increase in 
transfers of the previous years. These additional transfers, in turn, reduce even more the 
discretionary spending of the central government, which may induce fiscal deficits and/or 
a bigger role of the public sector in the economy. This outcome is related to the 
unintended consequence of several years of increasing automatic transfers to SNG, 
especially those linked to the extraction of natural resources.  
In the case of Peru the analysis will focus on LLGG rather than on RRGG, for the 
following main reasons: first, the distribution rules of transfers from natural resources 
mean that LLGG receive much more funds than RRGG; second, LLGG have more fiscal 
autonomy, since they collect their own revenue sources and have more discretion in the 
allocation of expenditures, especially with respect to current expenditures; third, and 
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related to the last point, LLGG have a longer history, since they have existed since the 
origin of Peru and were reinstated in 1981 as autonomous and legitimate entities, while 
RRGG used to be deconcentrated branches of the central government until they became a 
legitimate level of government in 2002; and fourth, LLGG are much more numerous, 
making them more difficult to monitor, which may create unexpected risks to the central 
government.  
Effects of transfers on Peru’s general government 
With respect to the reduction in the fiscal space of the central government to 
conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy due to the higher participation of SNG in the public 
sector, the main questions that I will assess are the following:  
1. Has the share of Peru’s central government spending been reduced as a proportion 
of the general government spending in response to the high increase in transfers to 
SNG?  
To answer this question I will describe the recent evolution of total tax collection 
of the central government, distinguishing taxes from extractive industries, most of which 
are automatically shared with Peru’s SNG. In turn, I will show the evolution of the 
relative proportion of transfers with respect to total tax collection of the central 
government; and I will also describe the evolution of the share of SNG in the primary 
expenditure of the general government, distinguishing between current and capital 
expenditure. This section allows having a measure of the change in the room to maneuver 
of Peru’s central government to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy following the large 
increase in transfers of the last decade.  
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2. Has the size of Peru’s general government augmented relative to GDP in response 
to the increase in transfers?  
To answer this question I will describe the evolution of the primary expenditure 
of Peru’s general government relative to GDP, distinguishing LLGG, RRGG and the 
central government. I will frame this description within the analysis of the recent fiscal 
performance of the country’s non-financial public sector, in order to assess whether the 
increase in transfers has contributed to a worsening of the country’s fiscal position.  
In this regard, as described in the literature review, the allocation of vast amounts 
of grants to SNG with loosely defined expenditure responsibilities can generate fiscal 
imbalances and/or a larger share of the public sector in the economy. In the case of Peru 
this will be evaluated against the background of the international financial crisis of 2009-
2010, which elicited a large increase in discretionary transfers to LLGG from the central 
government, to compensate them for the reduction in their regular grants.  
Effect of transfers on fiscal decisions of LLGG 
As the next step I will evaluate the fiscal decisions of LLGG in response to 
transfers. First I will describe the main features of the evolution of fiscal aggregates of 
LLGG, considering all LLGG and taking into account their different characteristics, with 
particular attention to the effect of transfers on own resources, current and capital 
expenditures, fiscal results, accumulated savings and debt. Then I will use econometric 
models to complement the descriptive analysis, building on the studies reviewed above to 
assess the effect of transfers on own revenue collection (fiscal sloth) and on expenditures 
of LLGG (flypaper effect).  
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Classification of LLGG 
In order to assess the fiscal response of LLGG to transfers it is important to 
disentangle the heterogeneity of municipalities, which in Peru and similar to other 
countries is very high. Indeed, the classification of municipalities into groups with similar 
characteristics can help assess the differential fiscal risk each of these groups may 
generate due to the fiscal response of LLGG to transfers.  
In this regard, and as pointed out by Herrera and Francke (2007), until recently 
there was not an official classification of municipalities in Peru, which would allow 
assorting them according to similar characteristics for the purpose of policy decisions 
and/or research. As a precedent, in their paper Herrera and Francke (2007) use cluster 
analysis to classify PPGG and DDGG in Peru into relatively homogeneous categories, 
taking into account the following characteristics of LLGG: population size, degree of 
urbanity and poverty level.  
Since 2008, however, and owing to the creation of FONIPREL and the PI and 
PMM, which are the competitive transfer schemes described above, the Government of 
Peru has introduced official classifications of SNG designed for the purposes of these 
schemes. In particular, FONIPREL uses cluster analysis to classify each level of SNG 
(DDGG; PPGG; and RRGG) into groups according to their needs, measured by basic 
unmet needs (BUN). The available indicators of BUN used by FONIPREL to classify 
SNG during 2010 were: percentage of population with no access to drinkable water, 
sanitation and electricity; percentage of female illiteracy (all based on the 2007 
population census); and the percentage of chronic malnutrition (based on the 2005 census 
of scholar weight and height). As explained in MEF (2010) FONIPREL uses cluster 
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analysis to classify SNG, applying the Ward hierarchical methodology, which allowed 
grouping SNG into conglomerates with the highest internal homogeneity and the largest 
possible difference between each conglomerate. This analysis is conducted separately for 
each level of government. For DDGG, FONIPREL determined that the optimal number 
of conglomerates was three, which was also the number of conglomerates assumed for 
PPGG and RRGG. The three conglomerates or groups are labeled “very high”, “high” 
and “medium” BUN.  
FONIPREL also classified SNG in 2010 into three groups according to the 
amount of determined transfers per capita that each of them received between 2007 and 
2009.
19
 These groups are labeled according to whether each SNG received “less”, 
“medium” or “more” resources on average during those years. The analysis is made 
separately for DDGG and PPGG: in the latter case the amount of average determined 
resources is divided by the entire population of the province. Each of these three groups 
is determined according to ranges of monetary transfers that each SNG received: LLGG 
with “less resources” include DDGG and PPGG that received less than S/. 467 and S/. 
147 per capita of determined resources, respectively. LLGG governments with “medium 
resources” received between S/. 467 and S/. 978 for DDGG; and between S/. 147 and S/. 
405 for PPGG. Lastly, LLGG with “more resources” received more than S/. 978 and S/. 
405 for DDGG and PPGG, respectively (see MEF, 2010).   
In turn, the PI and PMM classify all LLGG into three other groups according to 
their size and urbanity: main cities; LLGG that are not main cities with more than 500 
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 In the case of LLGG determined resources during those years where FONCOMUN and natural resources 
and customs.  
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urban houses; and LLGG with less than 500 urban houses. The statistical information is 
for 2010, and it is updated yearly by Peru’s INEI.   
These three classifications will be used in this dissertation because they provide 
an official assortment of municipalities according to characteristics that are relevant to 
assess the effect of transfers on fiscal aggregates of LLGG. Along with these three 
classifications I introduce a fourth one, which sorts LLGG based on the main transfer of 
determined resources that each of them receives. These transfers differ in their growth 
rates, volatility, timing of disbursement and restrictions on their use, which can result in 
different fiscal risks on LLGG. Similar to FONIPREL I take the average value of 
determined resources between 2007 and 2009, to classify LLGG according to whether the 
main transfer each of them receives is FONCOMUN, mining canon and perquisite, gas 
canon and perquisite, oil canon and over-canon, hydro-energy canon, fishing canon, 
FOCAM or customs. Each of these transfers has different monetary values, volatility, 
conditionality, timing of allocation and rules of distribution, which in turn can be 
expected to have a different effect on fiscal aggregates of LLGG. Lastly, as a fifth 
classification I conduct assessments of the differential effect of transfers on provincial 
governments (PPGG) and district governments (DDGG), which have different revenue 
sources and expenditure functions.   
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics of these five classifications of 
heterogeneity of LLGG. With respect to BUN groups, 59 percent of LLGG have either 
high or very high need. These LLGG tend to be more rural and with less population. In 
turn, according to resource groups, 64 percent of LLGG have less resources, while those 
with more resources tend to have relatively less population and density, and slightly less 
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poverty. The classification according to size shows that around 86 percent of LLGG are 
either small (more than 500 houses) or very small (less than 500 houses), with poverty 
increasing as the population is smaller and more rural, while LLGG that are main cities 
have a much higher average population and concentrate 67 percent of the country’s 
population. With respect to main transfer groups, around 59 percent of LLGG, 
comprising 22 of Peru´s 25 departments receive as main transfer FONCOMUN; in turn, 
almost 32 percent of LLGG from 16 departments receive more Mining; Gas is the main 
transfer for 4.6 percent of LLGG, all located in only one department; while 3.5 percent of 
LLGG from four different departments receive more Oil. Lastly, PPGG are relatively 
more populated and on average are less poor than DDGG. However, although not shown 
in the table, a larger proportion of the former have high or very high needs (74 percent) 
relative to the latter (57 percent). Moreover, DDGG tend to receive relatively more 
resources per capita; and most LLGG of less than 500 houses are DDGG. Finally, 
relatively more PPGG receive FONCOMUN as main transfer, while relatively more 
DDGG receive Mining or Gas as main transfers.    


























Very high need 494 26.9% 29.2% 7721 106 69.4% FONCOMUN 1080 58.9% 48.8% 19060 283 54.0%
High need 588 32.1% 41.1% 9033 216 53.6% Mining 582 31.7% 47.7% 10435 161 45.3%
Medium need 752 41.0% 66.5% 27043 313 37.6% Gas 85 4.6% 35.3% 9600 73 63.3%
Resource Group Classification according to resources Oil 65 3.5% 58.2% 14642 58 50.8%
More resources 209 11.4% 51.1% 4680 26 40.6% FOCAM 9 0.5% 32.8% 7404 24 52.6%
Medium resources 450 24.5% 46.3% 8916 88 52.7% Customs 8 0.4% 93.3% 118422 791 9.7%
Less resources 1175 64.1% 48.5% 20827 315 52.7% Hydroenergy 4 0.2% 45.0% 3275 26 52.6%
Size Group Classification according to size and urbanity Fishing 1 0.1% 59.1% 8844 21 46.4%
Main cities 249 13.6% 91.3% 79426 1125 25.3% Type of LLGG Classification according to type of LLGG
More than 500 houses 555 30.3% 54.9% 10503 165 51.8% Provincial govenrment 195 10.6% 66.5% 40154 449 49.0%
Less than 500 houses 1030 56.2% 34.3% 3743 42 57.3% District government 1639 89.4% 46.1% 13198 200 59.2%
Total 1834 100.0% 48.3% 16064 226 51.3% Total 1834 100.0% 48.3% 16064 226 51.3%
Classification according to BUN Classification according to main transfer
Sources: FONIPREL for BUN and resources; PMM and PI for size and urbanity; INEI for socio-economic indicatores; own elaboration for main transfer, based on information by MEF.
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In order to understand the distribution of LLGG among the different categories, I 
crossed the information between pairs of categories (for example, allocation of LLGG 
according to BUN and Resources), and performed Chi Square tests of association to 
evaluate whether differences across categories are statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, distinguishing between PPGG and DDGG:  
a. Crossing between needs and resources: there are relatively more DDGG with high 
need that receive more resources, and relatively less DDGG with very high need that 
receive more resources.  
b. Between size and resources: there are relatively more main cities and LLGG with 
more than 500 urban houses that have less resources; and relatively more LLGG with 
less than 500 urban houses with medium and more resources.  
c. Between size and needs: there are relatively more main cities with medium needs, and 
relatively more LLGG with less than 500 houses with high and very high needs.  
d. Between main transfer and resources: there are relatively more LLGG that receive 
FONCOMUN as main transfer that have less resources; there are also relatively more 
LLGG with mining and gas as main transfer that have medium or more resources; and 
relatively more LLGG with oil as main transfer that have medium resources.  
e. Between main transfer and size: this relationship only shows statistically significant 
differences across categories for DDGG. There are relatively more DDGG that have 
mining as main transfer with less than 500 houses, and relatively less DDGG that 
have mining as main transfer with more than 500 houses. There are also relatively 
more DDGG that have gas and oil as main transfer with more than 500 houses, 
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relatively less DDGG that have gas as main transfer and are main cities; and 
relatively less DDGG that have oil as main transfer with less than 500 houses.  
f. To conclude, between main transfer and needs: again, this relationship is only 
significantly different across categories for DDGG. Relatively more DDGG with 
FONCOMUN as main transfer have high or very high need; relatively more DDGG 
with mining as main transfer have medium need; relatively more DDGG with gas as 
main transfer have very high need. Lastly, relatively more DDGG with oil as main 
transfer have medium or high need.  
Inquiries related to fiscal decisions of LLGG 
The dimensions of heterogeneity described above allow having a better 
understanding of the main concerns of this section of the dissertation, which can be 
summarized as follows:  
3. Have LLGG worsened their fiscal position in response to transfers?  
Here I will describe the evolution of the aggregate fiscal position for all LLGG 
between 1998 and 2010, distinguishing the different sources of total income (own income 
and transfers); total expenditure (economic classification in current and capital outlays); 
primary and economic result (excluding and including debt interest and service, 
respectively); accumulated savings and debt. I will also analyze the relative importance 
of the different components of income and expenditure, along with the vertical fiscal 
imbalance and measures of the relative exposure of LLGG to changes in transfers.  
I will also analyze this evolution distinguishing among the different categories of 
LLGG introduced in this dissertation. In particular, I will evaluate the allocation of 
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ordinary resources to these different categories between 2006 and 2010; along with the 
use of the main sources of income of LLGG (FONIPREL, natural resources and customs, 
and own taxes) in current and capital expenditures, focusing on the classification by 
resources and main transfer groups.  
This description will provide the stylized facts of the evolution of LLGG public 
finances, assessing whether the fiscal response of municipalities to transfers generates a 
fiscal risk to Peru’s general government, and which particular group of LLGG is more at 
risk. In turn, it provides the basis for the more detailed analysis of the response of own 
income (fiscal sloth) and expenditures (flypaper effect) to transfers.   
4. Do LLGG reduce their fiscal effort in response to transfers, in the form of a 
decline in own revenue collection, which is labeled “fiscal sloth”?  
Here I will first describe the evolution of own resources of LLGG, focusing on 
the classification by type of LLGG (PPGG and DDGG) and size. In this description I 
divide own resources into two categories: local taxes and other own income.
20
  
The analysis of the evolution of own income of LLGG will focus on main cities, 
which is where own income is more relevant, since they concentrate most own resources 
of LLGG, comparing the different categories by resources and main transfer groups. In 
particular I will assess the behavior of own revenue collection between municipalities 
that received windfall transfers and those that did not. I will also distinguish the periods 
before and after the high increase in transfers. 
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 See Table A.3 in Annex 1 for an explanation of the different concepts of LLGG own resources. 
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Following this descriptive analysis I will test econometric models of the effect of 
transfers on own revenue collection of LLGG, building on the studies analyzed in the 
previous chapter. In this regard I will focus on local taxes, which are more sensitive to 
transfers since they are not intended to finance specific services (see Alvarado, 2003).  
The econometric models are based on an analysis of the determinants of LLGG 
tax collection, using the available information for the case of Peru. My main interest is to 
evaluate whether LLGG reduce their own tax collection in response to transfers, 
comparing in particular the different categories of municipalities according to resources 
and main transfer groups. Due to the timing of mining transfers, I assess the effect of the 
lagged variable of transfers on own tax collection of LLGG. I also introduce a measure of 
“symmetry”, inspired by Gramkhar and Oates (1996), which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 whenever total transfers decline, to assess whether LLGG tax 
collection reacts differently when transfers increase and decrease.  
As part of the construction of the econometric models I analyze descriptive 
statistics and scatter plots of the variables of interest; assess the validity of the balanced 
panel of LLGG that is included in the regression analysis; and in particular I tackle 
potential endogeneity concerns related to the interaction between the allocation rules of 
transfers and local tax collection of LLGG.  
To conclude, I will explore the relatively ignored topic of the effect of transfers 
on LLGG expenditures in Peru, through a formal assessment of the flypaper effect.  
5. Do LLGG increase their primary expenditure substantially in response to 
transfers, exhibiting what is known as the flypaper effect?  
112 
 
The assessment of the response of primary expenditure of Peruvian LLGG to 
transfers is of crucial importance to evaluate the potential fiscal risk of the recent surge in 
grants, especially those linked to natural resources, which tend to be highly volatile. I 
construct an econometric model of the determinants of LLGG expenditure, building on 
the vast international literature on the flypaper effect and the available information for the 
case of Peru. I analyze all LLGG, distinguishing between PPGG and DDGG, and 
focusing on the comparison of the reaction of primary expenditures to transfers according 
to resource and main transfer groups.  
I also compare LLGG according to needs and size groups: in the former case, I 
evaluate whether the response of primary expenditure to transfers increases with BUN of 
LLGG, a question analyzed by Espinoza (2008). In the case of the latter, building on the 
analysis by Aragon and Casas (2008), I assess whether larger LLGG present a higher 
flypaper effect, since they are assumed to have a higher capacity to spend.  
Similar to the analysis for own resources, I evaluate the effect of lagged transfers 
on primary expenditure of LLGG, using the measure of “symmetry” described above, 
distinguishing between PPGG and DDGG and the different categories of LLGG by 
resources and main transfer groups. I also analyze descriptive statistics and scatter plots 
of the variables of interest; and tackle the possible sources of errors in the estimation of 
the flypaper effect described by Bailey and Connolly (1998): in particular I estimate the 
regression models using both a linear and a logarithmic specification, following Becker 
(1996), in order to evaluate the robustness of results to different functional forms. Lastly, 
I assess the relevance of the estimated effect of the response of expenditure to transfers. 
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Chapter 6: Results 
 
Here I evaluate the five questions posed in the previous chapter, distinguishing 
between the macro-fiscal implication of the large increase in transfers in Peru’s general 
government, and the fiscal decisions of LLGG in response to transfers. 
Effect of transfers on Peru’s general government 
The first question to be assessed is whether the share of Peru’s central 
government has been reduced as a proportion of the general government during the past 
decade, in response to the considerable increase in transfers to SNG.  
In this regard, Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of central government tax collection 
in Peru between 1998 and 2010 as a proportion of GDP, distinguishing between tax 
collection from extractive industries, which are mining and hydrocarbons (oil and gas), 
and the rest of total tax collection. As can be seen, tax collection from extractive 
industries is the source of fiscal revenue that has grown most in Peru during the past 12 
years, from a low of 0.51 percent of GDP in 2002 to a peak of 3.79 percent of GDP in 
2007. It is also highly volatile: the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the series 
of tax collection from extractive industries is 0.6, while for the rest of total tax collection 
is only 0.05. Lastly, as described above, most of the tax collection from extractive 
industries is transferred to SNG: indeed, between 2003 and 2010, on average 56 percent 
of this revenue has been transferred to RRGG and LLGG in the form of canon, over-
canon and perquisite. 
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Figure 6.1 – Tax collection of Peru’s central government as proportion of GDP  
 
Hence, the fiscal revenue that has grown most in Peru is also the most volatile, 
and most of it is automatically transferred to SNG, mainly to be used in public 
investment. As shown in Figure 6.2 below, this has meant that an increasing proportion 
of the central government´s tax collection is allocated to SNG in the form of transfers. 
Indeed, between 2003 and 2010, the share of total transfers to SNG in central 
government´s tax collection has increased more than 9 percentage points, from 26 percent 
to 35 percent. All of this increase has occurred in transfers to LLGG, which as described 
above receive a larger share of transfers from natural resources relative to RRGG. In the 
case of RRGG, the increase in transfers from natural resources has been offset by a 
relative decline in other transfers, such as earmarks (more on this below).  
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Source: own elaboration based on information of SUNAT
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Figure 6.2 – Proportion of central government tax collection allocated to SNG  
 
In turn, the higher proportion of transfers to SNG with respect to total tax 
collection has increased the share of SNG in expenditures of the general government. 
This is shown in Figure 6.3, which displays the participation of the central, regional and 
local levels of government in consolidated primary expenditure during 2001-2010. In that 
period the participation of the central government in the primary expenditure of the 
general government decreased 18 percentage points, from 74 percent to 58 percent. In 
turn, RRGG increased their participation 5 percentage points, from 15 percent to 20 
percent (CTAR in 2001 and 2002); while LLGG gained most, doubling from 11 percent 
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Transfers to LLGG/total tax collection Transfers to RRGG/total tax collection
Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF (transfers) and SUNAT (tax collection).
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Figure 6.3 – Contribution of each level of government to primary expenditure  
 
Hence, the share of the central government was reduced as a proportion of the general 
government between 2001 and 2010, mainly in response to the high increase in transfers 
to SNG linked to natural resources. With respect to the composition of this reduction in 
terms of current and capital expenditure, Figure 6.4 shows consolidated current 
expenditure by level of government in terms of GDP. As can be seen, consolidated 
current expenditure has decreased from a peak of 13.3 percent of GDP in 2001 to 11.7 
percent in 2010. This reduction is mostly explained by the central government, whose 
share has declined from 10 percent in 2001 to less than 8 percent of GDP in 2010. In turn, 
the participation of RRGG since their creation has also declined, from 2.84 percent of 
GDP in 2003 to 2.43 percent in 2010, due to the relative stagnation in earmarks to 
RRGG; this helps explain the point highlighted in Chapter 4 that the functions transferred 
to RRGG as part of the decentralization process have not been linked to sufficient 
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Source: own elaboration based on SIAF and NAO, MEF. 
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resources to fulfill them. Lastly, the share of LLGG in consolidated current expenditure 
has increased from 1.14 percent to 1.63 percent of GDP; as will be seen below, this is 
mainly explained by the fact that those LLGG that receive large transfers from natural 
resources devote most of their other sources of income (own resources and other 
transfers) to current expenditures.  
Figure 6.4 – Contribution of each level of government to consolidated current 
expenditure (as proportion of GDP) 
 
In turn, public investment in Peru has undergone a dramatic change during the 
past decade (see Figure 6.5): first, between 2001 and 2010 the participation of 
consolidated capital expenditure in terms of GDP has more than doubled, from 3 percent 
to 6.2 percent. Second, public investment is now mostly executed by SNG: while in 2001 
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proportion declined to 43 percent. This last figure is up from a nadir of 34 percent in 
2008, largely due to the countercyclical stimulus package of 2009-10 implemented by 
Peru’s central government in the context of the international financial crisis. The increase 
in public investment has been larger for LLGG, which have augmented their share in 1.6 
percentage points between 2001 and 2010, but it has also been important for RRGG, 
whose participation was in 2010 one percentage point higher than in 2001.  
Figure 6.5 – Contribution of each level of government to consolidated capital 
expenditure (as proportion of GDP) 
 
This larger share of SNG in public investment is mainly explained by the increase 
in transfers linked to natural resources, which as mentioned above are mostly earmarked 
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of SNG also increased due to large discretionary transfers from the central government, 
to compensate for the decline in regular transfers due to the international financial crisis. 
To summarize, the share of Peru’s central government in the primary expenditure 
of the general government has decreased between 2001 and 2010 from 74 percent to 58 
percent, mainly at the expense of LLGG and to a lower degree RRGG. This is largely 
explained by the fact that most tax collection from extractive industries, which is the tax 
revenue with highest growth and volatility in Peru during the last decade, is automatically 
transferred to SNG, particularly to LLGG. In terms of the composition of expenditure by 
economic classification, the central government has declined its participation both in 
current and capital expenditure; RRGG have increased slightly their participation in 
current expenditure and significantly in capital expenditure; while LLGG have increased 
significantly their participation in both current and capital expenditure.  
Alternatively, the analysis shows that due to the increase in transfers, especially 
those linked to natural resources, the central government has reduced its control of tax 
collection between 2003 and 2010 from 74 percent to 65 percent (Figure 6.2), which is a 
measure of the higher restriction it faced by 2010 in its fiscal space to conduct counter-
cyclical fiscal policy.  
 
The second question of this section is whether the size of the general government 
has augmented relative to GDP in response to the increase in transfers. In this regard, 
Figure 6.6 combines Figures 6.4 and 6.5 above to portray the evolution of Peru’s 
consolidated primary expenditure relative to GDP between 2001 and 2010. As can be 
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seen, the size of Peru’s consolidated primary expenditure in 2010 was 17.9 percent of 
GDP, which was 1.7 percentage points higher than the average value for the period. This 
increase is mainly explained by the higher participation of SNG, especially LLGG, in the 
general government. Indeed, in 2010 LLGG’s primary expenditure was 3.9 percent of 
GDP, which was 1.3 percentage points higher than the average value for the series. In 
turn, RRGG’s primary expenditure in 2010 was 3.7 percent of GDP, 0.4 percentage 
points larger than the average value, and the central government’s primary expenditure in 
2010 was 10.3 percent of GDP, which was similar to the average for the series. Hence, 
LLGG contributed 75 percent of the increase in consolidated primary expenditure, while 
RRGG contributed 25 percent.  
Figure 6.6 – Contribution of each level of government to primary expenditure (as 
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LLGG also have the most volatile primary expenditure: the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the average of the series is 0.32 for LLGG, while it is 0.13 for RRGG and 0.1 
for the central government. As depicted in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, the increase in 
consolidated primary expenditure was due to higher public investment and it would have 
been higher had it not been for the relative decline of current expenditures, mainly from 
the central government. Noteworthy, in 2009-10 public investment by the central 
government increased by 1.23 percentage points of GDP, and it also increased in SNG 
partly due to larger discretionary transfers in the context of the international crisis. 
Hence, the size of Peru’s general government, measured by consolidated primary 
expenditure, has increased during the past decade, mainly due to the higher expenditure 
of LLGG and to a lower degree RRGG, which is associated to the surge in transfers, 
especially those linked to the extraction of natural resources. Did this increase in 
consolidated primary expenditure worsen Peru’s fiscal position in terms of higher deficits 
and/or debt? Figure 6.7 shows that, largely thanks to the public savings accumulated 
between 2006 and 2008, Peru´s central government was able to conduct counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy, expanding public expenditure in 2009-10 without increasing indebtedness 
in terms of GDP. In turn, as depicted in Figures 6.1, 6.4 and 6.5, the savings accumulated 
by the central government until 2008 came largely from higher tax collection, especially 
from extractive industries during 2006-2008; a relative decline in current expenditures; 
and a relative stagnation of public investment during those years.  
As analyzed below, SNG also contributed to public savings, especially in 2007, 
by increasing their expenditures with a lag in response to the surge in transfers linked to 
natural resources. However, as suggested in Figures 6.4 through 6.6, between 2008 and 
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2010 SNG increased their expenditures substantially, especially at the local level, 
contributing to the growth of consolidated primary expenditure relative to GDP.  
Figure 6.7 – Evolution of economic result (left axis) and indebtedness (right axis) of 
Peru´s non-financial public sector (as proportion of GDP) 
 
Below I analyze in detail the evolution of public accounts of LLGG in Peru, 
evaluating the fiscal decisions of municipalities in response to transfers, and whether this 
has worsened their fiscal position, generating fiscal risks to the general government 
through lower own revenue collection (fiscal sloth) and/or a high increase of expenditure 
in response to transfers (flypaper effect).  
Analysis of the effect of transfers on fiscal decisions of LLGG 
In this section I describe the evolution of fiscal aggregates of LLGG, trying to 
assess the third question of this dissertation: have LLGG worsened their fiscal position in 
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balance of LLGG, which is the difference between total income minus primary 
expenditure, between 1998 and 2010. It also includes a series showing total income 
without ordinary resources (OORR) to LLGG, to highlight the discretionary transfers 
from the central government in 2009 and 2010, included under ordinary resources, to 
compensate municipalities for the decline in other transfers during the international 
financial crisis of 2009. Figure 6.8 shows that total income of LLGG starts to grow in 
2002, which is when the canon law began to be implemented, and jumps substantially in 
2007, due to high tax collection in extractive industries (see Figure 6.1), and a change in 
the allocation formula of the mining canon, by which in July 2007 SNG received all the 
canon that was owed to them during 2006 and the last five months of 2005.  
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Source: own elaboration based on local government budgets provided by NAO, MEF
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In 2008 and 2009 the rate of growth of total income slows down, and in particular 
in 2009 it would have decreased substantially had it not been for the large discretionary 
transfers from the national government included under ordinary resources. In turn, the 
slowdown in 2008 and the decline in total income without ordinary resources in 2009, is 
mostly explained by the reduction in transfers from natural resources. Lastly, as the world 
economy improved in 2010 and the prices of extractive industries jumped again, total 
income of LLGG recovered, and it also benefited from the introduction of new transfers 
(PI&PMM), and the still large discretionary transfers from the central government 
included under ordinary resources.  
In turn, primary expenditure has tended to react with a lag to increases in 
transfers. In 2007 this was accentuated for two main reasons: first, LLGG had little time 
to react to the unexpected windfall of transfers they received in July of that year, 
especially from mining canon; and second, only 27 percent of mayors were reelected in 
the subnational elections of late 2006, which meant that most authorities were relatively 
inexperienced and unable to rapidly execute the windfall transfers they received. 
However, starting in 2008 primary expenditure had a sharp reaction, growing by 97 
percent between 2007 and 2010, at an annual average rate of 25 percent in current terms. 
Indeed, in 2009 and 2010 LLGG had an aggregate primary deficit, in spite of the fact that 
transfers continued increasing, and these deficits would have been much larger had it not 
been for the large discretionary transfers to LLGG in the context of the crisis of 2009.  
Table 6.1 below presents in detail the evolution of the main fiscal aggregates of 
LLGG in Peru between 1998 and 2010. The upper pane shows the evolution in current 
Peruvian S./ and the last column presents the yearly annual growth of the series in 
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constant 2002 S./. The lower pane presents the main components of income and 
expenditure as percent of the total, along with some key fiscal performance indicators. 
With respect to current own income of LLGG, it grew at an annual rate of 8.05 percent in 
constant terms, with local taxes (10.23 percent) growing faster than user fees, 
contributions and other income (6.78 percent). Comparatively, total tax collection of the 
central government grew at an annual rate of 9.64 percent in constant terms during the 
same period. Hence, this value does not give indication of “fiscal sloth” at the local level, 
by which the growth in transfers discourages local own revenue collection, at least at the 
aggregate level of LLGG.  
On the other hand, as described above, the growth in transfers is remarkable: 
almost 18 percent per year in constant terms. Natural resources and transfers grew most 
(27.78 percent), although falling abruptly in 2009 and growing again in 2010. Earmarks 
and other transfers also grew significantly (24.05 percent), although mainly in 2009 and 
2010. Lastly, FONCOMUN fell in 2009 due to the economic slowdown of that year and 
the adjustments to the base of Peru’s VAT that is used for this transfer; but in spite of this 
fall it grew by 8.8 percent per year in constant terms throughout the series. 
With respect to expenditures, since most transfers from natural resources are 
earmarked to public investment, capital expenditures grew more than current 
expenditures, at an annual rate of 18.31 percent vs. 11.66 percent for current expenditures 
in constant terms. Both figures are high, and primary expenditure grew at an annual rate 
of 14.91 percent in constant terms, which is higher than the figure for total income (14.12 
percent), although this growth rate does not capture the accumulated savings of 2007-08.  
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Table 6.1 – Evolution of fiscal aggregates of LLGG in Peru 
Local Government Budget by economic concept 
(in millons of current Peruvian S./)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average annual 
growth in constant 
2002 S./
I. Current own income S/. 1,427 S/. 1,437 S/. 1,508 S/. 1,566 S/. 1,733 S/. 1,871 S/. 2,137 S/. 2,288 S/. 2,201 S/. 2,771 S/. 3,367 S/. 3,645 S/. 3,826 8.05%
Local Taxes S/. 470 S/. 421 S/. 447 S/. 453 S/. 525 S/. 595 S/. 658 S/. 718 S/. 726 S/. 1,093 S/. 1,310 S/. 1,414 S/. 1,601 10.23%
User fees, contributions and other current income S/. 957 S/. 1,016 S/. 1,062 S/. 1,113 S/. 1,208 S/. 1,276 S/. 1,479 S/. 1,570 S/. 1,475 S/. 1,678 S/. 2,057 S/. 2,231 S/. 2,225 6.78%
II. Capital income S/. 28 S/. 16 S/. 15 S/. 20 S/. 27 S/. 12 S/. 27 S/. 17 S/. 30 S/. 11 S/. 25 S/. 26 S/. 78 8.42%
III. Total transfers S/. 1,650 S/. 1,644 S/. 1,827 S/. 1,872 S/. 2,027 S/. 2,599 S/. 3,612 S/. 4,210 S/. 5,770 S/. 9,588 S/. 10,562 S/. 10,993 S/. 12,132 17.53%
Foncomun S/. 1,118 S/. 1,134 S/. 1,253 S/. 1,279 S/. 1,329 S/. 1,528 S/. 1,729 S/. 1,957 S/. 2,324 S/. 2,758 S/. 3,257 S/. 3,006 S/. 3,257 8.80%
Natural resources and customs S/. 233 S/. 191 S/. 229 S/. 233 S/. 318 S/. 581 S/. 812 S/. 1,574 S/. 2,553 S/. 5,389 S/. 5,318 S/. 4,175 S/. 4,672 27.78%
Earmarks and other transfers S/. 299 S/. 319 S/. 345 S/. 360 S/. 380 S/. 490 S/. 1,071 S/. 680 S/. 893 S/. 1,441 S/. 1,986 S/. 3,812 S/. 4,203 24.05%
IV. Total income (I + II + III) S/. 3,104 S/. 3,097 S/. 3,351 S/. 3,459 S/. 3,787 S/. 4,482 S/. 5,776 S/. 6,516 S/. 8,001 S/. 12,370 S/. 13,954 S/. 14,663 S/. 16,036 14.12%
V. Current expenditure S/. 1,820 S/. 2,016 S/. 2,085 S/. 2,152 S/. 2,259 S/. 2,613 S/. 3,307 S/. 3,396 S/. 3,732 S/. 4,537 S/. 5,531 S/. 6,261 S/. 7,240 11.66%
Personnel, social and pension contributions S/. 647 S/. 723 S/. 738 S/. 753 S/. 822 S/. 984 S/. 1,061 S/. 1,152 S/. 1,225 S/. 1,379 S/. 1,544 S/. 1,892 S/. 2,149 10.00%
Goods, services and other current expenditure S/. 1,173 S/. 1,293 S/. 1,348 S/. 1,399 S/. 1,438 S/. 1,630 S/. 2,246 S/. 2,243 S/. 2,507 S/. 3,159 S/. 3,987 S/. 4,369 S/. 5,091 12.48%
VI. Capital expenditure S/. 1,268 S/. 1,206 S/. 1,239 S/. 1,216 S/. 1,280 S/. 1,407 S/. 2,064 S/. 2,243 S/. 3,814 S/. 4,278 S/. 7,391 S/. 9,284 S/. 10,091 18.31%
VII. Primary expenditure  (V + VI) S/. 3,088 S/. 3,222 S/. 3,325 S/. 3,368 S/. 3,539 S/. 4,020 S/. 5,371 S/. 5,638 S/. 7,546 S/. 8,815 S/. 12,922 S/. 15,546 S/. 17,330 14.91%
VIII. Primary result (IV - VII) S/. 16 -S/. 125 S/. 26 S/. 91 S/. 248 S/. 462 S/. 405 S/. 878 S/. 455 S/. 3,555 S/. 1,032 -S/. 882 -S/. 1,295
IX. Debt interest and charges S/. 48 S/. 63 S/. 85 S/. 131 S/. 113 S/. 93 S/. 103 S/. 83 S/. 53 S/. 33 S/. 34 S/. 38 S/. 369 17.90%
X. Economic result (VIII - IX) -S/. 32 -S/. 188 -S/. 59 -S/. 40 S/. 135 S/. 369 S/. 302 S/. 795 S/. 402 S/. 3,522 S/. 998 -S/. 920 -S/. 1,664
XI. Financing S/. 300 S/. 438 S/. 423 S/. 443 S/. 305 S/. 456 S/. 722 S/. 877 S/. 1,403 S/. 1,752 S/. 5,468 S/. 6,487 S/. 5,748 31.78%
Balance from previous years S/. 171 S/. 72 S/. 199 S/. 218 S/. 189 S/. 139 S/. 557 S/. 706 S/. 1,298 S/. 1,525 S/. 5,142 S/. 6,152 S/. 5,503 32.91%
Credit operations S/. 129 S/. 366 S/. 224 S/. 224 S/. 116 S/. 317 S/. 165 S/. 171 S/. 104 S/. 227 S/. 326 S/. 334 S/. 244
XII. Debt service S/. 251 S/. 113 S/. 192 S/. 228 S/. 248 S/. 167 S/. 259 S/. 330 S/. 260 S/. 160 S/. 204 S/. 222 S/. 354
Principal payment S/. 251 S/. 113 S/. 192 S/. 228 S/. 248 S/. 167 S/. 259 S/. 330 S/. 260 S/. 160 S/. 204 S/. 222 S/. 354
XIII. Net financing (XI - XII) S/. 50 S/. 324 S/. 231 S/. 189 S/. 34 S/. 280 S/. 452 S/. 530 S/. 1,135 S/. 1,587 S/. 5,263 S/. 6,264 S/. 5,394
XIV. Expected balance for next year (X + XIII) S/. 18 S/. 136 S/. 172 S/. 148 S/. 169 S/. 649 S/. 754 S/. 1,326 S/. 1,537 S/. 5,109 S/. 6,261 S/. 5,344 S/. 3,730
XV. Net municipal debt* S/. 1,172 S/. 1,569 S/. 1,865 S/. 2,299 S/. 2,562 S/. 2,805 S/. 2,807 S/. 2,753 S/. 2,714 S/. 3,025 S/. 3,592 S/. 4,696 S/. 4,314 10.95%
XVI. Net municipal debt as percent of GDP 0.90% 1.00% 1.22% 1.28% 1.31% 1.18% 1.05% 0.90% 0.90% 0.95% 1.20% 0.97%
Local Government Budget by economic concept 
(% of total)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average 1998-
2010
I. Current income 45.96% 46.40% 45.02% 45.29% 45.76% 41.74% 37.00% 35.12% 27.51% 22.40% 24.13% 24.86% 23.86% 35.77%
Local Taxes 15.14% 13.59% 13.33% 13.11% 13.86% 13.28% 11.39% 11.02% 9.08% 8.83% 9.39% 9.64% 9.98% 11.67%
User fees, contributions and other current income 30.82% 32.80% 31.69% 32.18% 31.90% 28.47% 25.61% 24.10% 18.43% 13.56% 14.74% 15.21% 13.88% 24.11%
II. Capital income 0.90% 0.53% 0.46% 0.58% 0.71% 0.27% 0.47% 0.26% 0.37% 0.09% 0.18% 0.17% 0.49% 0.42%
III. Transfers 53.15% 53.08% 54.53% 54.13% 53.53% 57.98% 62.53% 64.62% 72.12% 77.51% 75.69% 74.97% 75.66% 63.81%
IV. Total income (I + II + III) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
V. Current expenditure 58.93% 62.56% 62.72% 63.90% 63.84% 65.00% 61.57% 60.23% 49.46% 51.47% 42.81% 40.28% 41.77% 55.73%
Personnel, social and pension contributions 20.94% 22.43% 22.18% 22.35% 23.21% 24.47% 19.76% 20.44% 16.24% 15.64% 11.95% 12.17% 12.40% 18.78%
Goods, services and other current expenditure 37.99% 40.13% 40.54% 41.55% 40.62% 40.53% 41.82% 39.79% 33.22% 35.83% 30.85% 28.11% 29.37% 36.95%
VI. Capital expenditure 41.07% 37.44% 37.28% 36.10% 36.16% 35.00% 38.43% 39.77% 50.54% 48.53% 57.19% 59.72% 58.23% 44.27%
VII. Primary expenditure  (V + VI) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
VIII. Own income/Current expenditure 78.40% 71.29% 72.34% 72.78% 76.71% 71.60% 64.62% 67.39% 58.97% 61.06% 60.87% 58.21% 52.85% 66.70%
IX. Own income/Debt 121.76% 91.57% 80.90% 68.13% 67.64% 66.71% 76.13% 83.11% 81.09% 91.58% 93.73% 77.62% 88.68% 83.74%
X. % of Foncomun for current expenditure 19.55% 27.02% 27.00% 27.23% 28.15% 44.22% 43.23% 46.76% 49.42% 58.29% 55.75% 56.47% 58.69% 41.67%
* Net municipal debt is total debt minus deferred income and provision for social benefits.
Source: own elaboration based on information provided by NAO, MEF.
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Indeed, as shown in Figure 6.8 above, the evolution of the primary result and the 
economic result (which includes debt interest and charges) shows that LLGG experienced 
a large surplus in 2007 and to a lower degree in 2008, which they partially used to 
finance their deficits in 2009 and 2010. In this regard, the accumulated savings of LLGG, 
which reached S./ 6,152 million at the start of 2009, are expected to have declined by 
almost 40 percent to S./ 3,730 million at the start of 2011. Lastly, as shown in lines XV 
and XVI of Table 6.1, LLGG in general do not have a problem with municipal debt: 
although it grew 10.66 percent per year in constant terms, it barely grew in terms of GDP, 
although as mentioned above with reference to the studies of World Bank (2006) and 
Moron et al (2010), municipal debt is underestimated due to arrears and miss-registration 
of debt of many LLGG with other public institutions.   
The lower pane in Table 6.1 shows the significant increase in the vertical fiscal 
imbalance of LLGG in Peru, which measures the proportion of transfers in total income. 
Indeed, the dependency on transfers has grown by more than 20 percentage points, from 
53.15 percent to 75.6 percent of total income. On the other hand, capital expenditure has 
also increased significantly its importance in primary expenditure, from 41.07 percent to 
58.23 percent, which is mainly due to the requirement to spend most of the transfers 
linked to natural resources in public investment. Noteworthy, the capacity of LLGG to 
finance their current expenditure with their own income has declined substantially (line 
VIII in lower pane), from 78.4 percent to 52.9 percent, which is indicative that LLGG 
increasingly need to finance their current expenditure with transfers. Indeed, line X 
shows that the percentage of FONCOMUN used for current expenditure has increased 
significantly throughout the series, from 19.55 percent to 58.69 percent. Lastly, the 
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capacity of LLGG to pay their debt with their own income has also decreased, from 99.12 
percent to 74.48 percent (line IX).  
These three indicators suggest that LLGG have a higher exposure to changes in 
transfers, since their capacity to use their own resources to finance current expenditures, 
which are relatively rigid, is increasingly reduced.  
Fiscal response of LLGG to transfers according to their different characteristics 
In order to have a more complete picture of the fiscal response of LLGG to 
transfers, here I consider the different categories of LLGG laid out above. I focus initially 
on the evolution of total income, disaggregated in own income and transfers; and primary 
expenditure, with its components of current and capital expenditure, for each category of 
LLGG, along with the annual average growth of each series in constant 2002 S./.  
Table 6.2 shows the evolution of the share of each type of LLGG (PPGG and 
DDGG) in total income and primary expenditure, along with the annual growth of each 
series in constant 2002 S./. PPGG increased slightly their share in total own income 
throughout the period. In turn, DDGG increased substantially their share in total 
transfers, and in turn in total income. Hence, it should not be a surprise that DDGG have 
increased their share in current expenditure and especially in capital expenditure. Both 
for PPGG and DDGG total expenditures have grown more than total income between 
1998 and 2010, especially due to the high growth in capital expenditures.   
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Table 6.2 – Share of LLGG by type in total income and expenditure  
 
With respect to the evolution of the share of fiscal aggregates according to need 
groups, Table 6.3 shows that LLGG with higher needs have increased their share of own 
income relative to LLGG with medium needs, which is surprising given that LLGG with 
higher needs tend to be associated with lower fiscal and administrative capacities. 
Moreover, the average annual growth in primary expenditure is higher for LLGG with 
high and very high need, although the average annual growth in total income is also 
higher for them.  
Table 6.3 Share of LLGG by need groups in total income and expenditure 
 




Own income 45.7% 46.3% 45.6% 44.8% 45.3% 44.5% 47.2% 45.4% 44.2% 46.6% 46.5% 46.5% 49.6% 8.8%
Total transfers 44.9% 42.6% 42.4% 40.7% 38.6% 38.4% 35.7% 37.7% 35.8% 34.3% 32.2% 33.0% 32.3% 14.4%
Total income 45.2% 44.3% 43.8% 42.6% 41.7% 40.9% 40.0% 40.4% 38.1% 37.1% 35.7% 36.4% 36.5% 12.1%
Current expenditure 44.1% 44.0% 42.9% 42.5% 41.7% 39.8% 39.3% 41.4% 42.1% 42.5% 41.4% 40.3% 40.3% 10.8%
Capital expenditure 48.0% 43.7% 46.0% 44.8% 42.1% 36.1% 37.5% 38.0% 35.6% 31.9% 33.1% 34.6% 35.3% 15.3%
Primary expenditure 45.7% 43.9% 44.1% 43.3% 41.9% 38.5% 38.6% 40.1% 38.8% 37.4% 36.6% 36.9% 37.4% 13.0%
Own income 54.3% 53.7% 54.4% 55.2% 54.7% 55.5% 52.8% 54.6% 55.8% 53.4% 53.5% 53.5% 50.4% 7.4%
Total transfers 55.1% 57.4% 57.6% 59.3% 61.4% 61.6% 64.3% 62.3% 64.2% 65.7% 67.8% 67.0% 67.7% 19.6%
Total income 54.8% 55.7% 56.2% 57.4% 58.3% 59.1% 60.0% 59.6% 61.9% 62.9% 64.3% 63.6% 63.5% 15.5%
Current expenditure 55.9% 56.0% 57.1% 57.5% 58.3% 60.2% 60.7% 58.6% 57.9% 57.5% 58.6% 59.7% 59.7% 12.3%
Capital expenditure 52.0% 56.3% 54.0% 55.2% 57.9% 63.9% 62.5% 62.0% 64.4% 68.1% 66.9% 65.4% 64.7% 20.5%





Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF




Own income 2.6% 2.4% 2.4% 3.0% 3.2% 2.9% 2.8% 2.9% 3.5% 3.1% 3.6% 3.4% 3.0% 9.6%
Total transfers 19.2% 19.4% 19.4% 19.9% 20.0% 19.3% 22.7% 20.8% 20.5% 20.8% 20.2% 20.6% 21.2% 18.5%
Total income 11.4% 11.4% 11.7% 12.2% 12.2% 12.4% 15.2% 14.5% 15.8% 16.8% 16.2% 16.3% 16.8% 17.9%
Current expenditure 6.7% 6.6% 7.4% 7.7% 8.1% 8.6% 10.5% 10.1% 10.7% 10.8% 11.6% 11.8% 11.8% 17.2%
Capital expenditure 17.8% 19.6% 18.4% 19.4% 18.7% 19.4% 21.3% 22.3% 20.9% 22.7% 20.4% 18.5% 19.7% 19.3%
Primary expenditure 11.2% 11.5% 11.5% 11.9% 12.0% 12.4% 14.6% 15.0% 15.9% 16.6% 16.6% 15.8% 16.4% 18.6%
Own income 6.9% 6.6% 6.2% 6.7% 6.8% 7.0% 6.7% 6.4% 7.3% 7.0% 7.5% 7.9% 7.4% 8.8%
Total transfers 24.3% 25.7% 26.2% 26.8% 25.8% 24.8% 26.6% 28.0% 27.8% 26.0% 27.5% 27.1% 29.6% 19.5%
Total income 16.1% 16.7% 17.1% 17.5% 17.0% 17.3% 19.1% 20.3% 22.1% 21.8% 22.7% 22.3% 24.2% 18.0%
Current expenditure 11.1% 11.1% 11.7% 12.1% 12.4% 13.7% 15.0% 14.5% 16.4% 16.1% 16.5% 16.7% 17.2% 15.9%
Capital expenditure 22.3% 26.1% 25.4% 25.4% 23.6% 25.3% 24.5% 25.6% 27.8% 26.6% 27.2% 27.2% 26.9% 20.2%
Primary expenditure 15.7% 16.7% 16.8% 16.9% 16.5% 17.8% 18.7% 18.9% 22.2% 21.2% 22.6% 22.9% 22.8% 18.6%
Own income 90.5% 91.0% 91.4% 90.3% 90.0% 90.1% 90.5% 90.7% 89.2% 89.8% 88.8% 88.7% 89.5% 8.0%
Total transfers 56.5% 54.9% 54.4% 53.3% 54.2% 55.9% 50.7% 51.2% 51.7% 53.2% 52.3% 52.3% 49.2% 16.2%
Total income 72.4% 71.9% 71.2% 70.3% 70.8% 70.3% 65.6% 65.2% 62.1% 61.4% 61.2% 61.4% 59.0% 12.2%
Current expenditure 82.3% 82.2% 81.0% 80.2% 79.4% 77.6% 74.5% 75.5% 72.9% 73.1% 72.0% 71.5% 70.9% 10.3%
Capital expenditure 59.9% 54.3% 56.2% 55.2% 57.6% 55.2% 54.2% 52.1% 51.2% 50.7% 52.4% 54.3% 53.4% 17.2%
Primary expenditure 73.1% 71.8% 71.7% 71.2% 71.6% 69.8% 66.7% 66.2% 61.9% 62.3% 60.8% 61.2% 60.7% 13.2%
Very high need - 




High need - 




Medium need - 




Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF
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Table 6.4 shows the evolution of the share of fiscal aggregates by size groups: 
noteworthy, the share of own income of LLGG with less than 500 urban houses increases 
throughout the period. Moreover, the share of smaller LLGG in total income, and in 
current and especially capital expenditure increases throughout the period, mainly due to 
higher transfers.   
Table 6.4 – Share of LLGG by size groups in total income and expenditure 
 
Table 6.5 presents the evolution of the share of fiscal aggregates of LLGG 
according to resource groups. The group of LLGG of more resources per capita 
concentrates only 3 percent of the country’s population, but has increased substantially its 
share in total income (13.5 percent) and primary expenditure (15.6 percent), albeit with 
high volatility, given that it includes the LLGG that receive largest transfers per capita 
from natural resources and customs. To a lower degree, this is also the case of LLGG 
with medium resources. Noteworthy, the share of own income of LLGG with more 
resources increases relative to the other groups; and the rate of growth of primary 
expenditure is higher than for total income in all resource groups, which is striking in the 
case of LLGG with more resources, given the high rate of growth of total income.  




Own income 89.1% 91.3% 91.8% 90.1% 88.7% 90.0% 90.2% 89.2% 87.1% 87.8% 87.1% 85.9% 87.7% 7.9%
Total transfers 54.9% 52.6% 51.5% 50.1% 49.4% 51.1% 44.9% 45.0% 42.6% 40.9% 41.2% 43.7% 42.3% 15.0%
Total income 70.9% 70.8% 69.8% 68.5% 67.6% 67.4% 61.9% 60.6% 55.0% 51.4% 52.4% 54.3% 53.3% 11.4%
Current expenditure 82.5% 82.0% 80.7% 79.9% 78.3% 76.9% 73.2% 74.4% 72.1% 71.1% 69.4% 68.2% 68.1% 9.9%
Capital expenditure 56.0% 50.5% 53.6% 50.8% 51.5% 47.5% 46.2% 43.6% 41.7% 36.8% 41.1% 44.9% 43.1% 15.8%
Primary expenditure 71.6% 70.2% 70.6% 69.4% 68.6% 66.6% 62.8% 62.2% 56.7% 54.5% 53.2% 54.3% 53.6% 12.2%
Own income 8.7% 6.5% 6.4% 7.0% 8.8% 7.6% 7.1% 7.1% 8.7% 8.2% 8.8% 9.4% 8.3% 7.6%
Total transfers 27.9% 28.8% 28.4% 28.4% 27.2% 26.1% 29.3% 32.3% 33.2% 34.8% 34.2% 33.4% 35.0% 19.8%
Total income 18.9% 18.3% 18.4% 18.6% 18.6% 18.3% 21.0% 23.4% 26.3% 28.8% 28.0% 27.4% 28.5% 18.1%
Current expenditure 12.0% 11.9% 12.3% 12.7% 13.6% 14.3% 15.9% 15.5% 17.2% 18.1% 19.2% 20.4% 20.3% 16.7%
Capital expenditure 28.1% 30.0% 26.7% 27.2% 25.9% 26.6% 27.2% 31.6% 31.9% 33.6% 33.1% 33.1% 34.0% 20.2%
Primary expenditure 18.6% 18.7% 17.7% 18.0% 18.1% 18.6% 20.3% 21.9% 24.6% 25.6% 27.2% 28.0% 28.3% 19.0%
Own income 2.3% 2.2% 1.9% 2.8% 2.5% 2.4% 2.7% 3.7% 4.2% 4.0% 4.1% 4.7% 4.1% 13.5%
Total transfers 17.2% 18.6% 20.1% 21.4% 23.5% 22.9% 25.7% 22.7% 24.3% 24.4% 24.6% 22.9% 22.7% 20.3%
Total income 10.2% 10.9% 11.8% 12.9% 13.7% 14.3% 17.1% 16.0% 18.7% 19.8% 19.6% 18.4% 18.2% 19.8%
Current expenditure 5.6% 6.1% 7.0% 7.4% 8.1% 8.9% 10.8% 10.0% 10.7% 10.7% 11.3% 11.3% 11.6% 18.7%
Capital expenditure 15.9% 19.5% 19.7% 22.0% 22.5% 25.9% 26.6% 24.8% 26.5% 29.6% 25.7% 22.0% 22.9% 21.9%
Primary expenditure 9.8% 11.1% 11.7% 12.6% 13.3% 14.8% 16.9% 15.9% 18.6% 19.9% 19.6% 17.7% 18.2% 21.0%
Main cities - 




More than 500 
houses - 30% 
of LLGG, 20% 
of country's 
population
Less than 500 
houses - 56% 
of LLGG, 13% 
of country's 
population
Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF
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Table 6.5 – Share of LLGG by resource groups in total income and expenditure 
 
Lastly, Table 6.6 presents the evolution of the share of fiscal aggregates by main 
transfer group. As expected, it shows that LLGG that received mining and gas as main 
transfer have increased substantially their share in total income. In both cases primary 
expenditure has eventually caught up with the high growth rate of income. In spite of the 
growth in transfers, for LLGG that receive mining and gas as main transfer own income 
has also grown substantially, even higher than for LLGG in which FONCOMUN is the 
main transfer. Lastly, for LLGG where oil is the main transfer, which relative to mining 
and gas grows at a lower rate but also has less volatility, there is a relatively higher 








Own income 2.3% 2.3% 2.1% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 3.7% 4.7% 4.9% 4.8% 6.2% 4.7% 14.9%
Total transfers 6.4% 5.1% 4.7% 5.6% 6.5% 6.8% 7.9% 15.9% 20.9% 26.9% 23.1% 17.6% 16.4% 27.2%
Total income 4.4% 3.8% 3.5% 4.4% 4.9% 5.2% 6.1% 11.6% 16.4% 21.9% 18.6% 14.7% 13.5% 25.2%
Current expenditure 2.4% 2.6% 2.7% 3.1% 3.5% 3.7% 4.1% 4.3% 5.2% 7.0% 8.3% 8.9% 8.6% 24.2%
Capital expenditure 7.7% 5.9% 4.9% 6.1% 7.4% 7.9% 8.5% 14.2% 21.8% 25.2% 25.3% 20.8% 20.7% 28.5%
Primary expenditure 4.6% 3.8% 3.5% 4.2% 4.9% 5.2% 5.8% 8.3% 13.6% 15.8% 18.0% 16.1% 15.6% 27.3%
Own income 10.8% 8.4% 8.7% 9.2% 9.1% 8.7% 8.4% 8.9% 8.6% 9.3% 9.6% 10.0% 9.9% 7.2%
Total transfers 20.9% 20.3% 20.0% 20.6% 20.4% 20.4% 22.7% 24.3% 23.4% 26.2% 25.0% 23.2% 22.3% 18.2%
Total income 16.2% 14.7% 14.8% 15.4% 15.1% 15.5% 17.3% 18.8% 19.3% 22.4% 21.2% 19.9% 19.3% 15.8%
Current expenditure 11.6% 11.2% 11.1% 11.8% 12.0% 12.5% 13.1% 13.4% 13.6% 14.2% 15.2% 15.5% 15.6% 14.4%
Capital expenditure 22.3% 20.0% 20.6% 20.5% 20.3% 20.9% 23.2% 24.8% 25.2% 25.0% 25.8% 23.8% 23.5% 18.8%
Primary expenditure 16.0% 14.5% 14.6% 14.9% 15.0% 15.5% 17.0% 17.9% 19.5% 19.4% 21.3% 20.5% 20.2% 17.2%
Own income 86.9% 89.4% 89.2% 87.8% 87.9% 88.3% 88.5% 87.4% 86.7% 85.8% 85.6% 83.8% 85.4% 7.9%
Total transfers 72.8% 74.6% 75.4% 73.8% 73.1% 72.8% 69.4% 59.8% 55.7% 46.9% 52.0% 59.3% 61.3% 15.9%
Total income 79.4% 81.5% 81.6% 80.2% 80.0% 79.3% 76.6% 69.6% 64.3% 55.7% 60.2% 65.4% 67.2% 12.5%
Current expenditure 86.0% 86.2% 86.2% 85.1% 84.4% 83.7% 82.8% 82.3% 81.1% 78.8% 76.5% 75.5% 75.8% 10.5%
Capital expenditure 70.1% 74.1% 74.5% 73.4% 72.3% 71.2% 68.3% 61.0% 53.0% 49.9% 48.9% 55.3% 55.8% 16.1%
Primary expenditure 79.4% 81.7% 81.8% 80.9% 80.0% 79.4% 77.2% 73.8% 66.9% 64.8% 60.7% 63.5% 64.2% 12.9%
Less resources - 





- 11% of 









Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF
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To complement this analysis, Figures 6.9 through 6.23 break down the evolution 
of fiscal aggregates of LLGG presented in Figure 6.8 (total income, total income without 
ordinary resources, primary expenditure, accumulated savings and net debt) according to 
the different categories of municipalities used in this dissertation.  
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 present the evolution according to type of LLGG (PPGG and 
DDGG). Both series have similar features, with PPGG holding a higher proportion of net 
debt with respect to total income (36 percent for PPGG vs. 22 percent for DDGG). 




Own income 78.6% 80.5% 80.6% 79.7% 79.1% 79.3% 80.0% 78.8% 77.2% 77.2% 76.7% 74.6% 76.6% 7.8%
Total transfers 67.6% 68.3% 67.2% 67.6% 66.5% 64.5% 61.4% 53.2% 48.6% 39.1% 43.1% 49.5% 50.8% 14.8%
Total income 72.7% 74.0% 73.3% 73.1% 72.4% 70.7% 68.4% 62.3% 56.6% 47.7% 51.3% 55.8% 57.1% 11.8%
Current expenditure 78.4% 77.9% 77.2% 77.3% 76.7% 74.7% 73.6% 73.7% 71.8% 69.1% 66.6% 65.5% 65.3% 10.0%
Capital expenditure 65.7% 68.1% 66.5% 67.5% 66.0% 62.6% 59.9% 54.6% 47.0% 41.8% 41.1% 47.3% 46.6% 15.0%
Primary expenditure 73.1% 74.2% 73.2% 73.8% 72.9% 70.4% 68.4% 66.1% 59.3% 55.8% 52.0% 54.7% 54.4% 12.1%
Own income 11.8% 12.0% 12.4% 13.5% 14.1% 14.0% 13.3% 14.0% 14.8% 15.7% 15.4% 17.5% 16.1% 10.8%
Total transfers 22.3% 20.6% 20.1% 20.2% 21.3% 22.0% 23.9% 29.6% 35.4% 48.1% 42.0% 36.6% 33.0% 21.4%
Total income 17.4% 16.6% 16.6% 17.1% 17.9% 18.6% 19.9% 24.1% 29.6% 40.8% 35.6% 31.8% 28.9% 19.0%
Current expenditure 13.2% 13.5% 14.2% 14.4% 14.8% 15.3% 16.2% 16.0% 16.9% 18.9% 20.9% 22.4% 22.9% 16.9%
Capital expenditure 23.8% 21.1% 21.4% 21.4% 23.3% 24.7% 27.0% 28.6% 36.3% 44.0% 44.3% 38.9% 40.4% 23.6%
Primary expenditure 17.6% 16.3% 16.9% 16.9% 17.9% 18.6% 20.3% 21.0% 26.7% 31.1% 34.3% 32.3% 33.1% 21.1%
Own income 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.3% 14.5%
Total transfers 3.1% 3.1% 3.0% 3.3% 3.0% 2.8% 4.4% 6.9% 6.8% 6.2% 6.8% 6.7% 8.7% 28.0%
Total income 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 2.2% 2.0% 1.9% 3.1% 4.8% 5.3% 5.1% 5.5% 5.5% 6.9% 26.6%
Current expenditure 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 2.0% 1.9% 2.3% 3.0% 3.3% 3.5% 3.2% 19.6%
Capital expenditure 2.6% 3.0% 2.8% 2.9% 2.4% 2.8% 3.5% 7.5% 8.4% 7.8% 8.3% 7.5% 7.6% 29.4%
Primary expenditure 1.9% 2.0% 1.9% 2.1% 1.9% 2.0% 2.6% 4.1% 5.4% 5.3% 6.1% 5.9% 5.8% 26.1%
Own income 4.0% 1.6% 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% -1.8%
Total transfers 4.8% 5.8% 7.5% 6.7% 6.1% 6.5% 6.2% 6.6% 5.9% 4.0% 5.2% 4.3% 4.5% 17.0%
Total income 4.4% 3.8% 4.7% 4.3% 3.9% 4.3% 4.4% 4.7% 4.6% 3.4% 4.3% 3.6% 3.7% 12.5%
Current expenditure 2.8% 2.7% 2.8% 2.7% 2.7% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 3.7% 3.4% 3.5% 13.7%
Capital expenditure 6.1% 5.7% 7.5% 6.7% 5.4% 6.7% 5.8% 6.4% 6.0% 4.4% 4.2% 4.2% 3.6% 13.1%
Primary expenditure 4.2% 3.8% 4.5% 4.2% 3.7% 4.4% 4.2% 4.5% 4.7% 3.9% 4.0% 3.9% 3.5% 13.4%
Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF
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Figure 6.9 – Fiscal position of Peru’s PPGG (in million of S./) 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budget  information provided by NAO-MEF.
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Figures 6.11 through 6.13 present the evolution of aggregates according to needs: 
LLGG with medium need concentrate most of the debt and the primary deficit in 2010.  
Figure 6.11 – Fiscal position of LLGG with very high need (in million of S./) 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budget information provided by NAO-MEF.
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Figure 6.13 – Fiscal position of LLGG with medium need (in million of S./) 
 
Figures 6.14 through 6.16 show the evolution of fiscal aggregates according to 
size, with main cities having a higher concentration of debt, and LLGG with more than 
500 houses having relatively higher savings.  
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budget information provided by NAO-MEF.
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Figure 6.15 – Fiscal position of LLGG with more than 500 houses (in million of S./) 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budget information provided by NAO-MEF.
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In turn, Figures 6.17 through 6.19 present the evolution of fiscal aggregates 
according to resources per capita. As expected, LLGG with more and medium resources 
accumulated most savings through 2008, and especially in 2007, which was the boom 
year in natural resources transfers, but at the same time show the highest primary deficits 
in 2009 and 2010 due to the continued increase in expenditures in spite of the significant 
decline in total income. Noteworthy, these groups of LLGG were able to finance these 
deficits through accumulated savings, which in the case of LLGG with more resources 
increased to the point of matching total income in 2009. However, the increase in total 
expenditure continued unabated and decreased accumulated savings for LLGG with more 
resources for 2011 in an amount similar to the primary deficit of 2010. 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budget information provided by NAO-MEF.
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Figure 6.18 – Fiscal position of LLGG with medium resources (in million of S./) 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budget information provided by NAO-MEF.
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Lastly, Figures 6.20 through 6.23 present the evolution of fiscal aggregates 
according to main transfer: FONCOMUN (6.20), mining (6.21), gas (6.22) and oil (6.23). 
As can be seen, LLGG with mining as main transfer show the highest volatility of 
income, and due to the continued increase in expenditures they also show the highest 
volatility in fiscal result, concentrating in 2007 the largest surplus (65 percent of total 
surplus) and in 2010 the largest deficit (85 percent of total deficit) among LLGG. 
Noteworthy, for all categories of LLGG, expenditures continue increasing as income 
decreases, with municipalities financing their primary deficits through accumulated 
savings. Indeed, in the case of LLGG where oil is the main transfer, in 2010 the growth in 
expenditure slowed down as the accumulated savings were not enough to cover a large 
primary deficit, and private financing is not an easy option for most LLGG in Peru.  
The different timing in the allocation of transfers in the cases of mining, gas and 
oil help explain the increase in income in 2010 for LLGG where gas and oil is the main 
transfer, which only occurs in mining LLGG in 2011, since the distribution of the mining 
canon is based on the tax collection of the previous year. 
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Figure 6.20 – Fiscal position of FONCOMUN LLGG (in million of S./) 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budget information provided by NAO-MEF.
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Figure 6.22 – Fiscal position of gas LLGG (in million of S./) 
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Source: own elaboration based on LLGG budget information provided by NAO-MEF.
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In the context of the international economic crisis of 2009 and 2010, a relevant 
question relates to the distribution among LLGG of the discretionary resources that the 
central government transferred as “ordinary resources”, included in the stimulus package 
of those years. In particular, I am interested in assessing whether LLGG that had high 
transfers prior to the crisis (especially stemming from natural resources), which also 
suffered most from the decline in transfers in 2009 and 2010, received more ordinary 
resources to compensate for the decline in transfers. If this was the case, it would be 
suggesting the higher dependency that LLGG are developing to transfers, with the 
ensuing higher fiscal risk for the central government.  
Table 6.7 shows per capita transfers of ordinary resources to the different groups 
of LLGG (except for the distinction between provincial and district LLGG).  
Table 6.7 – Per capita transfer of ordinary resources to groups of LLGG (in 
constant 2002 S./) 
 
The classification by resource group shows that LLGG with more resources did 
receive more ordinary resources per capita in 2009 than the other groups of resources. 
Resource Group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2006-2010
More resources 48 90 159 210 39 109
Medium resources 46 75 114 197 46 95
Less resources 31 49 69 147 72 73
Main transfer 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2006-2010
FONCOMUN 42 69 103 188 73 95
Mining 30 50 80 145 46 70
Gas 22 34 51 91 34 46
Oil 24 31 39 104 52 50
BUN Group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2006-2010
Very high need 34 58 80 147 53 74
High need 43 68 101 173 76 92
Medium need 33 55 88 174 56 81
Size Group 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2006-2010
Main cities 12 14 18 87 60 38
More than 500 houses 23 35 47 137 76 64
Less than 500 houses 50 86 131 202 54 104
Source: own elaboration based on information by NAO-MEF
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However, the growth in ordinary resources between 2008 and 2009 has been lower than 
for the other groups, and in 2010 ordinary resources per capita declined most in LLGG 
with more resources.  
In turn, the classification by main transfer group displays that the group in which 
total income without ordinary resources declined proportionally most in 2009, which is 
LLGG with oil as main transfer, is also the group where ordinary resources increased 
most during that year and in 2010.  
Lastly, the classification by size group in the lower pane of Table 6.7 shows that 
the main determinant of the distribution of ordinary resources in 2009 and 2010 appears 
to be population size, since it is in main cities and in LLGG with more than 500 urban 
houses where per capita transfers grew most in 2009 and 2010, relative to 2008. Since 
those two groups of LLGG comprise 87 percent of the population, this redistribution 
policy allows compensating more people on a per capita basis.  
To conclude, Table 6.8 shows the economic classification of expenditure of 
LLGG (current expenditure, CE; capital expenditure, KE; and debt service, DS), 
stemming from their main sources of income: natural resources and customs; local taxes; 
and FONCOMUN. In turn, LLGG are classified according to resources and main transfer 
groups. For natural resources and customs and for local taxes I only present the 
proportion of these sources of income allocated to current expenditure, since the 
proportion allocated to debt service in both categories is very small, and the rest of 
expenditure is capital expenditure. In the case of expenditures stemming from 
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FONCOMUN resources, I present the three economic categories of expenditures because 
there is more variability among them.  
In terms of LLGG by resource group, in all three groups the proportion of natural 
resources and customs transfers allocated to current expenditure is small and has 
increased slightly in recent years, but there is not a large difference among groups. This 
shows that LLGG tend to comply with the restriction on the use of natural resources and 
customs for capital expenditure.  
In turn, the proportion of local taxes allocated to current expenditure is high, 
which shows that LLGG try to use most of their own resources to fund current 
expenditure; again there is not much difference among categories (in the case of LLGG 
with more resources, the proportion for 2010 is rather low due to an outlier observation; 
without that outlier the proportion of local taxes allocated to current expenditure 
increases from 73 percent to 97 percent). Lastly, the proportion of FONCOMUN 
transfers allocated to current expenditure increases throughout the years, and as one 
would expect, it increases more for LLGG with more resources, which since 2007 use 
more than 75 percent of their FONCOMUN funds for current expenditure. Noteworthy, 
all categories of LLGG used to allocate a sizable proportion of FONCOMUN to debt 
service, although in recent years that proportion has been reduced.  
The classification by main transfer group shows that LLGG with mining, gas and 
oil as main transfer allocate a higher proportion of local taxes and FONCOMUN to 
current expenditure, relative to LLGG that have FONCOMUN as main transfer. For 
LLGG in which oil is the main transfer, LLGG allocate a higher proportion of natural 
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resources and customs income to current expenditure, mainly because some of them have 
fewer restrictions on the use of those resources (see Table A1.3 in Annex 1). However, 
this also increases fiscal risk in the event of reductions in transfers, since current 
expenditure are politically more difficult to reduce.  
Table 6.8 – Share of economic classification of expenditure of LLGG by source of 
income (classified by resources and main transfer groups) 
 
To summarize this section, transfers to LLGG linked to natural resources 
increased substantially following the canon law of 2001, especially after 2005 due to high 
tax collection in extractive industries. Grants were particularly large in 2007 due to the 
Resources 
group
Concept\Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average 
1998-2010
CE Nat Res & Customs 4.2% 11.2% 14.6% 19.2% 9.4% 9.8% 11.1% 5.4% 3.9% 10.6% 10.7% 13.9% 14.3% 11.6%
CE LLGG Taxes 75.1% 51.4% 74.7% 46.7% 77.6% 88.6% 88.2% 87.1% 89.8% 95.9% 98.6% 91.6% 72.9% 81.1%
CE FONCOMUN 20.9% 29.5% 28.7% 27.4% 27.1% 39.7% 44.0% 52.5% 61.3% 75.8% 79.3% 85.3% 83.2% 58.5%
KE FONCOMUN 67.1% 65.1% 58.1% 57.8% 57.6% 48.3% 38.8% 31.0% 27.0% 17.8% 15.4% 11.3% 13.9% 32.1%
DS FONCOMUN 12.0% 5.5% 13.2% 14.9% 15.4% 12.0% 17.2% 16.4% 11.7% 6.4% 5.3% 3.5% 2.9% 9.4%
CE Nat Res & Customs 6.3% 11.2% 18.0% 19.2% 13.2% 13.4% 8.4% 6.0% 5.5% 7.3% 7.1% 7.9% 10.7% 8.4%
CE LLGG Taxes 48.7% 69.6% 91.3% 81.1% 93.3% 94.1% 95.1% 93.0% 95.3% 98.1% 88.5% 88.9% 80.6% 85.1%
CE FONCOMUN 23.2% 30.4% 27.4% 28.5% 29.4% 42.6% 43.5% 48.0% 50.1% 63.8% 62.3% 66.1% 67.6% 51.0%
KE FONCOMUN 62.8% 63.7% 60.4% 54.9% 53.3% 47.2% 42.0% 39.6% 40.2% 30.4% 32.6% 28.9% 27.8% 40.0%
DS FONCOMUN 14.0% 5.9% 12.2% 16.7% 17.4% 10.3% 14.5% 12.3% 9.7% 5.8% 5.1% 5.0% 4.6% 9.0%
CE Nat Res & Customs 10.4% 14.2% 15.7% 13.7% 12.5% 17.3% 15.6% 12.5% 10.8% 14.5% 13.0% 12.0% 17.1% 14.3%
CE LLGG Taxes 85.7% 90.3% 86.1% 81.4% 87.5% 82.4% 82.2% 80.3% 87.5% 91.5% 90.7% 81.0% 84.2% 85.4%
CE FONCOMUN 18.5% 26.0% 26.8% 26.9% 27.9% 45.1% 43.1% 45.9% 48.4% 55.7% 52.4% 52.0% 54.8% 44.7%
KE FONCOMUN 65.6% 64.3% 57.7% 49.5% 48.6% 45.1% 42.4% 39.9% 40.6% 39.4% 43.5% 43.0% 39.8% 45.2%
DS FONCOMUN 15.9% 9.7% 15.5% 23.6% 23.5% 9.9% 14.5% 14.2% 10.9% 5.0% 4.1% 5.0% 5.4% 10.1%
Main transfer 
group
Concept\Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average 
1998-2010
CE Nat Res & Customs 8.2% 11.7% 15.4% 13.0% 11.6% 10.0% 7.4% 5.1% 4.7% 7.5% 7.7% 6.9% 16.0% 10.3%
CE LLGG Taxes 85.7% 90.2% 85.2% 79.7% 87.8% 81.2% 80.9% 79.0% 87.1% 91.5% 90.8% 80.3% 84.0% 84.9%
CE FONCOMUN 19.2% 25.8% 26.6% 27.0% 28.2% 44.4% 42.4% 44.9% 47.1% 53.4% 49.6% 49.0% 51.6% 43.1%
KE FONCOMUN 65.9% 65.0% 58.4% 50.7% 49.7% 46.3% 44.3% 41.9% 42.4% 41.8% 46.4% 46.2% 43.1% 47.3%
DS FONCOMUN 14.9% 9.1% 15.0% 22.3% 22.0% 9.3% 13.3% 13.2% 10.5% 4.8% 4.0% 4.9% 5.4% 9.6%
CE Nat Res & Customs 3.2% 6.2% 7.5% 12.4% 3.3% 2.2% 2.0% 2.9% 3.7% 6.9% 7.8% 10.4% 11.4% 8.6%
CE LLGG Taxes 83.9% 82.0% 89.8% 79.8% 89.4% 93.4% 92.6% 91.3% 94.4% 97.2% 94.1% 92.7% 87.3% 90.7%
CE FONCOMUN 20.5% 28.8% 28.0% 28.2% 28.0% 42.4% 45.0% 49.8% 53.9% 70.3% 70.7% 76.4% 74.8% 54.8%
KE FONCOMUN 64.3% 65.3% 60.2% 53.9% 53.1% 45.7% 37.8% 34.1% 34.2% 23.7% 24.5% 19.8% 22.5% 35.7%
DS FONCOMUN 15.2% 6.0% 11.8% 17.9% 19.0% 11.9% 17.2% 16.1% 11.9% 6.0% 4.8% 3.8% 2.7% 9.5%
CE Nat Res & Customs 11.3% 0.1% 2.4% 0.2% 0.3% 0.8% 0.3% 0.4% 1.3% 10.9% 8.1% 9.8% 9.5% 8.2%
CE LLGG Taxes 98.5% 94.9% 86.1% 91.1% 89.0% 89.5% 95.2% 98.2% 92.7% 94.8% 93.9% 98.0% 95.7% 94.3%
CE FONCOMUN 19.7% 25.8% 26.1% 26.6% 28.2% 33.3% 35.4% 43.3% 46.9% 60.9% 66.0% 68.6% 76.6% 50.6%
KE FONCOMUN 69.8% 67.0% 62.9% 58.1% 52.7% 52.5% 47.2% 40.8% 42.1% 31.8% 27.5% 24.0% 16.7% 38.9%
DS FONCOMUN 10.6% 7.2% 11.0% 15.3% 19.1% 14.2% 17.4% 15.9% 11.0% 7.3% 6.5% 7.4% 6.6% 10.5%
CE Nat Res & Customs 19.3% 23.8% 21.6% 22.9% 23.1% 25.3% 21.2% 13.8% 10.2% 17.6% 19.1% 16.4% 22.5% 18.6%
CE LLGG Taxes 29.4% 41.0% 92.6% 85.7% 90.8% 91.7% 97.0% 93.6% 94.5% 94.7% 91.3% 96.5% 95.2% 74.7%
CE FONCOMUN 26.0% 40.1% 29.1% 28.6% 27.0% 50.3% 49.6% 64.5% 67.0% 78.9% 76.7% 77.2% 80.2% 61.3%
KE FONCOMUN 47.4% 47.8% 46.4% 42.1% 43.0% 37.8% 28.1% 19.2% 20.9% 14.2% 16.8% 16.5% 14.7% 25.5%
DS FONCOMUN 26.6% 12.0% 24.5% 29.3% 30.0% 11.9% 22.2% 16.3% 12.1% 6.9% 6.5% 6.3% 5.1% 13.2%
Gas
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change in the allocation rule of the mining canon, by which the central government 
transferred to SNG in a single installment 17-months-worth of this transfer in the middle 
of the budget year. This combined in 2007 with the inexperience of newly elected local 
authorities in 73 percent of LLGG, to yield a low budget execution rate for that year, 
which fostered the perception that SNG are incapable at spending their resources.  
However, primary expenditure of LLGG increased substantially between 2008 
and 2010, to the point of generating primary deficits in 2009 and 2010, which LLGG 
were able to finance through a combination of accumulated savings from the previous 
years and discretionary transfers from the central government, in the context of the 
international financial crisis of 2009.  
In turn, although own municipal resources increased across the different 
classifications of LLGG at a rate comparable to that of the central government, due to the 
high increase in primary expenditure, and especially current expenditure, LLGG have a 
higher dependence on transfers to finance their regular expenses. 
Hence, LLGG have in general worsened their fiscal position in response to 
transfers, mainly through the high growth of their primary expenditure between 2007 and 
2010, which generated primary deficits in 2009 and 2010. However, this is not a situation 
that generates an imminent macroeconomic concern for Peru’s general government, since 
municipalities have not increased on aggregate their indebtedness in terms of GDP, and 
they have been able to finance most of their deficits in 2009 and 2010 through a 
combination of discretionary transfers from the central government in 2009 and 2010; 
and accumulated savings, especially from the year 2007. Indeed, the expected 
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accumulated savings of LLGG in 2011 was still substantial, equivalent to around 87 
percent of their accumulated debt in 2010, although 40 percent lower than their peak at 
the start of 2009.  
The description suggests that those LLGG for which transfers grew most and are 
also highly volatile present the highest fiscal risk. This is the case of LLGG that have 
mining as main transfer: indeed, this group concentrated most of the surplus in 2007 and 
most of the deficit in 2010. Related to this, I assessed whether discretionary transfers 
from the central government included under ordinary resources increased most during 
2009 and 2010 in those LLGG that were already receiving large transfers on a per capita 
basis. In this regard, although transfers per capita under ordinary resources were higher in 
2009 in the groups of LLGG with more and medium resources, the rate of growth in 2009 
and 2010 was higher for the group of LLGG with less resources, which suggests that 
discretionary transfers during those years were probably allocated based on criteria such 
as population, rather than owing to the pressure from LLGG that were already receiving 
high resources.  
Lastly, I found that the groups of LLGG with more and medium resources, and 
the groups that have natural resources as main transfer (mining, oil and gas), tend to 
allocate a higher proportion of FONCOMUN to current expenditure relative to the other 
groups in their respective categories, which increases their dependence on transfers to 
finance recurrent expenses.  
Before I explore in more detail whether transfers generate a fiscal risk through a 
reduction in the incentive of local authorities to collect own taxes (fiscal sloth) and/or a 
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high increase in expenditures (flypaper effect), I present an illustrative example of the 
response of local tax collection and primary expenditure to transfers that serves as 
background to the analysis that follows.  
A tale of two provinces 
The provinces of Huari and Dos de Mayo are next to each other in the 
departments of Ancash and Huánuco, respectively. As can be seen in Table 6.9, they had 
relatively similar socio-economic indicators in terms of population, urban population and 
poverty rate in 2007, although the poverty rate by 2009 diminished more rapidly in Huari 
than in Dos de Mayo.  
Table 6.9 – Selected indicators of Huari and Dos de Mayo 
 
These two provinces have one large difference: Huari is home to an important 
mine, which allowed it to start receiving huge amounts of mining canon since 2006. 
Indeed, Huari is the third out of Peru’s 195 provinces in terms of total transfers per capita 
between 1998 and 2010, and includes the district of San Marcos, which is the sixth out of 
Peru’s 1834 LLGG in terms of most transfers per capita in that period. On the contrary, 
Dos de Mayo does not have mine exploitation and is not part of a department that is rich 
in natural resources; hence, it receives a negligible amount of transfers owing to canon.  
What has been the effect of this large increase in transfers in Huari on own 












Ancash Huari 16 59801 0.40 0.71 0.40
Huanuco Dos de Mayo 9 46797 0.35 0.79 0.78
Sources: Census 2007 for population and poverty 2007. Robles (2010) for poverty 2009
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de Mayo? The response to this question can give hints about the expected results in the 
following sections. Figure 6.24 shows the ratio of the average tax collection, total 
transfers and primary expenditure for all districts of Dos de Mayo relative to all districts 
of Huari. The large increase in transfers in Huari is captured by the sudden drop in the 
ratio of total transfers of Dos de Mayo relative to Huari from an average of 1 between 
1998 and 2005 (they basically received the same average amount of transfers every year) 
to an average of 0.11 between 2006 and 2010, with a nadir of 0.04 in 2007, which was 
the year of the high increase in mining canon. 
Figure 6.24 – Ratio of fiscal indicators (Dos de Mayo/Huari) 
 
In terms of local tax collection, under the hypothesis of fiscal sloth it is expected 
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Source: own elaboration based on  LLGG budget information provided by NAO-MEF.
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of local tax collection of Dos de Mayo to Huari should increase, given that LLGG in 
Huari should be collecting less taxes relative to Dos de Mayo in response to transfers. It 
is worth mentioning that the provinces of Dos de Mayo and Huari do not include any 
main cities, and due to their small population they have low tax collection potential, 
which helps explain the outlier value of the year 2005, in which tax collection in Dos de 
Mayo was especially low. This said, the ratio of local tax collection of Dos de Mayo to 
Huari does not change much after 2006: in 2006 and 2007 the ratio is below the average 
for the series of 0.2, and the values for 2008 and 2010 increase above the average, but not 
much differently from previous values in the series. Hence, in this extreme comparison of 
two neighbor provinces with very different inflow of transfers, there is no evidence of 
fiscal sloth.  
What is the response of primary expenditure to transfers? If Huari did not display 
a flypaper effect and saved an important proportion of its transfers, the ratio of primary 
expenditure of Dos de Mayo relative to Huari would decline, but in a smaller proportion 
than the decline observed in the ratio of transfers between Dos de Mayo relative to Huari. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 6.24, the ratio of primary expenditure behaves very 
similarly to the ratio of transfers: whereas the average ratio of primary expenditure 
between Dos de Mayo and Huari between 1998 and 2005 was 0.96 (similar to the ratio of 
transfers for that period, which was 1), the same average ratio between 2006 and 2010 
was 0.13, again very similar to the ratio of transfers for that period, which was 0.11. 
Indeed, the ratio of transfers was lower than the ratio of primary expenditure in 2006 and 
2007, when transfers grew rapidly, but the relationship reversed in 2009 and 2010, 
suggesting that LLGG in the province of Huari were on average spending more than the 
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transfers they received those years. Hence, the response of primary expenditure to 
transfers in Huari is indicative of a flypaper effect, albeit with a one year lag.  
 
To summarize, the comparison of fiscal indicators in the LLGG of the neighbor 
provinces of Huari and Dos de Mayo suggests that there is not fiscal sloth, but there is a 
flypaper effect. Table 6.9 also shows that poverty declined much more in Huari than in 
Dos de Mayo, which may be due to the high increase in transfers and their use in public 
investment; however, the study of that link, although important, is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. Below I analyze in detail the effect of transfers on LLGG fiscal effort.     
Do LLGG reduce their fiscal effort in response to transfers? 
Here I evaluate in more detail the fourth question of this dissertation, assessing 
whether LLGG reduce their fiscal effort in response to transfers. First I will describe the 
evolution of own revenue collection according to its components and the different 
categories of LLGG. Following that I will introduce and evaluate econometric models 
assessing the response of tax collection to transfers.  
Descriptive analysis of the evolution of LLGG own revenue collection 
As described in Table A1.4 in Annex 1, own resources of LLGG are local taxes; 
capital income, which is mainly proceeds from the sale of assets; and other own income, 
which mainly includes user fees, fines, property rents and interests on financial assets, 
among other. PPGG and DDGG collect property tax and a tax on property sale (except 
for the city of Lima since 2007, whose provincial government collects the latter tax on 
behalf of district governments), and a number of user fees and other own income, but 
152 
 
PPGG also collect the motor vehicle tax and user fees for provincial services. In turn, 
PPGG maintain on average a larger bureaucracy than DDGG, since they have 
expenditure functions on the provincial capital (as another district) but also over the 
province at large. For these reasons, in the analysis below, PPGG and DDGG will tend to 
be analyzed separately.  
Table 6.10 shows the evolution of own income of LLGG in Peru between 1998 
and 2010, classified according to whether they are a PPGG or DDGG and their type of 
own income (taxes or other non-tax income; capital income is not included because as 
shown in Table 6.1 it is negligible), along with the growth of the series during the 
analyzed time period in constant 2002 Peruvian S./.  
Table 6.10 – Own income of LLGG by type groups - As share of total 
 
As main features, PPGG concentrate almost half of all own income of LLGG, and 
their participation has grown since 1998, driven by the high growth in local taxes. 
Moreover, there is a high concentration of own income in main cities, and this 
concentration is even higher in the case of taxes. Indeed, that concentration has increased 
during the past 12 years. Only the province of Lima (including its 42 districts) 
Type and Size 
Groups
Values\Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average 
2000-2010
Own income - Share 
of total LLGG
45.7% 46.3% 45.6% 44.8% 45.3% 44.5% 47.2% 45.4% 44.2% 46.6% 46.5% 46.5% 49.6% 46.0% Own income 8.8%
Local taxes - Share of 
total LLGG
38.0% 39.2% 39.2% 35.4% 38.8% 39.6% 39.7% 38.8% 38.4% 48.3% 49.7% 48.3% 51.8% 41.9% Local taxes 13.1%
Other non tax income - 
Share of total LLGG




Own income - Share 
of total LLGG
54.3% 53.7% 54.4% 55.2% 54.7% 55.5% 52.8% 54.6% 55.8% 53.4% 53.5% 53.5% 50.4% 54.0% Own income 7.4%
Local taxes - Share of 
total LLGG
62.0% 60.8% 60.8% 64.6% 61.2% 60.4% 60.3% 61.2% 61.6% 51.7% 50.3% 51.7% 48.2% 58.1% Local taxes 7.9%
Other non tax income - 
Share of total LLGG




Provincial Govts. Own/total income 47.3% 49.1% 47.3% 48.3% 50.5% 45.7% 44.2% 39.8% 32.3% 28.3% 31.7% 32.0% 33.1% 40.7%
District Govts. Own/total income 46.5% 45.2% 44.0% 44.1% 43.6% 39.5% 33.0% 32.4% 25.2% 19.1% 20.2% 21.1% 19.3% 33.3%








concentrated 67 percent of total tax collection of LLGG in 2010, up from 52 percent in 
1998; and coupled with the next five provinces and their districts that collect most taxes 
in Peru, which comprise 42 percent of the country’s population, they concentrated 80 
percent of total tax collection of LLGG in 2010.  
In turn, Table 6.11 is similar to Table 6.10, but classifies LLGG by their size.  
Table 6.11  – Own income of LLGG by type groups - As share of total 
 
As can be seen, the participation of LLGG that are not main cities in own income, 
and especially in local taxes, is very small. Relative to all LLGG, both for municipalities 
with more and less than 500 houses, other own non tax income has been increasing, while 
local taxes have been decreasing. In the case of own non tax income, the increasing 
participation of smaller LLGG relative to all LLGG is partly explained in recent years by 
the increase in revenue from interest of financial assets, which is mainly the proceeds 
from the bank deposits of natural resources and customs transfers. Indeed, as an extreme 
Type and Size 
Groups
Values\Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average 
2000-2010
Own income - Share 
of total LLGG
89.1% 91.3% 91.8% 90.1% 88.7% 90.0% 90.2% 89.2% 87.1% 87.8% 87.1% 85.9% 87.7% 88.9% Own income 7.9%
Local taxes - Share of 
total LLGG
85.5% 92.8% 94.3% 93.4% 92.6% 94.6% 94.2% 94.2% 94.0% 95.3% 95.3% 95.0% 94.4% 93.5% Local taxes 11.1%
Other non tax income - 
Share of total LLGG




Own income - Share 
of total LLGG
8.7% 6.5% 6.4% 7.0% 8.8% 7.6% 7.1% 7.1% 8.7% 8.2% 8.8% 9.4% 8.3% 7.9% Own income 7.6%
Local taxes - Share of 
total LLGG
11.7% 5.2% 4.6% 4.6% 5.7% 4.6% 4.7% 4.4% 4.8% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.8% 5.0% Local taxes 0.5%
Other non tax income - 
Share of total LLGG




Own income - Share 
of total LLGG
2.3% 2.2% 1.9% 2.8% 2.5% 2.4% 2.7% 3.7% 4.2% 4.0% 4.1% 4.7% 4.1% 3.2% Own income 13.5%
Local taxes - Share of 
total LLGG
2.8% 2.0% 1.1% 2.0% 1.7% 0.8% 1.1% 1.4% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 1.2% 1.7% 1.5% Local taxes 5.8%
Other non tax income - 
Share of total LLGG




Main cities Own/total income 58.9% 60.6% 59.8% 60.4% 60.9% 56.1% 54.6% 52.0% 44.2% 38.4% 40.4% 39.6% 40.0% 51.2%
More than 500 
houses Own/total income
21.5% 16.7% 15.7% 17.3% 21.9% 17.4% 12.7% 10.8% 9.2% 6.4% 7.6% 8.6% 7.1% 13.3%
Less than 500 
houses Own/total income
10.4% 9.3% 7.2% 10.1% 8.5% 7.1% 5.9% 8.1% 6.3% 4.5% 5.1% 6.4% 5.4% 7.3%
More than 500 
houses - 30% of 
LLGG, 20% of 
country's population
Less than 500 
houses - 56% of 
LLGG, 13% of 
country's population
Source: own elaboration based on information provided by MEF
Main cities - 14% 
of LLGG, 67% of 
country's population




case, the district of San Marcos in the province of Huari, department of Ancash, which 
was analyzed in the previous section, received in 2009 S./ 14.4 million in interest from its 
bank deposits, which is equivalent to 5.3 times the total income that the district had only 
four years earlier, in 2005.  
In the case of local taxes of smaller LLGG, the average growth in constant terms 
shown in the last column of Table 6.11 is low, but it is distorted by an unusually high tax 
collection for two particular LLGG in 1998 (one classified in more than 500 houses and 
the other in less than 500 houses). If the value for 2010 is compared to that of 1999, the 
yearly rate of growth in constant terms is a much higher 8.6 percent and 10.1 percent for 
more and less than 500 houses, respectively. This value is lower than for main cities 
(11.15 percent), but it is still high.  
Lastly, the share of own income in total income decreases for all groups of 
LLGG, and especially for smaller LLGG; however, this is not due to a low growth in own 
income of LLGG, which as shown in the last column of Table 6.11 is even higher for 
LLGG with less than 500 houses than for main cities, but rather due to the high increase 
in transfers.  
To conclude, the aggregate descriptive analysis of own income of LLGG 
according to whether they are PPGG or DDGG and their size, does not indicate that 
transfers are generating “fiscal sloth” in LLGG, in the sense that they are decreasing their 
fiscal effort in response to transfers. It also signals that collection of own resources at the 
local level, particularly tax collection, is more relevant in PPGG than in DDGG, and 
especially in main cities, which concentrate most own resources of LLGG.  
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Table 6.12 below presents the average annual growth of own income and total 
transfers of PPGG and DDGG in main cities in constant 2002 Peruvian S./, distinguishing 
among resource groups (more, medium or less resources per capita), and main transfer 
groups (FONCOMUN, mining, oil or gas canon). Similar to Tables 6.10 and 6.11, it 
shows the evolution of total own resources, local taxes and other non-tax own income, 
along with the evolution of total transfers and the number of LLGG in each category. 
However, the evolution of own resources of LLGG is divided into two periods: 1998 to 
2010, and 2005 to 2010, in order to assess the effect on own income of the high growth in 
transfers, which as shown in Figure 6.1 accentuated and became more volatile after 2005.   
As can be seen, there is no descriptive evidence that the growth in transfers is 
generating “fiscal sloth” in main cities, where own income is most relevant. Among the 
three PPGG with more resources per capita, which have mining as their main transfer, the 
average growth of own income decreases and is relatively low following 2005, but this is 
thoroughly explained by only one PPGG (Ilo), where tax collection stagnated throughout 
the period; in the other two PPGG (Espinar and Mariscal Nieto) tax collection grew at an 
annual rate in constant terms of 22.17 percent between 2005 and 2010. Also, in PPGG 
with medium resources per capita, the yearly growth increases after 2005, and it is not 
too different among the categories of LLGG.  
PPGG with medium resources per capita and mining as their main transfer, 
including the cases of Cajamarca and Tacna, which are important cities that received 
large amounts of transfers, have a similar rate of growth of local taxes as PPGG with less 
resources that have FONCOMUN as their main transfer (excluding the city of Lima). 
This situation is similar for DDGG (right pane in Table 6.12) and for smaller LLGG 
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(more and less than 500 houses, not shown in Table 6.12), where as seen in Table 6.11, 
own resources are much less relevant.  
Table 6.12 – Average annual growth of own income of LLGG in main cities (in 










Total own income 11.5% 8.3% 16.3% 4.9%
Local taxes 9.5% 3.1% 4.1% 5.7%
Other non tax income 16.8% 9.3% 24.9% 4.1%
Total transfers 16.9% 9.1% 26.4% 18.1%
Number of LLGG
Total own income 8.8% 10.6%
Local taxes 8.4% 16.8%
Other non tax income 9.9% 8.0%
Total transfers 11.1% 10.0%
Number of LLGG
Total own income 8.5% 11.7% 8.8% 8.7%
Local taxes 9.9% 11.7% 6.0% 11.1%
Other non tax income 7.1% 7.6% 9.3% 8.4%
Total transfers 14.2% 14.9% 21.7% 19.2%
Number of LLGG
Total own income 5.1% 8.9%
Local taxes 3.2% 8.2%
Other non tax income 7.1% 3.7%
Total transfers 15.3% 10.1%
Number of LLGG
Total own income 9.1% 9.8% 6.6% 4.9%
Local taxes 14.5% 23.8% 9.5% 8.4%
Local taxes (without Lima) 9.1% 11.7%
Other non tax income 5.7% 1.5% 4.8% 2.2%
Total transfers 12.7% 16.9% 13.8% 21.1%
Number of LLGG
Total own income 5.3% 38.8% 8.6% 8.5%
Local taxes 8.1% 39.5% 8.8% 7.8%
Other non tax income 2.8% 38.0% 8.6% 9.2%
Total transfers 21.8% 89.7% 21.9% 34.1%
Number of LLGG
Total own income 10.9% 10.9%
Local taxes 8.4% 8.5%
Other non tax income 13.2% 12.9%
Total transfers 22.2% 25.8%
Number of LLGG
Total own income 6.4% 12.6%
Local taxes 0.3% 30.5%
Other non tax income 14.9% 6.9%
Total transfers 18.4% 23.3%
Number of LLGG




























Provincial Governments District Governments
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Lastly, given that in 2010 the PI&PMM transfer system was introduced, which 
allocates more resources to LLGG that, among other conditions, improve their tax 
collection, the results in Table 6.12 may be influenced by higher tax collection in 2010 
due to this incentive. Hence, I also conducted the assessment using 2009 as the end year 
(not shown), and the results were similar to those in Table 6.12.  
The descriptive analysis of LLGG own resources suggests that LLGG that 
received large amount of transfers in recent years do not respond by reducing their own 
fiscal effort. It also indicates that this analysis is most relevant in Peru’s main cities, 
which concentrate almost all own resources of LLGG. The response of own revenue 
collection of LLGG to transfers appears counterintuitive: arguably, those municipalities 
that receive large amounts of transfers do not have incentives to collect their own 
resources, since they can finance themselves through grants. Part of the answer to this 
riddle is related to the fact that most of the resources received from mining, gas and oil 
transfers are earmarked to public investment, which still leaves an incentive to collect 
own resources in order to finance the current expenditure that is necessary to maintain 
and operate investment projects, among other expenditures. In the context of the many 
studies reviewed above about the effect of transfers on local tax effort, these descriptive 
findings suggest that fiscal sloth is not a problem in LLGG in Peru.  
 
Econometric assessment of the response of local tax collection to transfers 
To assess econometrically the effect of transfers on LLGG tax collection I 
concentrate the analysis on main cities, which is where tax collection is most relevant. 
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This approach is different from previous research efforts, which did not make use of the 
different classifications of LLGG analyzed in this dissertation. In turn, the analysis 
focuses on local tax collection, excluding other own income, which is mainly fees for 
service, since as shown by Alvarado (2003) the latter is linked to the provision of public 
services, and hence it is less sensitive to variables such as changes in transfers.  
The dataset is a balanced panel between 2001 and 2009. Before 2001 the number 
of omitted LLGG increases substantially, which in turn reduces the available 
observations, so that year is used as the baseline. Also, 2001 is the year prior to the 
effective introduction of the canon law. In turn, in 2010 the PI&PMM transfer scheme 
was introduced, which rewards through additional transfers improvements in tax 
collection: arguably, this generates endogeneity due to reverse causality, since 
improvements in local tax collection increase transfers. Hence, the series that is used in 
regression analysis ends in 2009. 
Given that some of the taxes collected by PPGG and DDGG differ,
21
 and the 
allocation of transfers of FONCOMUN gives more weight to PPGG relative to DDGG 
(see Table A1.3 in Annex 1) both levels of LLGG are separated in the analysis. 
Noteworthy, for the group of LLGG assessed in the econometric analysis below the 
average per capita tax collection of PPGG is higher than for DDGG at the 1 percent 
significance level, which helps validate this separation.  
The variables are presented in per capita terms at 2002 prices, deflating by the 
consumer price index. Following Mello (2002), the use of per capita variables allows 
                                                 
21
 For example, only PPGG collect the vehicle tax. For the description of own resources of LLGG see Table 
A1.4 in Annex 1. 
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reducing the risk of heteroscedasticity stemming from the heterogeneity of Peru´s LLGG. 
Most studies that evaluate “fiscal sloth” in Peru also transform the variables to per capita 
terms (see Rabanal and Melgarejo, 2006; Aragon and Gayoso, 2005; and Alvarado, 
2003). I use panel data models, evaluating the different effect of transfers on local taxes 
per capita (fiscal sloth) according to the resources and main transfer groups of LLGG.  
The econometric analysis is only carried out for main cities, which as shown 
above is the group where it is most relevant, since they concentrated in 2010 98 percent 
of total tax collection for PPGG (S./ 816 million out of a total of S./ 829 million) and 90 
percent for DDGG (S./ 695 million out of a total of S./ 772 million). In per capita terms, 
PPGG that are main cities collected in 2010 approximately seven times more than PPGG 
with more than 500 houses, and five times more than PPGG with less than 500 houses. In 
turn, DDGG that are main cities collected in 2010 approximately four times more than 
DDGG with more and less than 500 houses.  
In addition to the fiscal variables, which are local taxes per capita (dependent 
variable) and total transfers per capita (main explanatory variable of interest), the 
regression model includes a number of control variables based on the determinants of 
local tax collection and the available information.  
As described by Aguilar and Morales (2005), local tax collection depends on the 
tax base and fiscal effort. The tax base is related to local production, income and wealth. 
Local production can be measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, since 
GDP in Peru is only disaggregated yearly at the regional level, I will use per capita 
department GDP between 2001 and 2009 at constant 2002 prices, which precludes 
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variability among LLGG within each department (in the absence of local GDP data this is 
also the approach used by Melo, 2002, for Colombia). In turn, local income and wealth 
can be proxied by the proportion of population living in poverty; again, this indicator in 
Peru is only available yearly at the regional level, so I will use department poverty 
between 2001 and 2009.  
Fiscal effort depends on local capacity and on the incentives of authorities to 
collect taxes. Local capacity is linked to the size of the municipality, which in the case of 
local tax collection is filtered by focusing on the size group of main cities. However, 
within main cities I also include the projection of population density between 2001 and 
2009 as a source of variability, assuming that it is easier to audit payment of local taxes in 
more densely populated LLGG (see Alvarado, 2003). As a second measure of local 
capacity I introduce a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if mayors get reelected, 
assuming that their longer experience in office enhances their managerial capacity, 
including their ability to collect local taxes. Lastly, in the nine PPGG that have 
introduced so far an autonomous Tax Administration Service (SAT, after acronym in 
Spanish), I include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 starting the year of the 
introduction of the Tax Administration Service, under the assumption that it improves the 
capacity of LLGG to collect taxes.  
In turn, the incentives of local authorities to collect taxes may depend on several 
factors. Here the main variable of interest is the availability of transfers, under the 
assumption that large increases in transfers should reduce the incentives to increase local 
tax collection, which is labeled “fiscal sloth”.  
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Since the mining canon is disbursed in one installment in the middle of the fiscal 
year, I also use the variable of per capita transfers with a lag, due to the fact that the 
decision of LLGG to collect taxes may be affected by the previous year’s transfers. Given 
the volatility of transfers in Peru during 2001-2009 (especially transfers linked to natural 
resources), I also include a variable of “symmetry” in the response of local tax collection 
to decreases in transfers, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 any year 
that transfers decrease. The rationale is that if local tax collection is assumed to decrease 
following large increases in transfers, it is also assumed to increase when transfers fall, in 
order to maintain the level of spending; this follows the analysis of Gramkhar and Oates 
(1996) who introduced this variable of symmetry in the context of the estimation of the 
flypaper effect.  
I also include a measure of self-sufficiency of LLGG, meaning the degree that 
they can finance themselves through their own resources, as the ratio of total own 
resources over total resources of each municipality (own resources include local taxes, 
user fees and other local current and capital income). I expect that higher self-sufficiency 
is related to larger increases in local tax collection, as LLGG need to rely on their own 
resources to increase their expenditures. Lastly, I include time dummies whenever they 
are statistically significant to assess in particular the election years (for the analyzed 
period it is the years 2002 and 2006), assuming that the incentive of mayors to collect 
taxes decreases in those years, given that there is a political cost in increasing tax 
auditing.  
The source for department GDP, department poverty, population projections and 
consumer price index (used to deflate nominal variables) is Peru´s National Statistics 
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Institute (INEI, after its acronym in Spanish). The database of local government elections 
for years 1998, 2002 and 2006 was provided by Peru´s National Election Jury (JNE after 
acronym in Spanish). The information about LLGG that have a Tax Administration 
Service, including the year of creation, is taken from the website of the National 
Association of Tax Administration Services (ASAT after acronym in Spanish: 
www.asat.org.pe). Lastly, as previously described, all fiscal variables were provided by 
Peru´s National Accounting Office at the Ministry of Economics and Finance.  
The database is a balanced panel between 2001 and 2009, representing 60 out of 
70 PPGG that are main cities (86 percent of total) and 139 out of 179 DDGG that are 
main cities (78 percent of total). The difference is made up of LLGG that have at least 
one omitted observation during this time period. Table 6.13 below shows the distribution 
of main cities according to availability of observations and the different groups of LLGG 
used in this dissertation. I ran chi square tests of association to assess whether there is any 
statistically significant difference between PPGG and DDGG that are main cities for 
which there are complete observations, and PPGG and DDGG that are main cities and 
have at least one omitted observation, across the three groups presented in Table 6.13: 
main transfer, resource group and need group. In all cases I found that for main cities, 
there is not a statistically significant difference between PPGG and DDGG for which 
there are complete observations and PPGG and DDGG that have at least one omitted 
observation, at the 10 percent significance level. This means there is not a particular bias 
in the composition of LLGG that are main cities and display a balanced panel, in terms of 
main transfer, resource and BUN groups.    
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Table 6.13 – Distribution of main cities by completeness of observations and groups 
 
Aragon and Gayoso (2005) note a potential endogeneity problem due to reverse 
causality related to the allocation rules of FONCOMUN, which duplicates the weight of 
rural population in its distribution formula. Indeed, given that rural districts tend to 
collect less local taxes, mainly because they tend to have a smaller tax base for the 
property tax, it can be argued that due to their lower local tax collection, they receive 
more transfers. In this regard, the official classification of LLGG according to size may 
reduce this potential endogeneity problem, because LLGG are clustered in groups with 
similar levels of urban/rural population: main cities are urban LLGG; more than 500 
houses are semi-rural LLGG; and less than 500 houses are rural LLGG.  
Table 6.14 below summarizes the number of LLGG, average and standard 
deviation of urban population based on Peru´s National Census of 2007. As can be seen, 
the degree or urban population of LLGG clearly increases with size: the difference in 
average urban population across size groups is statistically significant in all cases at the 1 
percent level, except for the difference between PPGG with more than 500 houses and 
PPGG with less than 500 houses, for which it is significant at the 5 percent level.  












At least one 
omission 7 3 2 8 4 6 10
Complete 42 12 1 4 1 3 19 38 6 20 34 60
49 15 1 4 1 3 21 46 6 24 40 70
At least one 
omission 20 19 1 2 2 36 1 4 35 40
Complete 82 47 3 3 4 6 9 124 1 8 130 139
102 66 3 3 5 8 11 160 2 12 165 179
151 81 4 7 6 11 32 206 8 36 205 249Total Main Cities




Chi Square Test of 
Association
Value: 3.8. Critical value with 4 degrees of 
freedom at 10% significance level: 7.78
Value: 0.14. Crit value with 2 deg of 
freedom at 10% signif level: 4.61
Value: 1.13. Crit value with 2 deg of 
freedom at 10% signif level: 4.61
Value: 1.84. Crit value with 2 deg of 










Chi Square Test of 
Association
Value: 1.4. Critical value with 4 degrees of 
freedom at 10% significance level: 7.78
Value: 1.25. Crit value with 2 deg of 
freedom at 10% signif level: 4.61
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Table 6.14 – Summary statistics of urban population of Peru’s LLGG by size group 
 
Moreover, within the group of LLGG that are main cities, I also evaluate whether 
there is any significant difference in terms of urban population among LLGG according 
to resources and main transfer groups. This is shown in Table 6.15, which presents the 
average urban population of main cities (PPGG and DDGG) according to resources and 
main transfer groups, along with the results of the test of difference of means between the 
different groups. In the case of resource groups, given the small number of observations 
for more and medium resources, both groups are pooled. For main transfer groups, there 
are few observations of LLGG that have oil, gas and customs as main transfer, so they are 
also pooled.  
As can be seen, there is no statistically significant difference between resources 
groups. In the case of main transfer groups, the average urban population for the group of 
gas/oil/customs LLGG is significantly higher than for the groups of FONCOMUN and 
mining (in the case of DDGG) and FONCOMUN (in the case of PPGG); however, the 
difference is not large, and the test is influenced by the small number of observations for 
the gas/oil/customs group. Hence, analyzing the effect of transfers on fiscal aggregates of 
each group of LLGG according to size (in the case of local tax collection, only for main 
cities), allows having relatively homogeneous municipalities in terms of urban 











Main Cities 89% 0.12 70 92% 0.12 178
More than 500 urban houses 55% 0.22 115 55% 0.25 440
Less than 500 urban houses 41% 0.16 10 34% 0.25 1019
Total 67% 0.26 195 46% 0.30 1637
195 Provincial Governments 1637 District Governments
Source: own elaboration based on information by INEI
Size Group\Type of LLGG
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Table 6.15 – Comparison of urban population of main cities by resource and main 
transfer groups (2007) 
 
Since transfers based on natural resources in Peru are allocated on a derivation 
basis, and in particular 10 percent of the mining canon is allocated directly to the 
producing LLGG (see Table A1.3 in Appendix 1 for a detailed analysis of the allocation 
rules of each type of transfer to LLGG), total transfers can be considered in that particular 
case an exogenous explanatory variable of fiscal variables such as local taxes and 
expenditures. The argument is that transfers based on natural resources are not correlated 
with variables that determine local taxes and expenditures, such as poverty or 
institutional capacity. Instead, these transfers are defined by the “lottery” in natural 
resources that determines whether minerals and/or hydrocarbons are available in each 
local of government.  
In the case of Peru, since it is a unitary country, regulation that provides 
incentives to extractive industries is defined by the central government, so it cannot be 
used by LLGG to compete for investments. Hence, extractive companies have not been 
strongly influenced in their investment decisions by the characteristics of each particular 
local government. In those LLGG from where resources are extracted, the case that the 
natural resource based transfer is exogenous is most clear. However, the allocation 
formula among the neighboring LLGG in the same province and department of the 
Resource Group Mean of Urban Pop StdDev of Urban Pop Number of PPGG Mean of Urban Pop StdDev of Urban Pop Number of DDGG
More/Medium Resources 0.85 0.15 22 0.92 0.09 14
Less Resources 0.90 0.11 38 0.94 0.11 123
Difference of means test
Main Transfer Group Mean of Urban Pop StdDev of Urban Pop Number of PPGG Mean of Urban Pop StdDev of Urban Pop Number of DDGG
Foncomun 0.88 0.13 42 0.93 0.12 79
Gas/Oil/Customs 0.96 0.08 6 0.97 0.03 10
Mining 0.88 0.12 12 0.94 0.09 47
Z Value (Gas/Oil/Customs - Mining): 1.72. P-Value: 0.09 Z Value (Gas/Oil/Customs - Mining): 2.4. P-Value: 0.02
Source: own elaboration based on information by INEI
PPGG - Main Cities with complete observations DDGG - Main Cities with complete observations
Z Value (More/Medium-Less Resources): -1.37. P-Value: 0.17 Z Value (More/Medium-Less Resources): -0.66. P-Value: 0.51
Difference of means test
Z Value (FONCOMUN - Gas/Oil/Customs): -2.17. P-Value: 0.03 Z Value (FONCOMUN - Gas/Oil/Customs): -2.35. P-Value: 0.02
Z Value (FONCOMUN - Mining): -0.06. P-Value: 0.95 Z Value (FONCOMUN - Mining): -0.08. P-Value: 0.94
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producing district, does take into account the criteria of population and BUN. In the case 
of population, it is a per capita criterion that treats all LLGG alike. But in the case of 
BUN, similar to the explanation above for FONCOMUN, LLGG with higher BUN tend 
to collect less tax revenue, since they are poorer and tend to have a lower tax base than 
wealthier LLGG. Therefore, it can be argued that there is also a problem of endogeneity 
in this case, since poorer LLGG receive more transfers based on natural resources 
because they collect less tax revenue.   
In this regard, similar to the analysis for FONCOMUN, the classification of 
LLGG according to size helps to minimize this potential endogeneity problem, because 
larger municipalities in Peru tend to be associated with lower BUN. Indeed, Table 6.16 
shows average BUN for LLGG with complete observations that are main cities. They are 
classified according to PPGG and DDGG, and within each group according to resources 
and main transfer groups. As can be seen, there is no difference in average BUN of 
LLGG among the different groups at the 5 percent significance level. This means that the 
assessed LLGG are relatively homogeneous in terms of BUN, and each of these groups 
receives on average similar transfers based on natural resources according to BUN.  
Table 6.16 – Comparison of main cities included in regression analysis according to 
Basic Unmet Needs (BUN, 2007) 
 
Resource Group Mean of BUN StdDev of BUN Number of PPGG Mean of BUN StdDev of BUN Number of DDGG
More/Medium Resources 0.50 0.18 22 0.47 0.25 14
Less Resources 0.42 0.19 38 0.46 0.28 123
Difference of means test
Main Transfer Group Mean of BUN StdDev of BUN Number of PPGG Mean of BUN StdDev of BUN Number of DDGG
Foncomun 0.45 0.19 42 0.44 0.28 79
Gas/Oil/Customs 0.47 0.20 6 0.42 0.32 10
Mining 0.44 0.18 12 0.50 0.25 47
Z Value (Gas/Oil/Customs - Mining): 0.27. P-Value: 0.79 Z Value (Gas/Oil/Customs - Mining): -0.7. P-Value: 0.48
Source: own elaboration based on information by INEI
PPGG - Main Cities with complete observations DDGG - Main Cities with complete observations
Z Value (More/Medium-Less Resources): 1.71. P-Value: 0.09 Z Value (More/Medium-Less Resources): 0.09. P-Value: 0.93
Difference of means test
Z Value (FONCOMUN - Gas/Oil/Customs): -0.23. P-Value: 0.82 Z Value (FONCOMUN - Gas/Oil/Customs): 0.19. P-Value: 0.84
Z Value (FONCOMUN - Mining): 0.1. P-Value: 0.92 Z Value (FONCOMUN - Mining): -1.14. P-Value: 0.25
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In turn, Table 6.17 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
regression analysis of the effect of transfers on LLGG own taxes. The variables for both 
PPGG and DDGG distinguish the database with complete observations for main cities 
both with and without Lima. This owes to the fact that the city of Lima, which comprises 
the Provincial Government and 42 other District Governments, is different from the rest 
of LLGG that are main cities, not only because it is much larger: it had in 2010 an 
estimated population of 8.2 million inhabitants, while the second most populated 
province, which is Callao, had 941,000 inhabitants. But also because since the year 2007 
Lima changed its methodology of assessment and collection of the tax on the sale of 
properties (“alcabala”), which allowed increasing substantially the collection of this tax 
for all 43 LLGG of Lima: this change did not take place in the rest of LLGG of Peru.  
Table 6.17 – Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression analysis of “fiscal 
sloth” (2001-09) 
 
For these reasons, the city of Lima, including its 43 LLGG, is not included with 
the rest of LLGG in regression analysis. In terms of total tax collection of LLGG in Peru 
this is an important omission, since Lima concentrated in 2010 two-thirds of this total. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 31.83 83.78 0.51 1095.30 23.58 29.61 0.51 247.99 37.94 96.80 0.00 1132.50 16.57 23.12 0.00 342.67
between 69.30 1.01 518.74 26.99 1.01 186.56 93.91 0.06 836.91 18.97 0.06 116.50
within 47.84 -321.24 608.39 12.63 -59.54 157.44 24.62 -183.24 333.53 13.33 -40.58 296.32
overall 243.56 274.68 35.26 2976.19 239.69 273.61 35.26 2976.19 138.48 247.01 0.00 2992.77 169.18 280.78 0.00 2992.77
between 169.92 72.71 1077.69 168.70 72.71 1077.69 186.03 9.49 1539.09 205.93 46.81 1539.09
within 216.81 -740.98 2142.05 216.41 -744.84 2138.19 163.18 -1355.41 1738.32 191.85 -1324.71 1769.02
overall 0.31 0.18 0.02 0.80 0.30 0.17 0.02 0.80 0.38 0.26 0.01 1.00 0.26 0.16 0.01 1.00
between 0.16 0.03 0.76 0.15 0.03 0.67 0.24 0.05 0.99 0.12 0.05 0.61
within 0.09 0.03 0.59 0.09 0.02 0.58 0.09 0.07 1.12 0.10 -0.04 1.00
overall 1332.61 3807.16 2.19 25062.50 1107.14 3417.52 2.19 25062.50 4038.50 6440.43 5.82 28337.89 1885.73 4021.60 5.82 21044.72
between 3832.52 2.56 23505.32 3440.71 2.56 23505.32 6456.29 7.48 27262.91 4037.81 7.48 20830.15
within 155.84 -334.85 2889.79 140.07 -560.32 2664.32 249.44 2287.22 5746.71 120.00 1051.13 2783.79
overall 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
between 0.21 0.00 0.78 0.21 0.00 0.78 0.22 0.00 0.78 0.21 0.00 0.78
within 0.27 -0.64 0.80 0.27 -0.65 0.80 0.32 -0.59 0.85 0.31 -0.61 0.83
overall 7189.60 4806.59 1879.39 33054.87 7103.00 4796.23 1879.39 33054.87 9340.12 4025.24 1879.39 33054.87 8186.34 4102.94 1879.39 33054.87
between 4390.66 2394.88 24772.76 4376.37 2394.88 24772.76 3554.91 2394.88 24772.76 3580.97 2394.88 24772.76
within 2027.70 -4880.72 15471.71 2034.77 -4967.31 15385.12 1909.45 -2730.19 17622.23 2030.98 -3883.97 16468.46
overall 0.51 0.18 0.13 0.90 0.51 0.18 0.13 0.90 0.37 0.16 0.14 0.82 0.41 0.16 0.14 0.82
between 0.16 0.24 0.85 0.16 0.24 0.85 0.13 0.24 0.73 0.14 0.24 0.73
within 0.08 0.28 0.72 0.08 0.29 0.72 0.08 0.15 0.57 0.09 0.19 0.61
overall 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
between 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
within 0.13 -0.69 0.87 0.13 -0.70 0.85
Variable Panel
PPGG - n = 60, T = 9, N = 540 PPGG w/o Lima - n = 59, T = 9, N = 531 DDGG - n = 139, T = 9, N = 1251 DDGG w/o Lima - n = 100, T = 9, N = 900
Department 
Poverty Rate (%)
SAT (1 = SAT, 0 
= No SAT)
Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF, INEI, JNE and ASAT










Reelection (1 = 
Reelected, 0 = Not 
reelected)
Department GDP 




However, for the purposes of this dissertation Lima is not crucial to assess the effect of 
large increases of transfers on LLGG tax collection because it receives relatively low 
transfers per capita, and it does not receive grants from natural resources and customs.  
Tables 6.18 and 6.19 present descriptive statistics for the main variables of 
interest, which are taxes and total transfers per capita in constant 2002 S./, distinguishing 
PPGG and DDGG according to the classifications that will be compared: resource groups 
and main transfer groups. Noteworthy, without the city of Lima the number of LLGG is 
59 PPGG and 100 DDGG. 
Table 6.18 – Descriptive statistics of main variables used in regression analysis by 
resource groups (2001 to 2009) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 19.04 21.13 0.85 181.89 17.59 17.92 2.43 114.23
between 15.04 2.24 56.08 16.44 4.86 68.40
within 15.15 -21.72 152.90 8.25 -16.20 63.42
overall 362.36 393.39 55.58 2976.19 479.03 612.88 0.00 2992.77
between 210.29 163.12 1077.69 428.93 189.98 1539.09
within 335.16 -622.17 2260.86 451.02 -1014.85 2078.87
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 39.24 103.38 0.51 1095.30 33.79 71.45 0.00 809.59
between 85.88 1.01 518.74 67.92 0.06 627.19
within 59.03 -313.83 615.80 22.93 -187.38 313.54
overall 174.78 130.06 35.26 945.41 96.93 101.13 6.84 1398.28
between 87.71 72.71 471.70 56.94 9.49 352.88
within 96.97 -94.87 760.47 83.71 -160.89 1236.87
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 26.28 33.40 0.51 247.99 16.41 23.86 0.00 342.67
between 31.96 1.01 186.56 19.43 0.06 116.50
within 10.89 -56.84 95.47 13.99 -40.75 296.16
overall 166.75 115.63 35.26 840.78 118.73 112.91 24.31 1398.28
between 73.43 72.71 407.54 53.56 46.81 352.88
within 90.04 -97.97 752.45 99.55 -139.09 1258.68
Variable Panel
PPGG, More&Medium Resources, n=22, T=9, N=198 DDGG, More& Medium Resources, n=14, T=9, N=126
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Taxes per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG, Less Resources, n=38, T=9, N=342 DDGG, Less Resources, n=124, T=9, N=1116
Taxes per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Taxes per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG, Less Resources w/o Lima, n=37, T=9, N=333 DDGG, Less Resources w/o Lima, n=86, T=9, N=774
Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF and INEI
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Table 6.19 – Descriptive statistics of main variables used in regression analysis by 
main transfer groups (2001 to 2009) 
 
Before introducing the regression model I present below scatter plots of the main 
variables of interest (local taxes and total transfers per capita), for the LLGG that will be 
tested for fiscal sloth: main cities with complete observations between 2001 and 2009, 
excluding Lima.
22
 Figures 6.25 through 6.27 show the scatter plots for all PPGG that are 
main cities, PPGG that are main cities with more and medium resources, and PPGG that 
are main cities with less resources, respectively. As can be seen, in the three cases the 
correlation between transfers and local taxes per capita is positive, and for more and 
medium resources the slope of the trend line is flatter mainly due to a few outliers.   
                                                 
22
 The general source of this information is NAO-MEF for fiscal information and INEI for population 
projections. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 23.87 25.11 1.57 181.89 22.33 25.06 0.19 261.52
between 17.01 3.42 56.08 22.20 2.61 116.50
within 19.04 -16.89 157.72 12.02 -34.83 167.36
overall 421.88 493.66 55.58 2976.19 202.75 314.94 0.00 2992.77
between 257.77 218.54 1077.69 208.98 52.68 1392.93
within 426.88 -562.65 2320.38 237.37 -1077.30 1802.60
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 27.13 18.58 4.97 97.50 21.41 21.73 0.52 114.23
between 15.17 12.82 54.68 21.22 2.23 68.40
within 12.25 4.60 96.85 7.89 -12.38 67.24
overall 271.95 231.35 35.26 1162.56 284.46 501.45 30.52 2709.60
between 146.09 103.93 512.07 442.43 109.26 1539.09
within 188.15 -121.42 922.43 270.74 -1209.42 1454.98
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 34.78 98.89 0.51 1095.30 48.90 123.21 0.00 1132.50
between 82.31 1.01 518.74 120.00 0.06 836.91
within 56.11 -318.29 611.34 30.62 -172.28 344.49
overall 188.55 137.56 46.22 945.41 83.83 91.43 6.84 1298.60
between 92.72 72.71 471.70 66.01 9.49 522.38
within 102.51 -81.10 774.25 63.64 -87.06 1160.81
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 22.98 32.06 0.51 247.99 9.15 18.76 0.00 342.67
between 30.75 1.01 186.56 10.61 0.06 62.92
within 10.14 -60.14 92.17 15.55 -39.30 288.90
overall 181.64 126.40 46.22 840.78 105.66 93.93 30.31 1298.60
between 82.21 72.71 419.05 40.42 46.81 221.82
within 96.78 -84.82 767.34 84.98 -65.23 1182.64
Variable Panel
PPGG, Mining, n=12, T=9, N=108 DDGG, Mining, n=47, T=9, N=423
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Taxes per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG, Other Nat Res, n=6, T=9, N=54 DDGG, Other Nat Res, n=10, T=9, N=90
Taxes per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
PPGG, FONCOMUN, n=42, T=9, N=378 DDGG, FONCOMUN, n=82, T=9, N=738
Taxes per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Source: own elaboration based on information by MEF and INEI
Variable Panel
PPGG, FONCOMUN w/o Lima, n=41, T=9, N=369 DDGG, FONCOMUN w/o Lima, n=43, T=9, N=387




Figure 6.25 – Main cities PPGG – 2001 to 2009 (59 LLGG)  
 
Figure 6.26 –Main cities PPGG with more and medium resources – 2001 to 2009 (22 
LLGG) 
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Figure 6.27 – Main cities PPGG with less resources – 2001 to 2009 (37 LLGG) 
 
In turn, Figures 6.28 through 6.30 present PPGG according to main transfer 
group: FONCOMUN, mining and gas/oil/customs. In the case of mining and 
FONCOMUN groups the relationship is positive and again flatter for mining mainly due 
to a few outliers with very high transfers per capita. On the other hand, for 
oil/gas/customs group the relationship is negative, but with few observations.  
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Figure 6.28 – Main cities PPGG with FONCOMUN as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
(41 LLGG) 
 
Figure 6.29 – Main cities PPGG with mining as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 (12 
LLGG) 
 





























Transfers per capita (in 2002 S./)





























Transfers per capita (in 2002 S./)
173 
 
Figure 6.30 – Main cities PPGG with oil/gas/customs as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
(6 LLGG) 
 
Figures 6.31 through 6.33 show the scatter plots for all DDGG that are main 
cities, DDGG that are main cities with more and medium resources, and DDGG that are 
main cities with less resources, respectively. Similar to PPGG, in the three cases the 
correlation between transfers and local taxes per capita is positive, and for DDGG with 
less resources the slope of the trend line is steeper than for more and medium resources, 
although in the latter case with relatively few observations.   
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Figure 6.31 – Main cities DDGG – 2001 to 2009 (100 LLGG) 
 
Figure 6.32 – Main cities DDGG with more and medium resources – 2001 to 2009 
(14 LLGG) 
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Figure 6.33 – Main cities DDGG with less resources – 2001 to 2009 (86 LLGG) 
 
To conclude, Figures 6.34 through 6.36 show DDGG according to main transfer 
group: FONCOMUN, mining and gas/oil/customs. Different to PPGG, in the case of 
FONCOMUN and mining groups there is not a clear relationship between transfers and 
local taxes per capita, while for oil/gas/customs the relationship is clearly positive, 
although similar to the case of PPGG, there are relatively few observations.  
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Figure 6.34 – Main cities DDGG with FONCOMUN as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
(43 LLGG) 
 
Figure 6.35 – Main cities DDGG with mining as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 (47 
LLGG) 
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Figure 6.36 – Main cities DDGG with oil/gas/customs as main transfer – 2001 to 
2009 (10 LLGG) 
 
Regression model 
In order to assess the effect of transfers on LLGG tax collection I use the 
following benchmark panel data model presented in equation (1):  
TAX/CAPit = (α + ui) + β1TTit + β2DGDP/Cjt + β3DPjt + β4DENit + β5REELECTit 
+ β6OI/TIit + β7SATit + eit      (1) 
As mentioned above, the database is a balanced panel between 2001 and 2009, 
analyzed separately for PPGG (59) and DDGG (100) that are main cities. TAX/CAP is 
local tax collection per capita and TT is total transfers per capita for each LLGG in 
constant 2002 S./; DGDP/C is department GDP per capita in constant 2002 S./; DP is the 
department proportion of the population in poverty; DEN is the population density of 
each LLGG; SAT (Tax Administration Service, using the term in Spanish) is a dummy 
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that takes the value of 1 every year following the creation of a SAT (it only applies to 
PPGG); REELECT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 every year after a 
LLGG mayor gets reelected; and Own Income/Total Income (OI/TI) is own income as 
percent of total income in each LLGG. The subscript (t) refers to time, (i) captures 
municipal variability and (j) departmental variability for DGDP/C and DP. 
The main variable of interest is TT, which is also evaluated according to resource 
groups (equation (2), more and medium resources are grouped together due to few 
observations); and according to main transfer groups (equation (3), “other fragmentary 
resources” also groups together oil, gas and custom transfers due to few observations).  
I include two more specifications in order to test the effect of the variable of 
symmetry (equation (4)) introduced by Gramkhar and Oates (1996), where SYMMETRY 
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when total transfers per capita fall with respect to the 
previous year. And the effect of lagged transfers on LLGG tax collection (equation (5)), 
where (TR-1) is total transfers per capita of the previous year in constant 2002 S./.  
TAX/CAPit = (α + ui) + β1(TT)it + β2DEPTGDPjt + β3DEPTPOVjt + β4DENit + 
β5REELECTit + β6OI/TIit + β7SATit + β8SYMMETRYit + eit       (4) 
TAX/CAPit = (α + ui) + β1(TT)it + β2(TT-1)it + β3DEPTGDPjt + β4DEPTPOVjt + 
β5DENit + β6REELECTit + β7OI/TIit + β7SATit + eit       (5) 
Equations (6) and (7) also test the effect of lagged transfers on LLGG tax 
collection, according to resources and main transfer groups. Each model is initially tested 
using the more efficient random effect regression, and then compared to the fixed effect 
regression using the Hausman test to assess whether the estimators are significantly 
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different, in which case I use fixed effects. Although not shown, I also test and correct 
each regression for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using panel corrected 
standard errors (PCSE) regressions, finding similar results to those described below, 
though in the case of PPGG some of the coefficients for the transfer variables have higher 
statistical significance. I also include time fixed effects as year dummy variables, labeled 
“time dummies”, whenever the year dummies are jointly statistically significant.  
A potential endogeneity concern related to subnational taxes that are highly 
correlated with economic activity, such as the sales tax, is that both the dependent 
variable (own tax collection of LLGG) and one of the explanatory variables (gross 
domestic product) are simultaneously determined. In the case of LLGG in Peru, however, 
there is not a sales tax, and the main source of own taxes is the property tax, which is 
relatively inelastic to the economic cycle, hence reducing this risk of endogeneity.  
Table 6.20 shows all regression results for PPGG and DDGG, which for TT tend 
to conform to the scatter plot figures presented above. The effect of TT on LLGG tax 
collection (equation (1) for PPGG and DDGG), is positive for PPGG and DDGG, and 
higher for DDGG, although not statistically significant for PPGG. The higher coefficient 
for DDGG is consistent with the scatter plots in Figures 6.25 and 6.31; it is partly 
explained by the fact that DDGG are on average more dependent on transfers than PPGG: 
this means that those DDGG that receive transfers from natural resources, which are 
mostly earmarked to public investment, have a stronger incentive to increase own 
resources to fund current expenditure to operate and maintain public investment, since 
their own resources are on average lower than for PPGG.  
180 
 
Table 6.20 – Results of “fiscal sloth” models (main cities w/o Lima) – 2001 to 2009 
 
Variable (1) Fixed
1 (2) Fixed (3) Fixed (4) Fixed (5) Fixed (6) Fixed (7) Fixed (1) Random
2 (2) Fixed (3) Random (4) Fixed (5) Fixed (6) Fixed (7) Fixed
0.0007 0.0021 0.0009 0.0113 0.0107 0.0085
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0029)** (0.0031)** (0.0047)*
0.0025 0.0032
(0.0039) (0.0049)
0.0011 0.0015 0.0113 0.0068
(0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0032)** (0.006)
0.0073 0.0057
(0.0037)** (0.0057)
0.0095 0.0107 0.0184 0.0156
(0.0109) (0.0133) (0.0062)** (0.0071)**
0.0286 0.0273
(0.0153)* (0.0121)**
0.0024 0.0026 0.0033 0.0108
(0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0055)**
0.0017 -0.0052
(0.004) (0.0059)
-0.0151 -0.0097 0.0289 -0.0022
(0.0088)* (0.0198) (0.0045)** (0.0141)
-0.0085 0.0202
(0.0207) (0.0113)*
-0.013 -0.0037 -0.0057 0.0240
(0.0096) (0.0127) (0.0084) (0.0116)**
-0.0139 -0.1241
(0.016) (0.0285)**
0.0008 0.0009 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006 0.0008 0.0003 0.0014 0.0012 0.0017 0.0016 0.0015 0.0014 0.0005
(0.0004)* (0.0004)** (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003)** (0.0004)** (0.0003)** (0.0003)** (0.0004)** (0.0004)** (0.0005)
-12.78 -12.99 -11.25 -16.49 -18.42 -42.13 -14.35 2.01 -17.19 5.18 9.71 8.40 -10.65 5.85
(11.26) -11.27 (11.27) (12.86) (13.03) (9.64)** (13.24) (8.06) (7.80)** (7.77) (8.94) (8.97) (9.48) (13.61)
-0.0257 -0.0244 -0.0277 -0.0187 -0.0187 -0.0137 -0.0217 0.0003 0.005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0048 -0.0012
(0.0035)** (0.0038)** (0.0037)** (0.0042)** (0.0042)** (0.0045)** (0.0046)** (0.0003) (0.004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0048) (0.0049)
5.16 5.17 4.48 3.74 3.66 4.48 2.94
(3.82) (3.82) (3.82) (4.22) (4.22) (4.22) (4.22)
-3.49 -3.41 -3.48 -3.84 -3.74 -3.29 -3.73 0.95 1.32 0.57 -0.04 -0.04 0.67 -0.83
(1.93)* (1.94)* (1.93)* (2.02)* (2.02)* (2.02) (2.02)* (1.54) (1.57) (1.53) (1.61) (1.61) (1.66) (1.64)
16.90 19.84 15.18 13.56 15.03 19.46 15.86 63.25 54.67 62.69 79.53 77.63 71.64 74.52
(10.49) (11.04)* (10.62) (11.21) (11.07) (10.72)* (11.33) (5.37)** (5.95)** (5.26)** (6.22)** (6.26)** (7.07)** (7.12)**
1.63 -2.30
(1.60) (1.36)*
R-Squared within 0.328 0.3291 0.3359 0.2664 0.2653 0.2481 0.277 0.328 0.1231 0.1536 0.1582 0.1554 0.1514 0.1921
R-Squared between 0.6039 0.5961 0.6132 0.5945 0.59 0.4887 0.6046 0.6039 0.1842 0.5437 0.5161 0.5182 0.2341 0.3521
R-Squared overall 0.4622 0.4539 0.4716 0.471 0.4674 0.3733 0.4836 0.4622 0.1462 0.4106 0.3961 0.3961 0.1893 0.2994
Observations 531 (59*9) 531 (59*9) 531 (59*9) 472 (59*8) 472 (59*8) 472 (59*8) 472 (59*8) 900 (100*9) 900 (100*9) 900 (100*9) 800 (100*8) 800 (100*8) 800 (100*8) 800 (100*8)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
1
 Fixed Effects GLS Panel Regressions. 
2
 Random Effects GLS Panel Regressions. Choice of model based on Hausman test at 10% significance level. Inclusion of time dummies based on joint significance at 10% level
Standard errors in parenthesis. * 10 % significance level. ** 5% significance level




















More & Medium Resources 
(M&MR)
Total Transfers (TT)
Dependent Variable: Tax/Cap Dependent Variable: Tax/Cap Dependent Variable: Tax/Cap Dependent Variable: Tax/Cap
Provincial Governments (PPGG) - Benchmark model PPGG - Transfers with one-year lag District Governments (DDGG) DDGG - Transfers with one-year lag
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This indicates that for DDGG, each additional S./ 1 of transfers increases tax 
collection in S./ 0.01 (in constant terms). In the case of the models that include the 
SYMMETRY variable (equation (4) for PPGG and DDGG), this variable is only 
significant and negative at the 10 percent level for DDGG, which indicates that tax 
collection falls on average S./ 2.3 when transfers fall. Lastly, for models that include the 
lagged transfer (equation (5) for PPGG and DDGG), this variable is not significant.      
The regressions that evaluate the effect of transfers according to resource groups 
show a positive and significant effect of transfers on tax collection only for DDGG (at the 
5 percent level), with a higher coefficient for DDGG with less resources relative to more 
and medium resources (equation (2) for PPGG and DDGG in Table 6.20). In the case of 
the specification that includes the lagged transfer variable according to resource groups 
(equation (6) for PPGG and DDGG), the lagged variable for PPGG is positive and 
significant for LLGG with more and medium resources, as well as less resources, with a 
higher coefficient in the latter case; and it is positive and significant for DDGG with less 
resources, with a coefficient that is similar to that for PPGG.  
For the regressions according to main transfer group (model (3) for PPGG and 
DDGG in Table 6.20), in the case of PPGG only “Other Fragmentary Resources” (OFR) 
is significant at the 10 percent level and negative, while for DDGG it is also the only 
significant variable at the 5 percent level, although it is positive. The negative sign of 
Other Fragmentary Resources for PPGG is consistent with Figure 6.30 and suggests some 
evidence of fiscal sloth, which can be partly explained by the fact that LLGG that receive 
oil as main transfer have less restrictions on the use of grants and less volatility of 
transfers, and consequently have less incentive to collect own taxes to maintain and 
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operate public investment. Moreover, PPGG already collect more own resources on 
average than DDGG, so they have less incentives to continue increasing own resources, 
which helps explain why the sign for DDGG is positive. However, it should also be noted 
that in both cases there are relatively few observations: 6 PPGG, of which 4 have oil as 
main transfer; and 10 DDGG of which 3 have oil as main transfer, which may bias the 
results.  
With respect to the lagged variables (model (7) for PPGG and DDGG), only 
DDGG show significant coefficients: mining transfers are positive and significant at the 5 
percent level, the lagged variable of Other Fragmentary Resources is positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level; and the FONCOMUN variable is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level for the contemporaneous variable, and negative and 
significant at the 5 percent level for the lagged variable.  
For the control variables, DGDP/C has the expected positive sign, although it is 
significant at the 5 percent level only for DDGG (except for model (7)), while for PPGG 
it is only significant at the 10 percent level for model (1) and at the 5 percent level for 
model (2). The absence of a measure of gross domestic product at the local level of 
government probably means that the coefficient of department gross domestic product 
per capita is biased downwards for LLGG that have mining as main transfer, since in 
most of them economic activity has been booming; and it is biased upwards for LLGG 
that have FONCOMUN as main transfer, in which economic activity has been on average 
less buoyant.  
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Department Poverty is mostly not significant across specifications, while Density 
is surprisingly negative and significant at the 5 percent level for PPGG. The Tax 
Administration Service (SAT) variable has the expected positive sign, although it is not 
statistically significant, and the REELECT variable is negative and significant at the 10 
percent level for PPGG. The variable Own Income/Total Income is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level for DDGG, which indicates that as DDGG improve their 
fiscal autonomy they tend to increase their tax collection in constant per capita terms. 
Lastly, although not shown in Table 6.20, in most models the time-dummies are jointly 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level for both PPGG and DDGG. In both cases, 
the years 2007 to 2009 have higher coefficients with higher statistical significance than 
the years 2002 through 2006, which suggests an improvement in the capacity of LLGG, 
on average, to collect own taxes.  
Hence, after evaluating the effect of transfers on tax collection of LLGG that are 
main cities (without Lima), which is where it matters most in terms of total tax collection 
of municipalities in Peru, I did not find evidence that transfers stimulate lower tax 
collection. On the contrary, in the case of DDGG, transfers stimulate higher tax 
collection, especially in DDGG that are main cities and receive less resources.  
For PPGG, transfers only stimulate lower tax collection in LLGG that receive 
Other Fragmentary Resources as their main transfer, which is partly related to the fact 
that LLGG that receive oil as main transfer have less restrictions on the use of grants and 
less volatility of transfers, and consequently have less incentive to collect own taxes to 
maintain and operate public investment; in this case, however, there may also be a bias 
due to few observations (only 6 PPGG). Noteworthy, the effect is the opposite for DDGG 
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that receive Other Fragmentary Resources as their main transfer, which is partly related 
to the fact that own resources of DDGG is lower than for PPGG, and hence they have an 
incentive to increase own resources.  
The lagged transfer variable is not consistent across specifications, and the 
SYMMETRY variable is only significant and negative for DDGG, suggesting that tax 
collection decreases symmetrically with transfers for that group of LLGG.  
 
To conclude, both the descriptive and econometric assessment of the response of 
own revenue collection to transfers confirm that there is no evidence of fiscal sloth in 
Peru: LLGG do not appear to decrease their fiscal effort in response to transfers. The 
analysis allowed narrowing the discussion to the group of municipalities where own 
resources matter most, which is main cities, comparing LLGG that received large 
transfers to those that did not.  
In the context of the many studies on this topic in Peru, fiscal sloth is not a 
relevant problem to macroeconomic stability: first, the resources at stake are a relatively 
small proportion of total income of LLGG; and second, municipalities do not decrease 
their tax effort in response to transfers. This behavior of LLGG can be partially explained 
by the fact that transfers linked to natural resources are mostly earmarked to public 
investment, so municipalities have the incentive to collect own revenue in order to obtain 
resources for current expenditure; indeed, as supporting evidence of this claim, Table 6.8 
in the previous section shows that most own taxes across categories of LLGG are 
allocated to current expenditure. Noteworthy, the stimulation of LLGG own revenue 
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collection is an important goal of the decentralization process. However, the evidence 
shows that transfers are not reducing fiscal effort in Peruvian municipalities.  
As described in Chapter 4, the effect of transfers on LLGG own revenue 
collection has been thoroughly studied in Peru. I turn next to the fifth question of this 
dissertation, evaluating the effect of transfers on municipal expenditures through an 
estimation of the flypaper effect. This is a topic that has been relatively ignored in the 
literature review on Peru, and as suggested by the descriptive findings in the previous 
section, it appears promising in assessing the effect of transfers on macroeconomic 
stability.  
Effect of transfers on LLGG expenditures 
To assess econometrically the answer to question 5 of this dissertation, whether 
LLGG in Peru increased substantially their expenditure in response to transfers, 
exhibiting a flypaper effect, I use a version of the flypaper effect model similar to that 
used in previous studies (see for example Melo, 2002, for the case of Colombia).  
Descriptive statistics 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the flypaper effect allows assessing the responsiveness 
of expenditures to transfers, and its comparison to the effect of income on expenditures, 
with income proxied by gross domestic product. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is 
of particular interest to compare the responsiveness of expenditures to transfers across the 
different categories of LLGG introduced above, and especially according to resource and 
main transfer groups.  
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Similar to the analysis of fiscal sloth, the dataset is a balanced panel between 
2001 and 2009. I exclude the year 2010 because that is the first full year for which the 
transfer “FONIPREL” included as part of its criteria to reward investment proposals the 
degree of budget execution of SNG: when FONIPREL rates public investment proposals 
it gives extra points to the SNG that executes a higher proportion of its budget (see Table 
A1.3 in Annex 1).
23
 Similar to the PI & PMM case analyzed above with reference to the 
response of own taxes to transfers, this can arguably create an endogeneity problem due 
to reverse causality, since SNG may receive more transfers because they increase their 
expenditures.  
To assess the effect of transfers on LLGG expenditures I include all LLGG for 
which I have complete observations between 2001 and 2009, which yields 1201 LLGG 
(65.5 percent of a total of 1834 LLGG): 156 PPGG (80 percent of a total of 195 PPGG), 
and 1045 DDGG (63.8 percent of a total of 1639 DDGG). In most regressions I 
distinguish between PPGG and DDGG, since they have some different functions of 
government and sources of income.
24
 PPGG have on average larger current expenditure 
per capita (statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level), while DDGG have 
on average higher capital expenditure per capita (statistically significant at the 5 percent 
significance level).  
                                                 
23
 This particular criterion was introduced during the second semester of 2009, but arguably it was too late 
during the budget execution of that year to have an effect on the decisions of subnational authorities.  
24
 For the different sources of income between PPGG and DDGG see Table A1.4 in Annex 1. According to 
the Municipal Organic Law (Law 17.972 of May, 2003) the expenditure functions of LLGG include broad 
responsibilities in the fields of urban development; health, water and sanitation; transit and public 
transportation; education, culture, sports and recreation; commercialization of goods and service; social 
programs; citizen security; promotion of local development; and other functions that are not exclusive of 
other levels of government. PPGG tend to have some specific functions for the whole province, and 
expenditure responsibilities are broad with respect to public investment. 
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In turn, PPGG receive on average higher FONCOMUN transfers per capita at the 
1 percent significance level, which do not have conditions on their use; and they collect 
on average higher own resources per capita than DDGG, at the 1 percent significance 
level, while DDGG receive higher earmarks and other resources per capita, at the 5 
percent significance level. Lastly, and as will be shown below when describing LLGG 
according to resources and main transfer groups, PPGG and DDGG present large 
differences in average expenditures and transfers per capita in constant terms across most 
categories. For these reasons, I separate PPGG and DDGG in the analysis below.   
In Tables 6.21 and 6.22 I evaluate whether there is any significant association 
among the different categories of LLGG used in this dissertation and the degree of 
completeness of the database, distinguishing between provincial and district 
governments.  





















Complete 10 42 104 60 90 6 48 68 40
Omitted 2 8 29 10 25 4 17 12 10
Total 12 50 133 70 115 10 65 80 50
Complete - Exp Value 10 40 106 56 92 8 52 64 40
Omitted - Exp Value 2 10 27 14 23 2 13 16 10
Chi Value
FONCOMUN Mining Oil Gas Custom FOCAM
Complete 109 35 9 1 1 1 156 80%
Omitted 31 8 39 20%
Total 140 43 9 1 1 1 195 100%
Complete - Exp Value 112 34.4 7.2 0.8 0.8 0.8
Omitted - Exp Value 28 8.6 1.8 0.2 0.2 0.2
Chi Value
Chi Value: 3.45. Critical Value at 10% sign. level with 5 degrees of 
freedom: 9.24
Category
Classification by Resources Classification by Size Classification by Needs
Chi Value: 0.85. Critical Value at 10% 
sign. level with 2 degrees of freedom: 
4.61
Chi Value: 4.15. Critical Value 
at 10% sign. level with 2 degrees 
of freedom: 4.61
Chi Value: 2.79. Critical Value 
at 10% sign. level with 2 
degrees of freedom: 4.61
Category
Classification by Main Transfer
Total Fraction
Source: own elaboration based on information by NAO-MEF. 
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In the case of provincial governments (Table 6.21), there is no particular 
association at the 10 percent significance level between omitted LLGG and the different 
categories of LLGG used in this dissertation.  
For district governments (Table 6.22), however, there is association between 
omitted LLGG and the classifications by size, needs and main transfers, although there is 
no association by resources.  
Table 6.22 - Tests of association for DDGG of completeness of data by municipal 
classifications 
 
In the classification by size in Table 6.22, there are relatively more omitted 
DDGG that have less than 500 houses than would be expected if there was no 
association, and relatively less omitted DDGG that are main cities: this is to be expected, 
since larger DDGG tend to have higher capacity to report their fiscal information. 
According to needs, there are relatively more omitted DDGG with high needs, and 
relatively less omitted DDGG with medium needs. Lastly, according to main transfer, 



















Complete 121 252 673 139 294 612 270 299 477
Omitted 76 148 369 40 146 408 159 209 225
Total 197 400 1042 179 440 1020 429 508 702
Complete - Exp Value 126 255 665 114 281 651 274 324 448
Omitted - Exp Value 71 145 377 65 159 369 155 184 254
Chi Value
FONCOMUN Mining Oil Gas Custom FOCAMHydroenergy Fishing
Complete 613 301 42 71 6 7 4 1 1045 64%
Omitted 326 239 14 13 1 1 594 36%
Total 939 540 56 84 7 8 4 1 1639 100%
Complete - Exp Value 599 344 36 54 4 5 3 1
Omitted - Exp Value 340 196 20 30 3 3 1 0
Chi Value
Category
Classification by Resources Classification by Size Classification by Needs
Source: own elaboration based on information by NAO-MEF. 
Category
Classification by Main Transfer
Total Fraction
Chi Value: 40.96. Critical Value at 1% sign level with 7 degrees of freedom: 18.48
Chi Value: 0.87. Critical Value at 10% 
sign. level with 2 degrees of freedom: 
4.61
Chi Value: 22.99. Critical 
Value at 1% sign. level with 2 
degrees of freedom: 9.21
Chi Value: 10.74. Critical 
Value at 1% sign. level with 2 
degrees of freedom: 9.21
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less omitted DDGG that have gas, oil and FONCOMUN as main transfer. 
Notwithstanding these associations, there is a relatively large number of complete 
observations in each category for DDGG, which reduces the risk of bias in the results.   
The main interest of this section is to assess econometrically the different effect of 
transfers on primary expenditures according to the classifications of LLGG by resources 
and main transfer groups, and distinguishing between PPGG and DDGG. This allows 
evaluating whether there is a flypaper effect for the different classifications of LLGG, 
and also whether there is a significant difference in the response of expenditures to 
transfers in LLGG with more and/or medium resources vis-à-vis LLGG with less 
resources; and in LLGG in which the main transfer stems from natural resources vis-à-vis 
LLGG in which the main transfer is FONCOMUN.  
Different to the analysis for own local taxes, the argument of endogeneity due to 
reverse causality posed by Aragon and Gayoso (2005) does not necessarily hold in the 
case of the response of expenditures to transfers. Indeed, the FONCOMUN transfer 
allocates more resources to LLGG that are rural, and hence have a lower tax potential. 
However, the tax potential of LLGG does not necessarily affect their propensity to spend 
out of transfers. For this reason, I separately pool together all PPGG and DDGG in the 
regression analysis presented below, regardless of their size and needs.   
It can still be argued that the allocation rules of the main transfers in Peru, which 
include rural population (FONCOMUN) and also BUN (in the case of canon) in its 
criteria, are also important determinants of the ability to spend of LLGG. This argument 
may also create an endogeneity problem due to reverse causality, since the transfers that a 
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LLGG receives may be determined by its capacity to spend, which in turn may be 
associated to its urban population (part of the criteria of the FONCOMUN transfer) and 
needs (part of the criteria of transfers based on natural resources). Hence, following the 
analysis of the previous section, I also estimate the econometric models distinguishing 
LLGG according to urban population (proxied by size groups) and needs (BUN groups).  
More importantly, I take advantage of the allocation rule of mining transfers, by 
which 10 percent of its distribution goes directly to the LLGG in which the mining 
production takes place: as previously discussed, this is arguably an exogenous transfer, 
since it is only related to whether a LLGG possesses a mining exploitation. In this regard, 
I estimate separate regressions distinguishing LLGG that are mining producers, for which 
most transfers come from mining and hence have clear exogenous nature. 
With respect to the regression model, the main variable of interest is the effect of 
total transfers on primary expenditure of LLGG. Control variables include other 
determinants of expenditures of LLGG frequently used in the literature that evaluates the 
flypaper effect, for which there is panel data available in Peru. The most important is 
GDP as a proxy for income: according to the “equivalence theorem” of the median-voter 
model presented in Chapter 2, this variable is supposed to have a positive effect on 
expenditure of a similar size as the response to transfers; the violation of this condition 
originates the empirical anomaly labeled the “flypaper effect”, by which the response of 
expenditures to transfers tends to be higher than for income. The series of GDP is only 
available at the department level, which precludes intra-department variation.   
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The other control variables used in the regression model are: 1. Poverty rate, 
which is also only available at the department level; its effect is expected to be positive, 
since poorer LLGG have more needs, and hence more propensity to spend; 2. Density, 
whose effect is expected to be ambiguous: less densely populated LLGG have higher 
expenditure needs, while more densely populated LLGG tend to be urban, with higher 
institutional capacities; 3. Reelection of the mayor is expected to be positive, since local 
authorities that are reelected have more experience, which may allow them to improve 
execution of expenditures; and 4. Own income/Total Income is also expected to be 
ambiguous: on one hand, more autonomous LLGG tend to have higher institutional 
capacities to execute expenditures, but on the other hand, less autonomous LLGG that 
receive windfall transfers may have “fiscal illusion” (Rodden, 2003) due to the low 
marginal cost of increasing funds that come from the national government, which may 
prompt them to increase expenditures.  
Similar to the estimation for the revenue models, I include the transfer variables 
with a lag, and following Gramkhar and Oates (1996) and Melo (2002), I introduce a 
symmetry variable to assess the reaction of expenditures when transfers fall. The source 
for all these variables is the same as described in the revenue section. Expenditures, 
transfers and GDP are also expressed in constant, per capita terms, using 2002 prices.  
As mentioned in the literature review, Bailey and Connolly (1998) analyze a 
number of estimation problems that have been found in relation to the measurement of 
the flypaper effect. First, some studies fail to acknowledge the existence of matching 
grants, which induce a substitution effect on the part of the recipient SNG, stimulating 
higher expenditures. In the case of Peru there is one transfer system that requires co-
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financing, FONIPREL, which was introduced during 2008 (included under “earmarks 
and other transfers” in Figure 1.1); however, the co-financing required by most LLGG is 
relatively low (see rules of FONIPREL in Table A1.3 in Annex 1), representing only 
around 0.66 percent of total expenditures of LLGG on average in 2008-09, which is why 
it is not considered here a significant stimulus of municipal expenditure. Second, Becker 
(1996) shows that the functional form can lead to different results of the flypaper effect: 
indeed, a linear specification may inflate the response of expenditures to transfers if the 
true functional form is not linear. In this regard, I estimate the regression models using 
both a linear and a logarithmic specification to evaluate the robustness of results to 
different specifications. And third, some model specifications include irrelevant variables 
and/or fail to include relevant variables: the regression models presented below include 
all the variables for which there is an available official series in Peru, and each variable 
has an underlying explanation for its inclusion.  
Table 6.23 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the benchmark 
model of the response of expenditures of LLGG to transfers. As mentioned above, both 
primary expenditure and transfers per capita are similar for PPGG and DDGG, but they 
have different composition. In turn, PPGG have more fiscal autonomy, measured by own 
income/total income, which is higher on average than for DDGG at the 1 percent 
significance level. Majors of DDGG get reelected more often, since the reelection 
variable is higher than for PPGG at the 1 percent significance level.  
Although not shown in Table 6.23, average total income per capita in constant 
terms for PPGG during 2001-09 has been S/. 489, while for DDGG it has been S/. 451, 
which is not much higher than primary expenditure per capita (S/. 417 and S/. 404, 
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respectively), in spite of the large increase in transfers of the last few years in Peru. 
Moreover, this average difference is reduced by 45 percent and 43 percent for PPGG and 
DDGG, respectively, if the year 2010 is added.   
Table 6.23 – Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression analysis of 
response of expenditure to transfers – 2001 to 2009 
 
Moreover, Table 6.24 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables of 
interest, which are primary expenditure and transfers per capita in constant 2002 S./, 
distinguishing between the different categories of resource and main transfer groups. For 
the classification by resource groups, more resources and medium resources are pooled 
together due to lack of sufficient observations for PPGG; while for the classification by 
main transfer groups, other fragmentary resources pools together gas, oil, hydro-energy, 
FOCAM, fishing and customs transfers, also due to insufficient observations for PPGG.  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 417 710 62 15505 404 648 5 18296
between 488 108 5492 456 66 6443
within 517 -4530 10431 461 -5859 12257
overall 413 1170 35 30408 402 848 0 31390
between 766 73 9373 575 9 10801
within 887 -8611 21449 623 -10286 20992
overall 0.20 0.16 -0.03 0.80 0.13 0.17 -0.04 1.00
between 0.14 0.02 0.76 0.16 0.00 0.99
within 0.08 -0.08 0.75 0.07 -0.36 0.89
overall 542 2442 0 25063 566 2714 0 28338
between 2447 0 23505 2714 0 27263
within 97 -1125 2099 91 -1185 2275
overall 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
between 0.19 0.00 0.78 0.22 0.00 0.78
within 0.25 -0.67 0.77 0.32 -0.60 0.84
overall 6580 4326 1879 33055 6715 3991 1879 33055
between 3921 2395 24773 3617 2395 24773
within 1853 -5490 14862 1690 -5356 14997
overall 0.55 0.18 0.13 0.90 0.54 0.19 0.13 0.90
between 0.16 0.24 0.85 0.17 0.24 0.85
within 0.08 0.33 0.76 0.08 0.31 0.75
Primary expenditure per 
capita (constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG - n = 156, T = 9, N = 1404 DDGG - n = 1045, T = 9, N = 9405
Source: own elaboration based on information by NAO-MEF, INEI and JNE
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Own income / total income 
(%)
Density (population per 
square kilometer)
Reelection (1 = Reelected, 
0 = Not reelected)
Department GDP per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)




Table 6.24 Descriptive statistics of main variables used in regression analysis by 
resource and main transfer groups - 2001 to 2009 
 
Table 6.24 shows that primary expenditure per capita in constant terms is lower 
on average than transfers only for “more and medium resources”, in the classification by 
resources, and “mining”, in the classification by main transfer, but again not by a large 
difference, while it is higher for the rest of the categories.   
Before conducting the regression analysis and similar to the analysis of the 
previous section, I present below scatter plots of the main variables of interest (transfers 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 572 1120 69 15505 698 991 5 18296
between 762 157 5492 649 140 6443
within 826 -4376 10585 750 -5565 12551
overall 636 1960 56 30408 726 1340 0 31390
between 1274 163 9373 860 190 10801
within 1499 -8388 21671 1028 -9962 21315
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 340 335 62 4326 241 188 11 3375
between 230 108 1740 127 66 1446
within 244 -502 3620 139 -297 2582
overall 302 316 35 4272 223 184 0 3283
between 202 73 1189 120 9 873
within 243 -600 3471 139 -371 2633
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 666 1332 82 15505 554 1039 5 18296
between 890 207 5492 681 66 6443
within 1000 -4281 10679 785 -5709 12407
overall 769 2367 56 30408 595 1463 0 31390
between 1526 219 9373 951 53 10801
within 1826 -8255 21805 1112 -10093 21185
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 330 325 62 4326 321 345 11 4620
between 223 108 1740 288 68 3485
within 237 -513 3609 189 -687 2662
overall 294 300 46 4272 300 309 0 3495
between 192 73 1189 251 9 2073
within 231 -608 3463 180 -949 2710
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
overall 489 428 81 1951 446 485 40 3936
between 375 181 1526 349 108 2258
within 229 17 1334 338 -1224 3119
overall 458 438 35 1990 438 483 31 5394
between 397 104 1560 360 109 2894
within 214 -18 1304 324 -1898 2938
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
DDGG - FONCOMUN, n=614, T=9, N=5518
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Source: own elaboration based on information by NAO-MEF
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG - Other frag res, n=12, T=9, N=108 DDGG - Other frag res, n=131, T=9, N=1179
Primary expenditure per 
capita (constant 2002 S./)
Primary expenditure per 
capita (constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG - FONCOMUN, n=109, T=9, N=981
DDGG - Mining, n=301, T=9, N=2709
Primary expenditure per 
capita (constant 2002 S./)
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG - Less Resources, n=104, T=9, N=936 DDGG - Less Resources, n=673, T=9, N=6057
Primary expenditure per 
capita (constant 2002 S./)
Transfers per capita 
(constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG - Mining, n=35, T=9, N=315
Primary expenditure per 
capita (constant 2002 S./)
Variable Panel
PPGG - More&Medium Resources, n=52, T=9, 
N=468




and primary expenditure per capita in constant S/. 2002), distinguishing between PPGG 
and DDGG, and among the different categories according to resources and main transfer 
groups. Figures 6.37 and 6.38 present the scatter plots for all PPGG and DDGG for which 
there is complete information during 2001-2009, respectively. As can be seen, a few 
outliers explain the high values of both axes. In either case the relationship is positive, as 
shown by the simple regression between both variables, and it would be closer to one had 
it not been by the outliers, especially in the case of PPGG.  
Figure 6.37 – Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of PPGG – 2001 to 
2009 
 


































Transfers per capita (in 2002 S/.)
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Figure 6.38 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of DDGG – 2001 to 
2009 
 
Figures 6.39 and 6.40 display the scatter plot of PPGG and DDGG with more & 
medium resources, with a lower coefficient for PPGG.  
Figure 6.39 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of PPGG with more and 
medium resources – 2001 to 2009 
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Figure 6.40 – Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of DDGG with more 
and medium resources – 2001 to 2009 
 
Figures 6.41 and 6.42 present PPGG and DDGG with less resources, respectively. 
In these cases both coefficients are more similar and closer to one, reinforcing the 
observation that the lower coefficient of the previous figures is only due to a few outliers.  
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Figure 6.41 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of PPGG with less 
resources – 2001 to 2009 
 
Figure 6.42 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of DDGG with less 
resources – 2001 to 2009 
 
In turn, the classification of mining as main transfer in Figures 6.43 and 6.44 
shows that this is the main source of outliers for both PPGG and DDGG, respectively. 
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Figure 6.43 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of PPGG with mining 
as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
 
Figure 6.44 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of DDGG with mining 
as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
 
Figures 6.45 and 6.46 present the classification of FONCOMUN as main transfer 
for PPGG and DDGG, respectively; and figures 6.47 and 6.48 show the classification of 
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other fragmentary resources as main transfer for PPGG and DDGG, respectively. For 
both classifications, the coefficient between transfers and primary expenditure per capita 
is much closer to one.  
Figure 6.45 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of PPGG with 
FONCOMUN as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
 
Figure 6.46 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of DDGG with 
FONCOMUN as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
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Figure 6.47 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of PPGG with other 
fragmentary resources as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
 
Figure 6.48 - Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of DDGG with other 
fragmentary resources as main transfer – 2001 to 2009 
 
Noteworthy, the relatively low dispersion around the linear trend-line across figures 
suggests that the true functional specification of the relationship between transfers and 
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primary expenditure is likely to be linear. Hence, I will report most results below using 
the linear specification, which also has an easy interpretation. 
Regression model 
To assess econometrically the effect of transfers on LLGG primary expenditure I 
use the following panel data benchmark model:  
PRIMEXP/CAPit = (α + ui) + β1TTit + β2DGDP/Cjt + β3DPjt + β4DENit + 
β5REELECTit + β6OI/TIit + eit       (1) 
As mentioned above, the database is a balanced panel between 2001 and 2009, 
analyzed initially for all LLGG (1201), and in the rest of regressions separately for PPGG 
(156) and DDGG (1045). PRIMEXP/CAP is primary expenditure per capita, and the rest 
of the variables are the same as those introduced for the analysis of the effect of transfers 
on local tax collection. The coefficient β1 denotes the average change in primary 
expenditure in response to the change in S/. 1 in transfers in per capita 2002 S/., while the 
coefficient β2 denotes the average change in primary expenditure in response to the 
change in S/. 1 in department gross domestic product (DGDP) in per capita 2002 S/. A 
flypaper effect exists as long as β1 > β2. 
I also assess a logarithmic model to evaluate the robustness of results to different 
functional forms:  
LN (PRIMEXP/CAPit) = (α + ui) + β1LN(TTit) + β2LN(DGDP/Cjt) + β3DPjt + 
β4DENit + β5REELECTit + β6OI/TIit + eit      (2) 
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In this case, the coefficient β1 denotes the elasticity of primary expenditure to 
transfers in per capita constant 2002 S/., or equivalently, the percentage change in 
primary expenditure in response to a 1 percent change in transfers; while β2 denotes the 
elasticity of primary expenditure to DGDP/C in per capita constant 2002 S/. Similar to 
the linear case, a flypaper effect exists when β1 > β2.  
In both specifications, my interest is twofold: 1. To have a measure of the reaction 
of primary expenditure to transfers; and 2. To compare this measure to the effect of 
income on primary expenditure, to assess the existence of the apparent “irrationality” of 
LLGG under the assumptions of the median-voter model, which is the flypaper effect.  
Similar to the analysis for LLGG own taxes, each model is initially tested using 
the more efficient random effect regression, and then compared to the fixed effect 
regression through the Hausman test, in order to assess whether the estimators are 
significantly different, in which case I use the more robust fixed effect regression. 
Although not shown, I also test and correct each regression for heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation using panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) regressions, with similar 
results to those described below for the coefficients with the effect of transfers on 
primary expenditure using the logarithmic specification, although for the linear 
specification the coefficients using PCSE tend to be somewhat smaller, but consistent 
with the findings that are summarized below. I also include time fixed effects as year 
dummy variables, labeled “time dummies”, whenever the year dummies are jointly 
statistically significant.   
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Table 6.25 shows the results for the basic benchmark model. Equation (1) 
presents all LLGG combined; equation (2) separates between PPGG and DDGG using 
the database of all LLGG; equations (3) and (4) test separately for PPGG and DDGG, 
respectively, while equations (5) through (8) repeat this analysis using the logarithmic 
specification.  
For both the linear and logarithmic specification, the main variable of interest, 
which is the effect of transfers on primary expenditure vis-à-vis the effect of income on 
primary expenditure, shows in all cases a flypaper effect.  
The coefficients for total transfers in the different specifications of the linear case 
are within the range of values of the studies reviewed by Bailey and Connolly (1998), 
which are between 0.25 and 1. In turn, the coefficients for income, estimated by 
department gross domestic product per capita, are somewhat lower than those reviewed 
by Bailey and Connolly (1998), which are between 0.05 and 0.1, especially for PPGG. 
However, it is important to note that the absence of a measure of gross domestic product 
at the local level probably means that the coefficient of department gross domestic 
product per capita is biased downwards for those LLGG whose economic activity has 
been booming, which may include municipalities that have mining and gas as main 
transfer; and is biased upwards for LLGG in which economic activity has been less 
buoyant, such as many of those that have FONCOMUN as main transfer. This means that 
the flypaper effect is probably smaller than reported here in LLGG that have mining and 




In the linear specification, for equation (1) in Table 6.25, the coefficient for Total 
Transfers (TT) means that a S./ 1 increase in transfers per capita in constant 2002 S./ 
expands on average primary expenditure per capita in S/. 0.54, while a S/. 1 increase in 
department gross domestic product per capita in constant 2002 S./ expands on average 
primary expenditure per capita in S./ 0.03. Similar to what is shown in Figures 6.37 and 
6.38, the coefficient for DDGG is higher than for PPGG across equations (2) to (4).   
In the logarithmic case, for equation (5) in Table 6.25, a 1 percent increase in total 
transfers per capita in constant 2002 S./ expands on average primary expenditure per 
capita in 0.87 percent, while the coefficient for department gross domestic product per 
capita is not statistically significant. Similar to the linear case, the values of the 
coefficients for DDGG are higher than for PPGG, although the range is smaller.  
Table 6.25 – Results of expenditure regression models – Benchmark model 
 
PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG
Variable (1) Random
1 (2) Random (3) Random (4) Random Variable (5) Fixed
2 (6) Fixed (7) Fixed (8) Fixed
0.5351 0.4604 0.5666 0.8664 0.8328 0.8676





0.0292 0.0277 0.0196 0.029 0.0042 0.0048 -0.1592 0.0382
(0.0016)** (0.0016)** (0.0034)** (0.0017)** 0.0265 0.0266 (0.0596)** 0.0292
272.91 260.99 101.86 281.69 0.1259 0.1263 0.0183 0.1474
(35.58)** (35.13)** (87.98) (37.61)** (0.0455)** (0.0455)** (0.1044) (0.0498)**
-0.0143 -0.0137 0.022 -0.0183 -0.00003 -0.00003 0.00002 -0.00004
(0.002)** (0.002)** (0.0049)** (0.0021)** (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00005) (0.00002)*
15.40 15.47 101.27 10.30 0.0186 0.0185 0.0181 0.0195
(9.29)* (9.2012)* (34.88)** 9.32 (0.0068)** (0.0068)** (0.02) (0.0073)**
322.21 331.63 14.02 372.37 1.5293 1.5245 1.5988 1.5208
(29.47)** (29.11)** (84.53) (30.99)** (0.0319)** (0.0325)** (0.0953)** (0.0347)**
R-Squared within 0.6396 0.6458 0.5719 0.6616 R-Squared within 0.8933 0.8933 0.8963 0.894
R-Squared between 0.8684 0.8722 0.9286 0.869 R-Squared between 0.8629 0.8618 0.9453 0.8471
R-Squared averall 0.7397 0.7452 0.7154 0.7545 R-Squared averall 0.877 0.8764 0.9154 0.8689
Observations 10809 (1201*9) 10809 (1201*9) 1404 (156*9) 9405 (1045*9) Observations 10809 (1201*9) 10809 (1201*9) 1404 (156*9) 9405 (1045*9)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
1
 Random Effects GLS Panel Regressions. 
2
 Fixed Effects GLS Panel Regressions. Choice of regression model is based on significance of Hausman test.
















Total Transfers (TT) LN (TT)
Dependent Variable: Prim Exp/Cap Dependent Variable: LN( Prim Exp/Cap)
All LLGG All LLGG
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To compare the linear and logarithmic specification and following Melo (2002) I 
estimate the point elasticity of the linear case by multiplying the coefficient on total 
transfers (β1) to the ratio of average transfers to average primary expenditure ((dPrim 
Exp/dTT) x (Avg. TT/Avg. Prim Exp)). In the case of equation (1) in Table 6.25, the 
calculation is 0.5351 x (404/406), which yields 0.53. Noteworthy, in all four equations of 
the linear specification the point elasticity of the coefficients on transfers is lower than for 
the logarithmic case, in which the elasticity is given by β1.  
In turn, the point elasticity of income, measured by department gross domestic 
product per capita (β2), in the linear specification is similarly calculated as ((dPrim 
Exp/dDGDP/C) x (Avg. DGDP/C/Avg. Prim Exp)). In equation (1) in Table 6.25 the 
estimation is 0.0292 x (6,697/406), which yields 0.48. This value is lower than the point 
elasticity of transfers, but the difference is much smaller than in the logarithmic 
specification. In all four equations the point elasticity of transfers is higher than that of 
income, except for the coefficient for PPGG in equation (2), in which the point elasticity 
of income is slightly higher (0.4368 vs. 0.4339 for the point elasticity of transfers); in that 
particular case it means that a 1 percent increase in department gross domestic product 
per capita yields a slightly higher expansion of primary expenditure per capita in constant 
2002 S/. than a 1 percent increase in total transfers.  
In the logarithmic specifications the coefficients for department gross domestic 
product per capita are small and not significant in three of the four equations, and in the 
case of PPGG (equation (7)) it is significant at the 5 percent level but negative, 
suggesting that a 1 percent increase in DGDP/C decreases primary expenditure per capita 
by 0.16 percent. Hence, the flypaper effect is systematically higher for the logarithmic 
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specification. However, as mentioned above, the absence of a reliable measure of gross 
domestic product at the municipal level means that the flypaper effect is probable smaller 
than reported here for LLGG in which gross domestic product has been booming, which 
may include those that have mining and gas as main transfer, and higher for those LLGG 
in which the economic activity has been less buoyant, such as many of those that have 
FONCOMUN as main transfer.  
With respect to the control variables, department poverty is positive and 
statistically significant for all LLGG combined and for DDGG, but not significant for 
PPGG; these results are consistent for the logarithmic specification. LLGG density shows 
a positive and statistically significant coefficient for PPGG, but negative and statistically 
significant for DDGG (in both cases at the 5 percent level), although this is not consistent 
in the logarithmic specification (except for DDGG, which is also negative at the 10 
percent significance level). Reelection is positive and significant at the 5 percent level 
only for PPGG, although for the logarithmic specification it is only positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level for DDGG. Lastly, fiscal autonomy, measured by the 
fraction of own income over total income, is positive and significant for DDGG in both 
the linear and logarithmic specifications (equation (4)), which suggests that DDGG 
increase their propensity to spend as they become more autonomous; this can be 
considered partly contradictory with the coefficient on poverty, since poorer LLGG tend 
to have less autonomy; and it is a surprising finding considering that the scatter plot 
between Own Income/Total Income and Primary Expenditure/Capita yields a negative 
relationship (see Figure 6.49 below). It is likely to be related to the higher institutional 
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capacities of more autonomous LLGG, which allows them to rapidly spend the transfers 
they receive.  
Figure 6.49 – OI/TI and primary expenditure per capita in constant 2002 S/. of 
DDGG – 2001 to 2009 
 
In all equations in Table 6.25 I tested for the joint significance of the time-
dummies, and I included them whenever I rejected the null-hypothesis that they are 
jointly equal to 0 (this occurred in all equations). In this regard, the individual value and 
statistical significance of each of the time-dummies allows assessing in which years the 
growth in primary expenditure is most significant. This is presented in Table 6.26 below, 
which shows the value of each of the time dummies in equations (1) and (5) of Table 
6.25. Noteworthy, these values are similar across the rest of equations of Table 6.25. As 
can be seen, the first years of new mandates of LLGG mayors, which are 2003 and 2007, 
have relatively small coefficients, and in the case of 2007 they are not statistically 
significant either in the linear and logarithmic specifications. Moreover, the years 2006, 
2008 and 2009 the coefficient is increasingly larger and statistically significant at the 5 





































percent level, which is evidence that after their first year in office, local government 
administrations, which have low reelection rates, learn to spend. Surprisingly the year 
2005 has a low and statistically insignificant coefficient: this can be partly explained by 
the fact that that year was still prior to the large boom in natural resources-based 
transfers; and it may also be related to the regional elections in 16 departments in 
October, 2005 to decide on the creation of “macro-regions” (see section above on “key 
features of fiscal decentralization in Peru”), which arguably increased local uncertainty 
and reduced attention to fiscal management.  
Table 6.26 – Time-dummies of equations (1) and (5) of Table 6.23 
 
Table 6.27 shows the results of separate regressions models for all PPGG and 
DDGG, distinguishing by resource groups (equations (1), (2), (5) and (6)) and main 
transfer groups (equations (3), (4), (7) and (8)). In the linear specification and for PPGG 
(equation (1) in Table 6.27), the coefficient for PPGG with less resources is higher than 
for PPGG with more and medium resources, while the opposite is true for the logarithmic 
specification (equation (5)). In turn, for DDGG the coefficient for more and medium 
resources is higher than for less resources in both the linear and logarithmic specification 
(equations (2) and (6), respectively): the latter result is surprising considering that LLGG 
with more and medium resources are transferred much more funds, which makes it harder 
for them to execute them.  
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Coefficient 10.91 22.44 59.03 14.51 85.28 21.33 187.94 278.62
Standard Error (12.44) (12.54)* (12.72)** (12.68) (13.01)** (13.68) (13.91)** (14.06)**
Coefficient 0.0068 0.0303 0.0832 0.0132 0.1459 0.0073 0.1933 0.3054
Standard Error (0.0084) (0.0088)** (0.0102)** (0.0108) (0.0133)** (0.0159) (0.0173)** (0.0182)**
Time-dummy
Equation (1) - Linear
Equation (5) - Log-linear
Standard errors in parenthesis. * 10 % significance level. ** 5% significance level
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With respect to the classification by main transfer and in the linear case, both 
PPGG and DDGG show that those LLGG that have mining as main transfer present a 
lower coefficient than the other categories (Other Fragmentary Resources and 
FONCOMUN), which in turn helps explain the relatively low value of coefficients across 
equations of the linear specification in Table 6.25 above, which appears to be influenced 
by LLGG that have mining as main transfer. In the logarithmic specification, however, 
the coefficient of PPGG and DDGG with FONCOMUN as main transfer is lower than for 
mining. Similar to the results in Table 6.25, the coefficients for transfers in the 
logarithmic specification are systematically higher than in the linear case, and the range 
of values across coefficients is smaller.  
Table 6.27 – Results by resources and main transfer groups – 2001 to 2009 
 
PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG
Variable (1) Random
1 (2) Random (3) Random (4) Fixed
2 Variable (5) Fixed (6) Fixed (7) Fixed (8) Fixed
0.4595 0.5666 0.8376 0.8811
(0.0093)** (0.0046)** (0.0212)** (0.0071)**
0.6506 0.5038 0.7914 0.8253
(0.0381)** (0.0252)** (0.0267)** (0.009)**
0.4565 0.5080 0.8336 0.8673
(0.0091)** (0.0053)** (0.0215)** (0.0072)**
0.8487 0.7704 0.8437 0.9322
(0.0612)** (0.0265)** (0.0387)** (0.0113)**
0.7515 0.6556 0.8150 0.8394
(0.0405)** (0.0246)** (0.0273)** (0.0096)**
0.01968 0.02820 0.02541 0.04347 -0.19427 -0.02223 -0.16913 -0.04692
(0.0033)** (0.0018)** (0.0033)** (0.0023)** (0.0612)** (0.0303) (0.0611)** (0.0309)
33.81 288.86 108.03 103.31 0.0472 0.1480 0.0398 0.1364
86.61 (37.69)** 86.06 68.43 (0.1048) (0.0497)** (0.1063) (0.0498)**
0.0194 -0.0181 0.0164 -0.0634 0.00002 -0.00004 0.00002 -0.00004
(0.0048)** (0.0021)** (0.0047)** (0.0322)** (0.00005) (0.00002) (0.00005) (0.00002)*
97.17 9.53 93.77 6.01 0.0201 0.0173 0.0174 0.0178
(34.38)** 9.33 (33.66)** 9.90 (0.0199) (0.0072)** (0.02) (0.0072)**
35.21 367.84 142.32 537.35 1.5653 1.4933 1.5916 1.5265
(82.44) (31.03)** 81.29 (44.81)** (0.096)** (0.0348)** (0.0955)** (0.0346)**
R-Squared within 0.5769 0.6615 0.5809 0.6616 R-Squared within 0.8968 0.8946 0.8964 0.8948
R-Squared between 0.9330 0.8697 0.946 0.869 R-Squared between 0.9102 0.8399 0.9504 0.7727
R-Squared averall 0.7206 0.7549 0.7308 0.7545 R-Squared averall 0.901 0.8611 0.9193 0.8265
Observations 1404 (156*9) 9405 (1045*9) 1404 (156*9) 9405 (1045*9) Observations 1404 (156*9) 9405 (1045*9) 1404 (156*9) 9405 (1045*9)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
1
 Random Effects GLS Panel Regressions. 
2
 Fixed Effects GLS Panel Regressions. Choice of regression model is based on significance of Hausman test.
















Mining (MIN)  LN (MIN)
Less Resources (LR) LN (LR)
More & Medium 
Resources (M&MR)
LN (M&MR)
Dependent Variable: Prim Exp/Cap Dependent Variable: LN (Prim Exp/Cap)
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There is a flypaper effect for all equations across specifications, and the point 
elasticity of transfers in the linear specification is higher than for department gross 
domestic product per capita for all coefficients in the case of PPGG (equations (1) and (3) 
of Table 6.27). For DDGG the point elasticity of transfers is higher than for department 
gross domestic product per capita for LLGG with more and medium resources, and in 
municipalities that have Other Fragmentary Resources as main transfer (equations (2) and 
(4) of Table 6.27, respectively).  
In equations (3) and (4) of Table 6.27, the lower value of the coefficient for 
LLGG that have mining as main transfer is related not only to the size but also to the 
timing of the distribution of transfers, since as described above mining transfers are 
distributed since 2007 in one single installment in June, which gives LLGG little time to 
execute those funds within the same fiscal year. Hence, taking into account the findings 
of the descriptive assessment of question 3 of this dissertation, it is to be expected that the 
primary expenditure of LLGG that have mining as main transfer, which are also many of 
the LLGG that have more and medium resources, should react with a lag to the surge in 
transfers. This expectation is tested in Table 6.28, which shows the different equations 
presented in Tables 6.25 and 6.27 but including a one year lag in transfers, meaning that 




Table 6.28 – Results including a one year lag of transfers – 2001 to 2009 
PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG PPGG DDGG
Variable (1) Random
1 (2) Random (3) Random (4) Fixed
2 (5) Random (6) Fixed Variable (7) Random (8) Fixed (9) Random (10) Fixed (11) Fixed (12) Fixed
0.1759 0.2280 0.6497 0.7456
(0.0131)** (0.0059)** (0.0196)** (0.0085)**
0.3431 0.4318 0.3206 0.2013
(0.0132)** (0.0059)** (0.019)** (0.0077)**
0.1540 0.1824 0.5853 0.6915
(0.0129)** (0.0061)** (0.0247)** (0.0114)**
0.3596 0.4413 0.3834 0.2477
(0.0129)** (0.0058)** (0.0241)** (0.0101)**
0.6540 0.6525 0.7246 0.7869
(0.0616)** (0.0284)** (0.0262)** (0.0106)**
0.0324 0.0809 0.2403 0.1637
(0.0824) (0.0374)** (0.0264)** (0.011)**
0.1576 0.1648 0.5575 0.6833
(0.0127)** (0.006)** (0.0301)** (0.0114)**
0.3638 0.4518 0.3612 0.2458
(0.0128)** (0.0058)** (0.0259)** (0.0103)**
0.6723 0.4933 0.6964 0.8315
(0.1794)** (0.0383)** (0.0756)** (0.0232)**
0.2121 0.3729 0.2700 0.1965
(0.1862) (0.0374)** (0.0749)** (0.021)**
0.7212 0.6918 0.7398 0.7982
(0.0652)** (0.0233)** (0.0317)** (0.0111)**
0.0930 0.1002 0.2541 0.1613
(0.0905) (0.0276)** (0.0342)** (0.0117)**
0.0211 0.0314 0.0214 0.0501 0.0268 0.0514 -0.0309 0.0051 -0.0263 0.0515 -0.0519 -0.0266
(0.0033)** (0.0016)** (0.0032)** (0.0027)** (0.0029)** (0.0026)** (0.0170)* (0.0317)* (0.0185) (0.0328) (0.0632)* (0.0338)
121.51 286.91 41.60 161.60 100.69 62.95 -0.0253 0.1020 -0.0198 0.1006 -0.1301 0.0484
(85.75) (34.93)** (84.66) (60.87)* (77.93) (60.29) (0.0516) (0.0547)* (0.0518) (0.0546)* (0.111) (0.055)
0.0248 -0.0157 0.0207 -0.0573 0.0180 -0.0470 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00005 -0.00001
(0.0051)** (0.0021)** (0.0051)** (0.0303) (0.0044)** (0.0297) (0.000003)** (0.00003) (0.000003)** (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00003)
84.94 -8.37 82.38 -8.02 77.76 -11.47 0.0016 0.0134 0.0025 0.0131 0.0117 0.0117
(30.79)** (7.77) (29.88)** (8.12) (28.45)** (7.95) (0.0161) (0.0072)* (0.016) (0.0072)* (0.0191) (0.0072)
-40.83 283.85 11.76 410.31 111.94 396.66 1.49 1.46 1.50 1.47 1.51 1.45
(84.93) (29.62)** (82.85) (40.45)** (76.09) (39.51)** (0.0535)** (0.038)** (0.0538)** (0.0381)** (0.0943)** (0.0377)**
R-Squared within 0.711 0.7859 0.7299 0.7952 0.7349 0.8034 R-Squared within 0.9064 0.8871 0.9079 0.8879 0.9098 0.8892
R-Squared between 0.9306 0.8885 0.9384 0.8049 0.9505 0.8425 R-Squared between 0.9807 0.8879 0.9807 0.8857 0.8239 0.8204
R-Squared averall 0.811 0.8368 0.824 0.8004 0.8342 0.8242 R-Squared averall 0.947 0.8874 0.9477 0.8866 0.8618 0.8464
Observations 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) Observations 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8)





 Random Effects GLS Panel Regressions. 
2
 Fixed Effects GLS Panel Regressions. Choice of regression model is based on significance of Hausman test.

















Mining (MIN)  LN (MIN)
LR-1 LN (LR-1)
Less Resources (LR) LN (LR)
M&MR-1 LN (M&MR-1)




Dependent Variable: Prim Exp/Cap Dependent Variable: LN (Prim Exp/Cap)
Total Transfers (TT) LN (TT)
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For equations (5) and (6) of Table 6.28, which evaluate the linear specification for 
PPGG and DDGG, respectively, according to main transfer group, only mining transfers 
with a lag has a higher coefficient than the contemporaneous variable. In turn, this helps 
explain that PPGG and DDGG with more and medium resources (equations (3) and (4), 
respectively) and all PPGG and DDGG (equations (1) and (2), respectively), show a 
higher coefficient for the lagged variable than for the contemporaneous one. In turn, the 
difference between the contemporaneous and the lagged variable for Other Fragmentary 
Resources (equations (5) and (6)) is smaller than for FONCOMUN, especially for 
DDGG.  
In the logarithmic case all equations show that the contemporaneous variable has 
a higher coefficient than the lagged variable, but LLGG that have mining as main transfer 
present the smallest difference in the value of the coefficient between the lagged and the 
contemporaneous variable, and this difference is smaller for PPGG than for DDGG. 
These results confirm that those LLGG that receive large mining transfers do increase 
significantly their expenditures, but with a lag.  
Lastly, most equations present a flypaper effect, with the exception of the lagged 
variable of less resources for PPGG (equation (3)), which in turn is related to the lagged 
variable of FONCOMUN for PPGG (equation (5)): in both cases the coefficients are not 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In turn, for the linear specification the 
point elasticity of transfers is lower than that of DGDP/C for all coefficients for DDGG 
(equations (2), (4) and (6)); while it is higher for PPGG only for the lagged variable of 
more and medium resources (equation (3)), the contemporaneous variable of less 
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resources (equation (4)), and the contemporaneous variables of OFR and FONCOMUN 
(equation (6)).  
Although not shown in Table 6.28, I also tested equations (1) and (2) (linear 
case), and (7) and (8) (logarithmic case) including one year lag of department gross 
domestic product per capita. For the linear case, the coefficients for transfers are similar 
to those shown in equations (1) and (2) in Table 6.28, although for department gross 
domestic product per capita the coefficient of the lagged variable is higher and 
statistically significant both for PPGG and DDGG (coefficient of 0.02 and 0.029, 
respectively), than the contemporaneous variable, which is not significant. For the 
logarithmic case, again the coefficients for transfers are similar to those shown in 
equations (7) and (8) in Table 6.28, while for department gross domestic product per 
capita the coefficient of the lagged variable is more negative and statistically significant 
for PPGG (coefficient of -0.19, significant at the 10% level) than the contemporaneous 
variable, which is not significant; while the lagged variable is positive and statistically 
significant for DDGG (coefficient of 0.07, significant at the 10% level), whereas the 
contemporaneous variable is not statistically significant. Hence, in all these cases the 
flypaper effect persists, although the lagged variable of department gross domestic 
product per capita tends to have a higher and more statistically significant coefficient 
than the contemporaneous variable.  
Table 6.29 evaluates the test of symmetry proposed by Gramkhar and Oates 
(1996), to assess whether expenditures of LLGG behave symmetrically to changes in 
transfers. This is done separately for all PPGG and DDGG (equations (1), (2), (7) and (8), 
respectively), and distinguishing the measure of symmetry according to resources 
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(equations (3), (4), (9) and (10)) and main transfer groups (equations (5), (6), (11) and 
(12)). Noteworthy, the distribution of observations of the symmetry dummy variable is 
similar for both PPGG and DDGG to the distribution of LLGG across main transfer 
groups, which means there is not a particular bias of this variable for a given group.  
For the linear case, table 6.29 shows that according to main transfer group only 
LLGG that have mining as main transfer have a positive and significant coefficient of 
symmetry at the 5 percent level, with PPGG having a higher coefficient than DDGG. 
This means than in LLGG that have mining as main transfer, when transfers fall 
expenditures increase on average by S./ 332 and S./ 228 in per capita 2002 S./ for PPGG 
and DDGG, respectively.  
Similar to the analysis with lagged variables, the sign and statistical significance 
of the symmetry variable for LLGG that have mining as main transfer is extended to 
municipalities with more and medium resources (equations (3) and (4)), and to all LLGG 
(equations (1) and (2)), although with a coefficient for the symmetry variable that reduces 
its size as the degree of aggregation of LLGG increases, and with PPGG having a higher 
coefficient than DDGG. Again, the explanation is related to the high growth of mining 
transfers and their timing, by which LLGG that receive mining transfers in the middle of 
a given year carry them partially over to the following year, when their transfers may fall, 
which is what occurred between 2007 and 2009. 
For the logarithmic specification the results are similar, although the symmetry 
variable is also positive and statistically significant for LLGG that have less resources 
(equations (9) and (10)), that have FONCOMUN as main transfer (equations (11) and 
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(12)), and that have Other Fragmentary Resources as main transfer in the case of DDGG 
(equation (12)), although in all cases the coefficients in these equations are smaller than 
for LLGG that have more and medium resources and that have mining as main transfer 
(equations (9) through (12)). In the case of equation (11), the coefficient for PPGG that 
have mining as main transfer denotes that when transfer fall, PPGG increase their 
primary expenditure per capita by 16.91 percent in constant 2002 S/.  
Lastly, although there is a flypaper effect across equations, in the linear 
specification the point elasticity of transfers is lower than for department gross domestic 
product per capita in all equations for DDGG (equations (2), (4) and (6)), and higher for 




Table 6.29 – Results including the variable of symmetry – 2001 to 2009 
 




2 (3) Random (4) Fixed (5) Fixed (6) Fixed Variable (7) Fixed (8) Fixed (9) Random (10) Fixed (11) Fixed (12) Fixed
0.4642 0.5037 0.4614 0.5031 0.3515 0.5018 0.8345 0.9133 0.8336 0.8771 0.8299 0.8758
(0.0098)** (0.0058)** (0.0097)** (0.0057)** (0.0123)** (0.0057)** (0.0218)** (0.0059)** (0.0218)** (0.0075)** (0.0218)** (0.0075)**
82.59 74.02 0.0923 0.0931
(30.73)** (8.98)** (0.0138)** (0.0062)**
233.93 196.74 0.1366 0.1293
(44.63)** (13.69)** (0.0214)** (0.0096)**
-6.05 2.42 0.0677 0.0599
(35.96) (10.77) (0.0165)** (0.0076)**
331.94 228.25 0.1691 0.1564
(52.9)** (14.82)** (0.0238)** (0.0104)**
-63.20 9.04 0.0642 0.0660
(94.02) (24.79) (0.042) (0.0173)**
-21.01 5.55 0.0606 0.0519
(36.82) (11.14) (0.0166)** (0.0079)**
0.0191 0.0426 0.0178 0.0426 0.0302 0.0431 -0.1977 0.0321 -0.1898 0.0062 -0.1833 0.0159
(0.0035)** (0.0035)** (0.0035)** (0.0035)** (0.0097)** (0.0035)** (0.0655)** (0.015)** (0.0653)** (0.0326) (0.0652)** (0.0326)
106.01 197.84 137.00 208.91 472.93 268.59 0.0631 0.1278 0.0604 0.1837 0.0890 0.2087
(92.39) (81.05)** (92.17) (80.3)** (252.94)* (80.48)** (0.1156) (0.0382)** (0.1152) (0.0563)** (0.1151) (0.0564)**
0.0242 -0.0692 0.0248 -0.0705 -0.2411 -0.0718 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0054)** (0.0403)* (0.0053)** (0.034)* (0.121)** (0.0399)* (0.00005) (0.000002)** (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00003)
97.68 7.07 99.64 5.49 70.10 5.13 0.0207 0.0184 0.0231 0.0192 0.0195 0.0188
(36.49)** (10.79) (36.24)** (10.69) (44.75) (10.67) (0.0204) (0.0072)** (0.0203) (0.0074)** (0.0203) (0.0074)**
-15.81 513.47 29.42 509.84 289.65 504.86 1.53 1.70 1.54 1.50 1.53 1.50
(93.28) (53.65)** (93.3) (53.15)** (196.33) (53.05)** (0.101)** (0.0321)** (0.1006)** (0.0391)** (0.1003)** (0.039)**
R-Squared within
0.5363 0.6366 0.5441 0.6434 0.562 0.6448
R-Squared within
0.8958 0.8791 0.8965 0.8802 0.8973 0.8809
R-Squared between
0.9344 0.7727 0.9336 0.7725 0.1529 0.7514
R-Squared 
between 0.9256 0.9194 0.9321 0.8782 0.9357 0.8752
R-Squared averall 0.7144 0.7094 0.7193 0.7126 0.2545 0.702 R-Squared averall 0.9071 0.9017 0.9109 0.879 0.9129 0.8775
Observations 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) Observations 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8) 1248 (156*8) 8360 (1045*8)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1
 Random Effects GLS Panel Regressions. 
2
 Fixed Effects GLS Panel Regressions. Choice of regression model is based on significance of Hausman test.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * 10 % significance level. ** 5% significance level
DP












Symmetry Other Fragmentary 
Resources (OFR)
Symmetry OFR
Symmetry Mining (MIN) Symmetry MIN
Symmetry More & Medium 
Resources (M&MR)
Symmetry M&MR
Symmetry Less Resources 
(LR)
Symmetry LR
Dependent Variable: LN (Prim Exp/Cap)
Symmetry Symmetry
Total Transfers (TT) LN (TT)
Dependent Variable: Prim Exp/Cap
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To conclude, I present in Table 6.30 the response of primary expenditure per 
capita in constant 2002 S/. to total transfers in those PPGG and DDGG that are mining 
producers (a total of 12 PPGG and 77 DDGG, equations (1), (2), (9) and (10), 
respectively). As discussed in the previous section, this allows assessing the regression 
model for a variable that, in the case of LLGG that are mining producers, has a strong 
argument of exogeneity. I also compare to the rest of LLGG (equations (3), (4), (11) and 
(12)), and assess the effect of one year lag (equations (5), (6), (13) and (14)), and the 
symmetry variable (equations (7), (8), (15) and (16)).  
In this regard and as would be expected, between 2001 and 2009 most transfers 
received by mining producers are linked to natural resources, which is mainly mining 
canon: 83 percent of total transfers for DDGG that are mining producers have this source 
vis-à-vis 38 percent for the rest of DDGG; and 66 percent of total transfers for PPGG that 
are mining producers have this source vis-à-vis 29 percent for the rest of PPGG.  
For the linear specification, the coefficient of mining producers is higher for 
PPGG than for DDGG (equations (1) and (2), respectively), although this can be 
influenced by the small sample size (12 PPGG). Similar to the comparison between 
LLGG whose main transfer is mining and the other main transfer groups presented in 
equations (4) of Table 6.27, the coefficient of mining producers is smaller than for the 
rest of LLGG for DDGG (equation (4) of Table 6.30), although it is slightly higher for 
PPGG (equation (3)), which can again be influenced by the small sample size.  
As expected, the effect of the lagged variable for mining producers is very strong 
for both PPGG and DDGG (equations (5) and (6)), to the point that the contemporaneous 
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variable is not statistically significant for PPGG. For the rest of LLGG, the lagged 
variable is also very important because they include LLGG that are not mining producers 
but still receive large transfers related to mining; indeed, the lagged coefficient for the 
rest of LLGG is higher than the contemporaneous coefficient for PPGG. Lastly, the 
variable of symmetry is much larger for mining producers vis-à-vis the rest of LLGG 
(equations (7) and (8)), especially for DDGG.  
For the logarithmic specification the lagged variable for PPGG that are mining 
producers (equation (13)) is the only equation in which the lagged variable has a higher 
value than the contemporaneous variable, which is consistent with the high value of the 
lagged variable found for the equivalent linear specification (equation (5)).  
To conclude, the point elasticity of transfers for PPGG in the linear specification 
is higher than for department gross domestic product per capita for the coefficients of 
transfers in equations (1) and (3); and for the coefficients of lagged variables of equation 
(5). In turn, for DDGG the point elasticity of transfers is higher than for department gross 
domestic product per capita for both coefficients of transfers in equation (4), for the 
contemporaneous coefficient of rest of LLGG and the lagged variables for both mining 
producers and rest of LLGG in equation (6); and for both coefficients of transfers in 




Table 6.30 - Results for mining producers vis-à-vis the rest of LLGG – 2001 to 2009  
 


































0.7620 0.4339 0.4797 0.4649 -0.0317 0.1437 0.4295 0.5094 0.8368 0.7894 0.7805 0.8371 0.3931 0.5569 0.7621 0.8949
(0.0916)** (0.0169)** (0.0626)** (0.0055)** (0.0913) (0.0062)** (0.0973)** (0.0048)** (0.0759)** (0.0252)** (0.027)** (0.0095)** (0.0435)** (0.0187)** (0.0283)** (0.0064)**
0.4600 0.7260 0.1795 0.4893 0.3536 0.8258 0.8504 0.8799 0.6917 0.7792 0.8575 0.9193
(0.0094)** (0.0102)** (0.0131)** (0.0095)** (0.0123)** (0.0081)** (0.0218)** (0.0074)** (0.0251)** (0.0088)** (0.0225)** (0.006)**
0.6803 0.4549 0.4604 0.3342
(0.0963)** (0.0063)** (0.0393)** (0.0174)**
0.3380 0.4308 0.2585 0.1894
(0.0132)** (0.0098)** (0.0228)** (0.0083)**
212.48 446.36 0.2230 0.2275
(91.77)** (25.61)** (0.0407)** (0.0198)**
62.14 60.98 0.0851 0.0825
(31.97)* (8.71)** (0.0142)** (0.0064)**
0.0155 0.0598 0.0191 0.0263 0.0192 0.0181 0.0272 0.0156 0.1275 -0.0921 -0.1371 0.0310 -0.0868 0.0028 -0.1684 0.0446
(0.0055)** (0.0206)** (0.0039)** (0.0029)** (0.0037)** (0.0014)** (0.0105)** (0.0015)** (0.089) (0.1292) (0.0599)** (0.0292) (0.061) (0.0315) (0.0651)** (0.015)**
536.60 472.87 95.46 71.79 91.98 129.23 367.95 147.03 0.5891 0.2981 0.0332 0.1389 -0.0621 0.0897 0.0722 0.1266
(278.68)* (835.9) (90.57) (66.51) (88.04) (30.09)** (256.77) (33.22)** (0.2867)** (0.2899) (0.1042) (0.0498)** (0.1071) (0.0543)* (0.1144) (0.038)**
-0.0187 -16.8100 0.0219 -0.0508 0.0251 -0.0123 -0.2317 -0.0137 -0.00002 -0.00764 0.00003 -0.00004 0.00004 -0.00002 0.00004 0.00001
(0.0251) (13.29) (0.0049)** (0.0313) (0.0052)** (0.0017)** (0.1228)* (0.0018)** (0.00003) (0.0047) (0.00005) (0.00002)* (0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.000002)**
29.75 46.13 101.68 12.72 86.44 -4.18 83.81 10.35 0.0915 0.0415 0.0131 0.0201 0.0029 0.0136 0.0169 0.0182
(75.9706) (98.73) (34.93)** (9.65) (30.72)** (6.97) (45.41)* (8.98) (0.0627) (0.0346) (0.02) (0.0072)** (0.0189) (0.0072)* (0.0203) (0.0071)**
595.89 1024.44 14.83 500.16 -50.98 395.94 306.67 456.69 2.02 1.72 1.59 1.52 1.47 1.44 1.52 1.71
(242)** (315.45)** (84.74) (43.63)** (85.15) (25.76)** (200.83) (29.49)** (0.2748)** (0.1163)** (0.095)** (0.0349)** (0.0932)** (0.0376)** (0.1)** (0.032)**
R-Squared within 0.7398 0.6501 0.5720 0.6849 0.7152 0.8226 0.5492 0.6654 R-Squared within 0.9255 0.9102 0.8971 0.8942 0.9114 0.8893 0.8981 0.8802
R-Squared 0.9319 0.2227 0.9286 0.8450 0.9298 0.9235 0.1638 0.9287 R-Squared 0.9483 0.4395 0.8921 0.8372 0.8679 0.8502 0.8423 0.9206
R-Squared 
averall
0.7904 0.2814 0.7154 0.7625 0.8127 0.8740 0.2649 0.7978
R-Squared 
averall
0.9281 0.5888 0.8919 0.8637 0.8870 0.8657 0.8667 0.9028


























Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1
 Random Effects GLS Panel Regressions. 
2
 Fixed Effects GLS Panel Regressions. Choice of regression model is based on significance of Hausman test.




















LN (Rest of 
LLGG-1)
Dependent Variable: Prim Exp/Cap Dependent Variable: LN (Prim Exp/Cap)
Rest of LLGG







Noteworthy, across the different specifications in Tables 6.27 through 6.30 the 
results for the control variables tend to be similar to those of the models described in 
Table 6.25.  
 
To summarize, using a linear and a logarithmic specification, the econometric 
analysis shows the existence of a flypaper effect for PPGG and DDGG in all regressions 
models in Tables 6.25 and 6.27 to 6.30 above, confirming the high propensity of LLGG 
to spend out of transfers presented in the descriptive analysis. The flypaper effect tends to 
be higher for LLGG that do not have mining as their main transfer, especially in the 
linear specification. For LLGG that have mining as main transfer the flypaper effect tends 
to be stronger with a one-year lag in transfers, which is mainly due to the high value of 
transfers following 2005 and the timing of the mining transfer, which since 2007 occurs 
in the middle of the fiscal year.  
This also helps explain why the coefficient of symmetry has a higher coefficient 
and is only statistically significant (in the case of the linear specification) for LLGG that 
have mining as main transfer. The high propensity to spend out of transfers and its 
manifestation through a flypaper effect is also confirmed in the regressions that only 
assess the effect of transfers in mining producers, in which the argument of exogeneity of 
the transfer variable is strongest.  
The time dummies in Table 6.26 confirm the lower spending capacity on average 
of LLGG in 2007, which is associated to the renewal of local authorities in most 
municipalities; along with the high increase in expenditures in 2008 and 2009 as the 
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municipal teams gain more experience and start executing the surge in transfers, 
especially in LLGG that have mining as main transfer.  
The comparison between functional specifications shows the robustness of the 
flypaper effect. However, the logarithmic specification is consistently higher than the 
linear case; this contradicts the findings in Becker (1996), who uses a simulation to show 
that if the true form of the functional specification is not linear, a linear specification may 
be biased towards inflating the value of the transfer coefficients. There are two main 
arguments to explain this contradiction. (1) As shown in Figures 6.37 through 6.48, the 
relatively small volatility around the linear trend-line of the scatter plots of the 
relationship between transfers and primary expenditure supports the case that the true 
functional form is linear. And (2), LLGG in Peru tend to be highly dependent of 
transfers; this means that increases in expenditure need to rely mostly on transfers, which 
leads to expect a relatively high elasticity of expenditure to transfers; this is supported by 
the fact that the effect of transfers on primary expenditure tends to be higher for DDGG 
than for PPGG, since the former have less fiscal autonomy and hence are more dependent 
on transfers. In turn, the logarithmic transformation of the linear values reduces the 
volatility of outliers, which are mostly observations from LLGG that have “mining” as 
main transfer, increasing the value of the estimates of the effect of transfers on 
expenditure in the logarithmic estimation. This is depicted in Figures 6.50 and 6.51 
below, which reproduce Figures 6.37 and 6.38, showing the scatter plots of the 
relationship between transfers and primary expenditure for PPGG and DDGG, 
respectively, using their logarithmic values.  
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Figure 6.50 –Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of PPGG in logarithmic 
form – 2001 to 2009 
 
Figure 6.51 – Transfers and primary expenditure per capita of DDGG in 
logarithmic form – 2001 to 2009 
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In the linear specification, the point elasticity of transfers tends to be higher than 
for income, especially for PPGG. However, the absence of an official series of income at 
the municipal level precludes the analysis of intra-department variability of GDP, which 
limits the findings of the effect of income on expenditure, both for the linear and the 
logarithmic specifications, and in turn of the flypaper effect. This said, both the linear and 
the logarithmic specifications do show the high propensity of LLGG to spend their 
transfers, which poses a fiscal risk for Peru’s central government.  
 
Although not presented in tables below, I tested several variants of the benchmark 
model of equation (1) in Table 6.25 for all LLGG (PPGG and DDGG combined) opening 
the variable “other fragmentary resources” into its main components, which are “oil”, 
“gas” and “rest of fragmentary resources”. In this regard, LLGG that have gas as main 
transfer present the highest coefficient of the effect of transfers on primary expenditure 
for the fixed effects linear specification (0.77), followed by FONCOMUN (0.63), oil 
(0.54) and mining (0.46); rest of fragmentary resources is not statistically significant.  
I also tested variants that included a one-year lag of these variables, finding for 
the fixed effects linear specification that, similar to the mining case, the lagged gas 
variable of the effect of transfers on primary expenditure also has a higher and 
statistically significant coefficient than the contemporaneous variable (0.5 vs. 0.39, 
respectively), although the difference is smaller than for the mining case (0.42 vs. 0.15, 
respectively). This is related to the fact that gas transfers have also grown significantly 
following 2005. Lastly, I tested specifications that included a symmetry variable for each 
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of the main transfer groups, and similar to the results above only the mining symmetry 
variable is positive and statistically significant.   
I also evaluated other variants of the benchmark model separately for all PPGG 
and DDGG by need and size. In the case of needs, for both PPGG and DDGG the effect 
of transfers on primary expenditure increases with BUN: in the case of PPGG, the 
coefficients of the fixed effects linear specification are 0.36, 0.65 and 0.59 for medium, 
high and very high need, respectively; while for DDGG the coefficients were 0.49, 0.56 
and 0.66, respectively. This shows that the flypaper effect increases as LLGG are poorer, 
precisely because they have more development needs, a point noted by Espinoza (2008) 
and suggested for Peru by Loayza, Rigolini and Calvo (2011).  
In the classification according to size, for PPGG the coefficients are somewhat 
similar for main cities and the rest of PPGG (the categories of more and less than 500 
urban houses are pooled together due to few observations): 0.48 and 0.46, respectively, 
for the random effects linear specification; while for DDGG, the values are 0.66, 0.5 and 
0.64 for main cities, more than 500 urban houses and less than 500 urban houses, 
respectively, using a fixed effects linear specification. These values do not provide clear 
indication of a different flypaper effect by size of LLGG, other than a lower value for the 
group of more than 500 urban houses.  
In turn, I estimated the benchmark model separately for PPGG and DDGG, and 
also separately by each category of need and size, with similar results to those presented 
in Table 6.25.  
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To conclude, I estimated variants of the benchmark model using alternatively as 
dependent variable “primary result” and “net debt” for all LLGG combined. For the 
effect of transfers on primary result, most regressions do not yield statistically significant 
coefficients. Only the random effects linear specification with a one year lag of transfers 
presents a statistically significant value for the mining transfer: 0.024 for the 
contemporaneous variable and -0.025 for the one year lag, both significant at the 5 
percent level. This is consistent with the description in Figure 6.21: many LLGG that had 
mining as main transfer had a surplus in boom years (especially 2007), which they 
partially spent when transfers declined (2008 and 2009), generating a deficit during those 
years.   
In the case of net debt, the effect of transfers for all LLGG is slightly positive and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, with a coefficient of 0.003 for the random 
effects linear specification. LLGG with less resources have a higher coefficient than 
LLGG with more and medium resources for the random effects linear specification 
(0.017 vs. 0.003, at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance level, respectively), while 
according to main transfer group FONCOMUN is the variable with highest coefficient 
and significance level (0.02, at the 5 percent significance level). Hence, transfers have a 
mild positive effect on net debt of LLGG, and especially in those LLGG that have 
FONCOMUN as main transfer. This is consistent with the fact that only large cities in 
Peru (especially Lima) are able to obtain debt in Peru, and many of them receive 
FONCOMUN as main transfer.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions, policy implications and recommendations 
 
Conclusions 
The motivation for this dissertation is the high increase in fiscal transfers to 
LLGG in Peru with loosely defined expenditure responsibilities between 2001 and 2010, 
especially those linked to natural resources, and its effects from the standpoint of 
macroeconomic stability, understood as the emergence of fiscal risks. In this regard, it 
builds on the vast international literature on the links between decentralization and 
macroeconomic stability, with particular reference to the flypaper effect and the 
allocation among levels of government of the fiscal rent from the extraction of natural 
resources.  
For the case of Peru no previous study has made a comprehensive assessment of 
this topic, considering the implications of the surge in transfers in terms of the size and 
composition of the general government, along with the fiscal decisions of LLGG in 
response to transfers, especially in terms of own revenue collection and expenditure. 
Previous studies on Peru focused on the response of own revenue collection to transfers, 
with inconclusive results and without analyzing this relationship where it matters most in 
terms of LLGG tax collection, which is in main cities. In turn, there are no recent studies 
on the response of local expenditure to transfers from the standpoint of macroeconomic 
stability, through a formal assessment of the flypaper effect.  
Here I conducted a thorough descriptive analysis of the evolution of local 
government finances between 2001 and 2010, making use of different classifications of 
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LLGG according to their heterogeneity, which allows identifying the fiscal risk of 
different groups of municipalities and informs the strategy for regression analysis.  
The main findings for Peru indicate that, although the surge in transfers is not an 
immediate threat to macroeconomic stability, the response of LLGG conforms to the 
international experience, in the sense that they have been increasing substantially their 
expenditure, which in other countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia in the late 
1990s put fiscal pressure on the central government to maintain the flow of transfers, and 
eventually contributed to episodes of macroeconomic instability.  
In particular, due to the high increase in transfers to LLGG and their high increase 
in expenditures, the share of Peru’s central government in the primary expenditure of the 
general government has decreased between 2001 and 2010 from 74 percent to 58 percent, 
mainly at the expense of LLGG, and to a lower degree RRGG (Figure 6.3). This is 
largely explained by the fact that most tax collection from extractive industries, which is 
the tax source with highest growth and volatility in Peru during last decade, is 
automatically transferred to SNG, especially to LLGG. In terms of the composition of 
expenditure by economic classification, the participation of the central government has 
declined in both current and capital expenditure; RRGG have increased slightly their 
participation in current expenditure and substantially in capital expenditure; while LLGG 
have increased substantially their participation in both current and capital expenditure.  
Alternatively, the analysis shows that due to the increase in transfers, especially 
those linked to natural resources, the central government reduced its control of tax 
collection between 2003 and 2010 from 74 percent to 65 percent (Figure 6.2), which is a 
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measure of the reduction in the fiscal space it faced by 2010 to conduct counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy.  
In turn, the increase in transfers has contributed to augment the size of the 
primary expenditure of the general government relative to GDP to 17.9 percent of GDP 
by 2010, which was 1.7 percentage points higher than the average value between 2001 
and 2010. Of this increase, 75 percent is explained by the higher participation of LLGG, 
and 25 percent by RRGG. This is mainly due to the increase in public investment of SNG 
due to the surge in transfers linked to natural resources, which are mostly earmarked to 
capital expenditure. This increase in the size of Peru’s general government did not 
worsen Peru’s fiscal position in terms of higher deficits and/or debt, which was mainly 
thanks to the public savings accumulated between 2006 and 2008.  
A more detailed descriptive analysis of the evolution of municipal finances shows 
that the increase in transfers was particularly large in 2007, owing to a change in the 
allocation rule of the mining canon, by which the central government transferred to SNG 
in a single installment 17 months-worth of this transfer in the middle of the budget year, 
which occurred in a period of high commodity prices. This combined with the 
inexperience of newly elected local authorities in 73 percent of LLGG, to yield a low 
budget execution rate for 2007, which fostered the perception that SNG are inefficient at 
spending their resources. However, primary expenditure of LLGG increased substantially 
between 2008 and 2010, to the point of generating primary deficits in 2009 and 2010, 
which LLGG were able to finance through a combination of accumulated savings from 
the previous years and discretionary transfers from the central government, in the context 
of the international financial crisis of 2009.  
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Although own municipal resources increased across the different classifications of 
LLGG at a rate comparable to that of the central government, due to the high increase in 
primary expenditure, including current expenditure, LLGG have a higher dependence on 
transfers to finance their regular expenses. Hence, LLGG have in aggregate worsened 
their fiscal position in response to transfers, mainly through the high growth of their 
primary expenditure in 2008-2010, which generated primary deficits in 2009 and 2010. 
However, this is not a situation that generates a significant fiscal risk for Peru’s general 
government, since municipalities have not increased in aggregate their indebtedness in 
terms of GDP, and they have been able to finance most of their deficits in 2009 and 2010 
through a combination of discretionary transfers from the central government in 2009 and 
2010; and accumulated savings, especially from the year 2007. Indeed, the expected 
aggregate accumulated savings of LLGG in 2011 was still substantial, equivalent to 
around 87 percent of their aggregate accumulated debt in 2010, although 40 percent 
lower than their peak at the start of 2009.  
The descriptive analysis suggests that those LLGG were transfers grew most and 
were also highly volatile present the highest fiscal risk. This is the case of LLGG that 
have mining as main transfer: indeed, this group concentrated most of the surplus of all 
LLGG in 2007 and most of the deficit in 2010. Related to this point, I assessed whether 
discretionary transfers from the central government included under ordinary resources 
increased most during 2009 and 2010 in those LLGG that were already receiving large 
transfers on a per capita basis: in this regard, although transfers per capita under ordinary 
resources were higher in 2009 in the groups of LLGG with more and medium resources, 
the rate of growth in 2009 and 2010 was higher for the group of LLGG with less 
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resources, which suggests that discretionary transfers during those years were allocated 
based on criteria such as population, rather than owing to the pressure from LLGG that 
were already receiving high resources. Lastly, I found that the groups of LLGG with 
more and medium resources, and the groups that have natural resources as main transfer 
(mining, oil and gas), tend to allocate a higher proportion of FONCOMUN to current 
expenditure relative to other groups, which increases their dependence on transfers.  
Next I analyzed in depth the effect of transfers on LLGG own resources, 
concentrating on Peru’s main cities, in which the analysis is most relevant since they 
concentrate almost all own municipal resources: the descriptive analysis showed that 
LLGG that received large amount of transfers did not respond by reducing their own 
fiscal effort. I also evaluated econometrically the effect of transfers on tax collection of 
Peru’s main cities, again confirming that there is not fiscal sloth. On the contrary, in the 
case of DDGG, transfers stimulate higher tax collection, both for DDGG with more and 
less resources per capita. This phenomenon is related to the fact that since canon is 
mostly earmarked for public investment, LLGG have an incentive to collect own taxes in 
order to finance their current expenditure.   
To conclude I estimated econometrically the response of expenditures to transfers, 
through an assessment of the flypaper effect. I found the existence of a flypaper effect for 
LLGG in Peru across groups of municipalities and functional specifications (linear and 
logarithmic), confirming the high propensity of LLGG to spend out of transfers presented 
in the descriptive analysis. The flypaper effect tends to be higher for LLGG that do not 
have mining as their main transfer, especially in the linear specification. For LLGG that 
have mining as main transfer the flypaper effect tends to be stronger with a one-year lag 
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in transfers, which is mainly due to the high value of transfers following 2005 and the 
timing of the mining transfer, which since 2007 occurs in the middle of the fiscal year.  
This also helps explain why the coefficient of symmetry introduced in the 
regression analysis, which assesses whether primary expenditure increases and declines 
symmetrically with transfers, has a higher coefficient and is only statistically significant 
(in the case of the linear specification) for LLGG that have mining as main transfer. The 
high propensity to spend out of transfers and its manifestation through a flypaper effect is 
also confirmed in the regressions that only assess the effect of transfers in LLGG that are 
mining producers, in which the argument of exogeneity of transfers is strongest.  
The time dummies in Table 6.26 confirm the lower spending capacity on average 
of LLGG in 2007, which is associated to the renovation of local authorities in most 
municipalities. They also show the high increase in expenditures in 2008 and 2009, as the 
municipal teams gain more experience and start executing the surge in transfers, 
especially in LLGG that have mining as main transfer.  
The comparison between functional specifications shows the robustness of the 
flypaper effect, with the logarithmic case being consistently higher and oscillating within 
a smaller range of values than the linear case. In the linear specification, the point 
elasticity of the response of expenditure to transfers tends to be higher than for GDP, 
especially for PPGG. However, the absence of an official series of GDP at the municipal 
level precludes the analysis of intra-department variability of GDP, which limits the 
findings of the effect of income on expenditure, and in turn of the flypaper effect.  
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I also tested several other models, finding that LLGG that have gas as main 
transfer present the highest coefficient of the effect of transfers on primary expenditure 
for the linear specification; and similar to LLGG that have mining as main transfer, the 
lagged variable also has a higher significant coefficient than the contemporaneous 
variable (although the difference between the lagged and contemporaneous variable is 
smaller than for the mining case), which is related to the fact that gas transfers have also 
grown substantially following 2005. Moreover, the coefficient measuring the effect of 
transfers on LLGG expenditure increases with poverty, measured by BUN, both for 
PPGG and DDGG, which highlights that LLGG with higher needs tend to spend more 
out of transfers, in spite of the fact that they tend to have lower institutional capacity.  
Policy implications and recommendations 
The case of Peru provides lessons to improve its decentralization process and 
informs other countries that are evaluating to share the fiscal revenue from the extraction 
of natural resources among levels of government.  
The reduction in the fiscal space of the central government to conduct counter-
cyclical fiscal policy means that the national authorities may be forced to establish more 
aggressive targets of public savings in good economic times, in order to have fiscal room 
to maneuver when the economy slows down. In turn, this more aggressive savings targets 
may detract public resources to address nationally determined policy goals, including the 
possibility of increasing discretionary transfers to SNG in the event of economic 
downturns and/or recessions. Moreover, it demands the central government to coordinate 
fiscal policy with multiple SNG at the regional and local level: this coordination may 
create political frictions without guarantee that the fiscal policy goals are achieved.  
234 
 
The decision of how much of this revenue should be allocated to SNG is 
intrinsically political. However, this dissertation illustrates for the case of Peru the 
consequences of sharing a high proportion of this rapidly growing and volatile fiscal 
revenue from the standpoint of macroeconomic stability. It should be noted that the 
source of this growth in transfers is relatively new, given that the boom in commodity 
prices took place during the last decade, but the consequences are a reminder of the vast 
literature on the “soft budget constraint” and the fiscal risks linked to the decentralization 
processes that materialized in countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia during 
the decade of 1990.  
With respect to the flypaper effect, the analysis of the case of Peru highlights the 
importance of assessing not only the theoretical models that explain this apparent 
“anomaly”, but also its consequences in terms of macroeconomic stability. In this regard 
and as shown in Chapter 4, the expectation in much of Peru’s policy debate is that SNG 
should immediately spend all their transfers, mainly because in most RRGG and LLGG 
development needs are very high. Against this background, the prediction of the median-
voter model that SNG should treat surges in transfers as equivalent to surges in private 
income is regarded in Peru’s policy debate as an anomaly itself, and many analysts and 
policy-makers indirectly treat the flypaper effect as something desirable. Hence, the 
assessment conducted in this dissertation of the consequences of the flypaper effect in 
Peru in terms of the emergence of fiscal risks is important to inform the policy debate and 
highlight its potential threat in terms of macroeconomic stability.  
The above discussion needs to be framed within the question of whether the surge 
in transfers is temporary or permanent. The expectation that SNG should immediately 
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spend all their transfer proceeds is more understandable under the assumption that the 
increase is permanent. However, in the case of transfers linked to extractive industries the 
assumption that the increase is permanent should be treated with caution, considering the 
high volatility observed in 2008-2010 and the fact that the revenue source depends on an 
exhaustible resource. Hence, it is advisable that transfers linked to extractive industries be 
regarded as temporary, and SNG should not be expected to spend them immediately but 
rather save part of them for periods in which transfers fall.  
In terms of the literature and international experience on sharing fiscal revenue 
from extractive industries among levels of government, the case of Peru provides 
important lessons. First, it shows that once a large proportion of this revenue is shared 
with SNG, it is politically very difficult to take it away, which calls for prudence in the 
initial allocation.  
Second, from a political economy standpoint and as discussed in Chapter 4, the 
reform of the Canon Law in Peru in July 2001, which increased substantially the 
participation of SNG in the fiscal revenue from the extraction of natural resources, took 
place only 17 days before the end of the transitional Presidency of Valentín Paniagua, as 
a combination of a relatively weak Presidency, following the strong rule of the Fujimori 
Administration; increased political demand for decentralization, as part of a more open 
democratic environment; and the fact that the Constitution of 1993 gave SNG the right to 
participate in the fiscal revenue from natural resources. The combination of these factors 
provided a window of opportunity that was seized by advocates of decentralization, and 
shows the importance of having a strong and prepared Executive Branch, with the 
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participation of well-informed authorities from the Ministry of Economics and Finance, 
to discuss and inform the consequences of this type of decisions.   
Third, within the distinction included in World Bank (2010) between “oil 
economies” and “economies with oil”, relative to the contribution of the extractive sector 
to the economy, the case of Peru highlights the time inconsistency at the moment of 
defining the legal framework that shares fiscal revenue from natural resources among 
levels of government. The Canon Law was enacted when Peru was an “economy with 
oil”, and only later in the decade and due to the surge in commodity prices it became an 
“oil economy”, having to grapple with the consequences of sharing a large fraction of the 
fiscal revenue from natural resources with SNG. At the time of the reform, this demands 
a projection of the stream of expected fiscal revenue, including sensitivity analysis that 
takes into consideration the available historical data and well-informed forecasts, 
although back then it was difficult to foresee the period of high prices that started in 
2003, which after a brief respite in 2009, has resumed since 2010. Indeed, had the prices 
been in 2001 at the average level of the last decade, the decisions regarding the share of 
SNG in the canon might have been different. 
Although not assessed in this dissertation, it is also important to analyze the 
implications of high and volatile transfers linked to natural resources from the standpoint 
of efficiency and equity. With respect to the former, a key concern refers to the quality of 
expenditure in SNG in which outlays grow rapidly, without adequate monitoring from the 
central government. In this regard, CIUP (2009) shows using data for the year 2007 that 
in a representative sample of SNG, 81.1 percent of evaluated projects of RRGG had 
major observations and/or did not comply with the requirements of Peru’s National 
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Public Investment System (SNIP in Spanish), while this figure climbed to 92.8 percent 
for projects of LLGG. These are alarming figures that suggest that investment projects at 
the subnational level, which are mostly financed through transfers, are not complying 
with the requirements for approving projects with high social return.  
Moreover, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence about the high incidence of 
corruption in SNG that receive large transfers linked to natural resources; this is partly 
fostered by the fact that public officers at the regional and local level have low salaries.  
Lastly, in recent years there has been a proliferation of protests in Peru by local 
communities against private projects linked to extractive industries, which suggests that 
canon funds are not being effective in compensating for the environmental and social 
costs created by this type of projects; this partly owes to the fact that the legislation on 
the use of canon does not require its use on mitigating these costs, and there is inadequate 
monitoring from the central government on the use of canon funds.   
In terms of equity, as shown in Government of Peru (2011) the allocation of 
transfers linked to natural resources among levels of government tends to be regressive: 
the 5 departments with most transfers of this sort have on average 35 percent of poverty, 
while the 9 departments with least transfers have on average 49 percent of poverty. This 
situation not only raises important questions about the fairness of Peru’s decentralization 
process, but also puts pressure on the central government to compensate SNG that do not 
receive large transfers linked to natural resources. Moreover, as suggested by the flypaper 
effect, it also puts pressure to maintain and/or increase transfers to those SNG that are 
already receiving large transfers, which on average have less poverty than those SNG that 
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receive less transfers. These risks emerge in a context in which transfers have already 
grown significantly and have reduced the fiscal space of the central government to 
conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
 
Looking forward in terms of policy recommendations, as mentioned above Peru´s 
policy debate is centered on the importance of increasing expenditure at the subnational 
level. This is clearly relevant considering the high development needs of most SNG. 
However, this dissertation highlights the fiscal risks stemming from the flypaper effect, 
which are relatively neglected in the policy debate, but need to be considered within the 
discussion of the fiscal consequences of the growth in transfers of the last decade.   
Grappling with these fiscal consequences requires improving the fiscal space of 
the central government to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy. In Peru this was recently 
improved in 2011 through an increase in the taxation of mining, with the extra revenue 
entirely allocated to the central government. However, this puts additional pressure on the 
private sector.  
It is also important to stimulate own resources of SNG, partly in order to reduce 
the pressure on the central government to increase transfers, especially when the latter 
fall. As shown in this dissertation, in Peru LLGG do not display fiscal sloth, but tax 
collection of municipalities is nonetheless low. Tackling this issue requires reforms that 
strengthen the tax rates and bases of LLGG, and finding mechanisms to improve 
coordination among the numerous municipalities in Peru, in order to generate economies 
of scale in tax collection.  
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In turn, the high growth of expenditure of LLGG can create fiscal risks to the 
central government that have to be dealt with. An important step is to tackle MEF’s 
contradictory requirements on municipalities: on one hand, the fiscal rules put a tight 
limit on the growth of consumption expenditure, which is not complied with by most 
LLGG.
25
 On the other hand, transfer systems such as FONIPREL reward a high budget 
execution of the investment budget, which often requires LLGG to break the fiscal rule 
that refers to consumption expenditure, given that the latter is necessary to operate the 
newly developed public investment.  
This contradiction calls for consistency among the policy instruments used by 
MEF to monitor the fiscal performance of SNG. In this regard, the different 
classifications of LLGG used in this dissertation, most of them already being used by 
MEF, can help to sort SNG according to their fiscal risk. The classification by size 
contributes to identify risks stemming from high indebtedness in LLGG that are main 
cities; indeed, as described in Chapters 3, 4 and 6, most public debt at the local level is 
concentrated in large metropolitan areas, which due to their size increases the moral 
hazard of potential financial bailouts from the central government. Most of this debt is 
linked to long-standing obligations with central government public institutions, such as 
the national tax agency, social security and public health. A concerted path towards 
streamlining these debts can reduce fiscal risks and allow LLGG that are main cities to 
obtain debt from private creditors within a fiscally responsible framework.  
                                                 
25
 In 2009 73.3 percent of LLGG did not comply with the fiscal rule referred to the annual growth in 
consumption expenditure in real terms. See Table 4.1.  
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With respect to the high growth in expenditures, the classifications of LLGG by 
resources and main transfer, the latter introduced in this dissertation, helps to identify 
those municipalities whose fiscal behavior requires closer monitoring and control from 
MEF. In this regard, LLGG that have mining and gas canon as main transfer require 
special attention due to the high growth and volatility of these revenue sources.   
In turn, the timing rules by which the mining canon is transferred to SNG during 
the budget year should be reconsidered, in order to allow for better forecasting during 
budget preparation and phase out financial transfers throughout the year in order to give 
time to subnational authorities to incorporate these resources into their planning.  
Related to the last point, the main yardstick by which the budget execution 
performance of SNG is judged should not be the Institutional Modified Budget (PIM) 
inclusive of accumulated savings, which stimulates local authorities to spend all their 
available funds immediately. Instead, a better measure of execution performance is the 
comparison to the effective budget expenditure execution of a given period to the 
available resources for that period, excluding accumulated savings. This measure of 
execution performance would have allowed focusing on the primary deficits of most 
LLGG in 2009 and 2010, instead of their inability to spend all their available resources.  
 
To conclude, in terms of policy recommendations for Peru´s decentralization 
process, it is important to simplify the multitude of current transfer schemes, associating 
them whenever possible with the expenditure responsibilities of SNG. There is the 
perception in Peru´s policy debate that increasing transfers, including those without 
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clearly associated expenditure responsibilities, contributes to the decentralization process; 
this view does not give appropriate consideration to the problems related to the soft 
budget constraints and the “addiction to transfers” that is displayed by SNG in Peru and 
throughout the world. Hence, there is scope to improve the understanding and 
communication of the fiscal risks related to the surge in transfers of the last decade.  
Although the canon law is politically very difficult to reform, from an efficiency 
standpoint there is space to improve monitoring and technical assistance on the use of 
canon, in order to increase the social return from investment projects at the subnational 
level. It is also important to assess whether canon funds are being used to mitigate 
environmental and social externalities related to extractive industries. In case they are 
not, it is possible to consider some degree of earmarking of its use towards public 
investment that contributes to mitigate these externalities. However, it is best to negotiate 
with SNG the establishment of such a type of earmarking, and provide monitoring and 
technical assistance from the central government to make sure that the funds are 
effectively used to mitigate the externalities inflicted by extractive industries.   
It is also important to improve the distributional equity of the transfer system, but 
within the current envelope of fiscal resources that are already being transferred to SNG, 
since the allocation of additional resources would reduce even more the fiscal space of 
the central government to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
As mentioned above, it is also important to foster fiscal autonomy at the 
subnational level, improving to the extent possible the “tax handles” of both local and 
regional governments. In terms of expenditure responsibilities it is necessary to improve 
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the definition of functions by level of government, assessing and allocating the necessary 
resources to fulfill them.  
To conclude, it is central to strengthen the leadership of Peru´s decentralization 
process, with active involvement of MEF and Peru´s Ministerial Council Presidency 
(PCM in Spanish) in the technical and political aspects, respectively, in consultation with 
Congress and the organizations that represent SNG. In this regard, the establishment in 
2010 of Peru´s Multi-Sector Commission for Fiscal Decentralization, integrated by 
representatives of the national government and SNG organizations, is a positive step that 
needs to be complemented with a clear roadmap of policy reforms.   
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Annex 1 – Reference tables 
 
Table A1.1 – Annual inflation and exchange rate series for Peru – 1998 - 2010 
 
Table A1.2 – Summary of main legal framework of Peru’s current decentralization process (until December 2010) 
Canon Law (Law No. 27506 of July, 2001, and successive modifications). As mentioned in the introduction, it essentially increases 
from 20 to 50 percent the participation of SNG in the taxes paid by companies that exploit natural resources. This law was enacted on 
July 10, 2001, only 18 days before the end of the term of Transitional President Valentín Paniagua, who was President of Congress 
when President Fujimori resigned in November 2000, and was selected by Congress as Transitional President of Peru to guarantee the 
transparency of the new general elections that would choose Alejandro Toledo as President. Although this law predates the National 
Accord and is usually not included in the legal framework of the decentralization process, it has significantly increased the allocation 
of funds to SNG (see more on this law in Table A-II below). 
Constitutional Reform on decentralization (Law No. 27680 of March, 2002). It introduces decentralization as a permanent and 
compulsory State policy, which is also a democratic way of organization, and which has as its main goal the integral development of 
the country. In this context it creates “Regional Governments” (RRGG) as the regional or intermediate level of government (the 
equivalent to the States in the United States), elected by popular vote in the geographic space of the 24 historic departments of Peru 
and the Constitutional Province of Callao. The RRGG replaced what were until then the Transitory Counsels of Regional 
Administration (CTAR, after their name in Spanish), which had been functioning in each department since 1992 as deconcentrated 
units of the central government that executed all regional expenditures. It also introduces “Regions” as another intermediate level of 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Series 
average
Annual Inflation 7.25% 3.47% 3.76% 1.98% 0.19% 2.26% 3.66% 1.62% 2.00% 1.78% 5.79% 2.94% 2.08% 2.98%
Average yearly exchange rate 
(Peruvian S./ per US dollar)
2.93 3.38 3.49 3.51 3.52 3.48 3.41 3.30 3.27 3.13 2.93 3.01 2.83 3.25
Source: BCRP (Peru's Central Bank)
244 
 
government, which is to be created by means of a referendum through the integration of two or more neighboring departments. To 
date no region has been created (more on this below). 
Bases of decentralization Law (Law No. 27783 of July, 2002). It develops the newly introduced Constitutional chapter on 
decentralization mentioned in the previous paragraph, including the goals and principles of the process. These conform to some of the 
good practices of fiscal decentralization, such as clear definition of functions among levels of government; transparency, predictability 
and neutrality of transfers, the latter being the avoidance of transfer of resources without associated expenditure responsibilities; and 
fiscal responsibility by SNG. It also regulates the formation of regions, sets the basic functions of each level of government and 
relationships among them, including the shared functions among levels of government, along with a roadmap of the next steps in the 
decentralization process. Finally, it creates the “National Council for Decentralization” (NCD) as a National agency with Ministerial 
rank, overseen by representatives from the local, regional and national levels of government, which would lead the implementation of 
the roadmap of the process.  
Organic Law of Regional Governments (Law No. 27867 of November, 2002). It defines the characteristics and functions of 
RRGG; the exhaustive list of their 185 exclusive functions, along with guidelines for their progressive annual transfer through an 
accreditation process to be later defined (Law No. 28273, more on this below). It mentions that a Fiscal Decentralization Law would 
be proposed within the following six months, which would include the roadmap for the transfer of taxes to RRGG within an integral 
tax reform. The law also includes mechanisms for regional coordination, as part of the process for the creation of regions. a broad list 
of shared functions among levels of government. 
Organic Law of Local Governments (Law No. 27972 of May, 2003). This updates the characteristics and functions of LLGG in the 
context of the decentralization process initiated in 2001. Similar to the law for RRGG, it states the exclusive and shared functions of 
the two levels of LLGG: provincial governments, which are comprised of a number of districts and have functions both over the 
provincial capital (acting as another district) and the rest of the province; and district governments, which only have functions over 
their district. The law also mentions the existence of “populated centers” as a third more decentralized level of local government, but 
there are only 8 such centers formally recognized in Peru. It also gives a special status to the Municipality of Lima and to LLGG in 
international borders. The law states that transfers to LLGG would be doubled between 2004 and 2008, from 6 to 12 percent of the 
budget of the public sector. It also includes a fiscal rule, by which debt payments of LLGG cannot exceed 30 percent of the income of 
the previous year; and it mentions that when the budget and financial management of LLGG seriously compromises the 
macroeconomic stability of the country, the central government can adopt extraordinary economic and financial measures. Lastly, the 
law includes as municipal income the transfers from FONCOMUN and Canon, and sets a minimum amount of FONCOMUN for each 
LLGG. 
Fiscal Decentralization Decree-Law (Decree-Law No. 955 of February, 2004). It details the steps for the transfer of sources of 
income to RRGG upon the formation of regions; and introduces all fiscal rules for SNG, along with requirements to ensure fiscal 
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transparency and responsibility. The decree mentions that upon the formation of any region, it would receive 50 percent of national 
taxes collected in that region, including Value Added Tax, selective consumption and personal income tax. Each region would receive 
additional income if they adopt tax administration measures in coordination with the tax administration agency that increases their 
collection. However, the transferred taxes substitute the transfers that RRGG were already receiving, and they cannot receive more 
taxes than those necessary to comply with the transferred functions. With respect to fiscal rules, the decree clarifies the concept and 
methodology to calculate the 9 fiscal rules that apply to SNG. It also includes a transition period in 2006 and 2007 to comply with 
these rules. All RRGG and selected LLGG to be defined between MEF and NCD should also begin conducting multiannual fiscal 
reports in coherence with the National Multiannual Macroeconomic Framework.  
Accreditation System Law (Law No. 28273 of June, 2004). It defines the system of accreditation to certify the capacities of SNG 
(especially RRGG) to exercise the functions and programs transferred to them as part of the decentralization system. It also creates an 
information system to track progress in decentralized public management, and the procedures to certify the functioning of 
Coordination Groups of RRGG and their progress towards the creation of regions. For small municipalities, it includes a requirement 
of execution of at least 80 percent of their budget to be able to receive the new functions. 
Incentives for the integration and formation of regions Law (Law No. 28274 of June, 2004). It provides the guidelines for the 
formation of regions, as the union of two or more RRGG. This possibility was also extended to the provinces and districts. Those 
RRGG that want to create a region should first elaborate a pre investment document with the technical analysis that justifies the social 
returns of creating a region. The law also expands on the incentives for the formation of regions, including additional transfers, 
preference for international loans, increased fiscal space for internal credits, and procurement incentives for businesses located in the 
RRGG to be integrated. 
Source: Congress of Peru 
 
Table A1.3 – Description of transfer systems to LLGG in Peru (until December 2010) 
Municipal Compensation Fund: FONCOMUN – Equalization transfer 
Transfer Source and use of funds, legal base and main changes Distribution rule 
FONCOMUN 
 
Source of funds: 
- Municipal promotion tax (2 percentage points of Value 
Added Tax). Approximate Weight: 93.75 percent  
- Gasoline tax (8 percent of gasoline production or 
import). Approx. Weight: 6.12 percent 
Minimum base: Every LLGG receives at least 8 tax 
units per month (S./ 28,400 or US$ 9,600 in 2009).   
Timing of distribution: Funds are automatically 
distributed monthly.  
Distribution rule: Until 2009 inclusive, two-step 
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- Recreational ship tax (5 percent of value of 
recreational ships). Approx. Weight: 0.13 percent 
Restrictions on use of funds: 
- Public investment (until 01-2002); no restrictions 
(since 01-2002) 
Legal base and main changes: 
- Included in the Constitution of 1993 (Art. 196, Num. 
5) 
- Legislative Decree (LD) 776-1993, “Municipal Tax 
Law”. States characteristics of FONCOMUN: sources 
of funds, distribution criteria and use of funds for public 
investment. Supreme Decree (SD) 06-1994: regulates 
operation of FONCOMUN. 
- Law 27630-2002. Lifts restriction on use of funds for 
public investment 
- LD 952-2004. Defines minimum transfer per LLGG. 
Mentions that allocation criteria among LLGG will 
consider territory, own income and use of transfer for 
investment; also authorizes to subtract from 
FONCOMUN the devolutions for excess or incorrect 
payments of the municipal promotion tax. These last 
two changes did not go into effect until 2010. 
- Law 29332-2009. Creates the Plan of Incentives for the 
Improvement in Municipal Management, which intends 
to improve municipal tax collection and execution of 
public investment. The Plan is funded by the 
devolutions for excess or incorrect payments of the 
municipal promotion tax, which start to be subtracted 
from FONCOMUN starting in 2010.  
- Supreme Decree (SD) 060-2010. Incorporates the new 
criteria for distribution of FONCOMUN stated in LD 
allocation process:  
1. Index among the country’s 195 provinces, 
considering population and infant mortality  
2. 20 percent to provincial government; remaining 80 
percent to all districts of province (including 
provincial government as another district): 
- For Lima and Callao, basic unmet needs: population, 
adult illiteracy, households with children out of 
school, without water, sewage, public lighting, 
improvised construction and 3 or more people per 
room 
- Rest of country: rural population (x 2) and urban 
population (x 1) 
Since 2010, three-step allocation criteria: 
1. Index among the country’s 195 provinces, 
considering population, water, hygiene and 
electricity service provision 
2. 20 percent to provincial government; remaining 80 
percent to all districts of province, considering: 
- 85 percent weight, for Lima and Callao, index of 
basic unmet needs, considering population, 
inadequate housing, lack of water and hygiene, 
children out of school, poverty. For rest of country, 
index of rural population (x 2) and urban population 
(x 1)  
- 5 percent weight, index of territorial extension of 
each district within each province; 
- 10 percent weight, index of municipal management: 
considers with equal weight the yearly increase in 
own income collection and the fraction of 
FONCOMUN resources used for public investment, 
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952-2010.  weighing in turn each district within its province.  
3. Every district receives at least 8 tax units and at 
least the same as it received in 2009. The above 
formula applies to the total funds available after 
complying with this minimum requirement. 
Natural resources and customs (fragmentary transfers): Canon (mining, gas, fishing, forestry and hydro-energy); Oil canon 







Sources of funds. Since July 2001 (Canon Law). It 
began distribution in June 2002:  
- Mining canon: 50 percent of corporate income tax for 
making use of mineral metallic and non-metallic 
resources (until 2001 it was 20 percent)  
- Gas canon: 50 percent of corporate income tax, 50 
percent of perquisite and 50 percent of 50 percent of 
State participation in gas service contracts. 
- Fishing canon: 50 percent of corporate income tax and 
fishing permits paid for commercial extraction of fish in 
large scale. 
- Forestry canon: 50 percent of payments of permits and 
authorizations for use of forestry resources.  
- Hydro-energy canon: 50 percent of corporate income 
tax for use of hydrological resources; later changed to 
all energy resources.   
Restrictions on use of funds: 
- Until June 2005 all canon had to be used for public 
investment projects (PIP), and since August 2004 30 
percent of canon has to be used for productive 
investment for sustainable development of the 
communities where the natural resource is exploited.  
- Since June 2005 SNG can use up to 20 percent for 
maintenance of infrastructure and selection processes 
Timing of distribution: 
- All canon transfers that depend on corporate income 
tax (mining, hydro-energy and part of gas and fishing) 
are distributed in 12 equal monthly installments 
starting in June, transferring the tax collection of the 
previous year, which is determined by the National 
tax administration agency in March. For mining 
canon, starting in 2007 all the transfer is made in one 
payment in June; the first transfer that year was 
equivalent to five pending months of 2005 and all 
2006.  
- Gas perquisite, which is most of the gas canon, is 
paid monthly. 
- Forestry canon was transferred quarterly in 2002. 
Both forestry and fishing permits are transferred every 
semester since 2003.  
Distribution rule: The distribution envisaged in the 
Canon Law began in January 2002. Until February 
2004 it followed the following criteria:  
1. 20 percent among LLGG in the province/s where 
the resource is exploited, according to rural 
population (x2) and urban population (x1).  
2. 60 percent among LLGG of the department/s 
where the resource is exploited, according to 
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for PIP. Since January 2006 this 20 percent also 
includes up to 5 percent for pre-investment studies. 
Since January 2007 the 5 percent for pre-investment 
studies is in addition to the 20 percent for maintenance 
and selection processes. Since May 2009 and in the 
context of the economic crisis, it allows using until the 
end of 2010 up to 50 percent of canon for maintenance.   
Legal base and main changes: 
- Precedent: Legislative Decree 708-1991. States that 
starting in 1992 the percentage of corporate income tax 
of mining companies to be redistributed to the regions 
shall be 20 percent. 
- Constitution of 1993 (Art. 77, 2nd paragraph). “It 
corresponds to the respective jurisdictions, conforming 
to law, to receive an adequate participation in the total 
income and rent obtained by the State in the 
exploitation of natural resources in the form of canon”.  
- Law No. 27506-2001 “Canon Law”. Regulates Art. 77 
of the Constitution, defining the natural resources 
whose exploitation generate canon, along with its 
distribution to SNG. Modified by Law No. 28077-2003, 
28422-2004 and 29281-2008.  
- SD 005-2002. Regulates the canon law. Modified by 
SD 115-2003, 029-2004, 187-2004 and 044-2009. 
- Law No. 28562-2005 “Supplementary budget”. Budget 
Laws 2006 to 2010. Emergency Decree (ED) 060-2009: 
They gradually lift the restriction on the use of canon 
for public investment.  
population density (inhabitants/sq. Km). 
3. 20 percent for regional government/s where the 
resource is exploited.  
From February 2004 until December 2004: 
1. 10 percent for the district/s where the resource is 
exploited. If the resource is exploited in more than 
one district, it is shared equally.  
2. 25 percent for LLGG of the province where the 
resource is exploited excluding the district/s where 
resource is exploited. The distribution among the 
LLGG is based on population x proportion of 
population with at least one basic unmet need 
(BUN). BUN considers inadequate housing, lack of 
water or hygiene service, households with children 
out of school and with high economic dependence.  
3. 40 percent for LLGG of the department where the 
resource is exploited excluding the province/s where 
the resource is exploited. The distribution among 
LLGG is based on population and BUN.  
4. 25 percent for RRGG where resource is exploited, 
which in turn allocates 20 percent to the regional 
public university for research in science and 
technology for regional development. 
Lastly, since January 2005:  
1. 10 percent for the district/s where the resource is 
exploited. If the resource is exploited in more than 
one district, it is equally shared.  
2. 25 percent for LLGG of the province where the 
resource is exploited. The distribution among LLGG 
based on population and index of BUN. 
3. 40 percent for LLGG of the department where the 
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resource is exploited. Distribution among LLGG is 
based on population and index of BUN.  
4. 25 percent for the regional government where the 
resource is exploited; the RRGG allocates in turn 20 
percent to regional public universities for research in 
regional development. 
Oil canon and 
over-canon  
Sources of funds. Oil canon and over-canon are the first 
natural resource-based transfers that have been 
established. Different to the Canon Law they are specific 
to each of four departments of Peru (Loreto, Ucayali, 
Piura and Tumbes) and the district of Puerto Inca, 
department of Huánuco.  
- In all five cases the oil canon is defined as 10  percent 
of total oil production value (“ad-valorem”) of each 
jurisdiction.  
- The over-canon is an extra levy of 2.5 percent of oil 
production value in Loreto and Ucayali, and 2.5 percent 
of participation in the rent from oil produced from oil 
exploitation in Piura and Tumbes (district of Puerto 
Inca does not have over-canon).   
- These sources of funds have been unchanged since 
June 1998. Both oil canon and over-canon exist until 
the resource is exhausted. 
Restrictions on use of funds.  
- For Piura and Tumbes, until July 2004 SNG could use 
20 percent in current expenditure and 80 percent in 
public investment. Starting in July 2004 they had to use 
100 percent on public investment. Since June 2005 
SNG can use up to 20 percent of canon for maintenance 
of infrastructure and selection processes for PIP. Since 
January 2006 this 20 percent also includes up to 5 
Timing of distribution. Monthly based on estimates 
by PERUPETRO.   
Distribution rule.  
- Oil canon and over-canon for Loreto and Ucayali 
since 1994:  
1. 52 percent for Regional Government where 
resource is extracted;  
2. 40 percent for LLGG where resource is extracted. 
Distributed among LLGG by population (70 
percent), territorial extension (10 percent), provincial 
capital (15 percent) and population with more than 
100 inhabitants (5 percent).  
3. 5 percent for Amazonian National University. 
4. 3 percent for Peruvian Amazon Research Institute.  
- Oil canon for Ucayali since January 2007: 
1. 20 percent for Regional Government. 
2. 10 percent for Local Government/s where resource 
is exploited.  
3. 20 percent for LLGG of the province where 
resource is exploited: first according to production, 
and then following the compound indicator of 
population and BUN. 
4. 40 percent for LLGG of the department where 
resource is exploited: according to compound 
indicator of population and BUN.  
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percent for pre-investment studies. Since January 2007 
the 5 percent for pre-investment studies is in addition to 
the 20 percent for maintenance and selection processes, 
and SNG can also use over-canon. Since May 2009 and 
in the context of the economic crisis, it allows using 
until the end of 2010 up to 50 percent of canon for 
maintenance.   
- For Loreto, Ucayali and the district of Puerto Inca are 
less stringent: transfers should be used for the execution 
of plans and investment programs to promote integral 
socio-economic development.  
Legal base and main changes:  
- Loreto: Law 21678 of November 1976 creates the oil 
canon for 10 years, later modified until resource is 
exhausted (Law 23538-1982). Law 23350-1981 creates 
oil over-canon in Ucayali. Law 24300-1985 defines first 
distribution criteria among SNG for both departments. 
ED 027-1998 creates oil canon for Ucayali and oil over-
canon for Loreto. Law 28699-2006 sets oil canon 
distribution criteria for canon in Ucayali; S.D. 206-2006 
regulates this law in Ucayali. 
- Piura and Tumbes: Law 23630-1983 creates oil canon 
until resource is exhausted. Also sets the same 
distribution criteria among SNG for both departments. 
Law 23871-1984 creates oil over-canon. Laws 27763-
2002, 28277-2004 and 29345-2009 change distribution 
criteria. SD 138-2009 regulates these laws.  
- Law No. 28562-2005 “Supplementary budget”. Budget 
Laws 2006 to 2010. ED 060-2009: They gradually lift 
the restriction on the use of canon and over-canon for 
public investment. 
5. 5 percent equally among national public 
universities in the department. 
6. 3 percent equally among national technological 
institutes.  
7. 2 percent for Peruvian Amazon Research Institute. 
- Oil canon and over-canon in Piura and Tumbes. 
From June 1983 until December 2002:  
1. 60 percent for Regional Government where 
resource is extracted. 
2. 40 percent equally among provincial governments 
in proportion to the value of production of each 
department.  
- From January 2003 until April 2009, canon and over-
canon: 
1. 20 percent for Regional Government where 
resource is extracted. 
2. 20 percent for LLGG of the province where 
resource is exploited: distributed among districts 
according to population and production. 
3. 50 percent for LLGG of the department where 
resource is extracted: first equally among provinces; 
within each province, according to population, 
poverty, pollution and BUN. 
4. 5 percent for national universities.  
5. 5 percent for Superior Technological and 
Pedagogical Institutes.  
- Since April 2009, one change of canon in Piura: 20 
percent for LLGG where resource is located has a 
two-step allocation: 1. Distribution among provinces 
according to production levels; 2. Among districts of 
each province using compound indicator of 
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population and BUN. Rest of distribution does not 
change. 
- Since April 2009, one change of canon in Tumbes: 
20 percent for LLGG where resources if extracted is 
allocated to regional government, which receives 40 
percent of transfers. Rest of distribution does not 
change.  
- Since April 2009, one change of over-canon in Piura 
and Tumbes: 20 percent for LLGG where resource is 
extracted is now allocated to LLGG of the 
department, which have 70 percent of total allocation, 
following same distribution as before. Rest of 
distribution does not change.  
Mining 
perquisite 
Sources of funds. 100 percent of payment for 
exploitation of metallic and non-metallic minerals. Based 
on international value of mineral concentrate or 
equivalent. Calculated by owner of mine; audited by 
National tax collection agency. Three tranches of 
payments depending on net value of concentrate sales 
(value of sales minus fees, indirect taxes, insurance, 
freight, storage and international trade costs), :  
- Up to US$60 million of net value of concentrate sales: 
1 percent. 
- Between US$60 and 120 million: 2 percent. 
- More than US$120 million: 3 percent.  
Minerals with no internationally prices pay 1 percent, 
regardless of volume. 
Restrictions on use of funds.  
- Funds need to be used on productive public investment 
that articulates mining with local economic 
development.  
Timing of distribution. Determined and distributed 
monthly based on payments made by mining 
companies.  
Distribution rule.  
1. 20 percent for district/s where the natural resource 
is exploited. 
2. 20 percent to LLGG of the province/s where the 
resource is exploited based on compound index of 
population and BUN.  
3. 40 percent to LLGG of the department/s where the 
resource is exploited based on compound index of 
population and BUN.  
4. 15 percent to regional government/s where the 
resource is exploited.  
5. 5 percent to national universities of the department 
where the resource is exploited.  
- Funds collected due to sanctions for delays or non-
compliance with payments are allocated following the 
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- 50 percent of the 20 percent allocated to the district/s 
where the resource is exploited needs to be invested in 
the communities next to the mine.  
- Since January 2006, SNG can use up to 20 percent of 
the perquisite for maintenance of infrastructure and 
selection processes for PIP, which includes up to 5 
percent for pre-investment studies. Since January 2007 
the 5 percent for pre-investment studies is in addition to 
the 20 percent for maintenance and selection processes. 
Since May 2009 and due to the crisis, it allows using 
until 2010 up to 50 percent for maintenance. 
Legal base and main changes: 
- Law 28588-2004 creates the mining perquisite. 
Modified by Law 23823-2004.  
- SD 157-2004 regulates mining perquisite. Modified by 
SD 018-2005.  
- Budget Laws 2006 to 2010 and ED 060-2009 gradually 
lift the restriction on the use of canon and over-canon 
for public investment. 







Sources of funds. FOCAM is established for the 
sustainable development of the departments through 
which the hydrocarbon pipeline of lots 88 and 56 
(Camisea Project) goes through. It is funded by 25 
percent of the gas perquisite for both lots, after the 
deductions for the payment of the gas canon. The share 
for the department of Ucayali is an additional 2.5 percent 
of the gas perquisite.  
Restrictions on use of funds.  
- Funds should be used for PIP and economic and social 
infrastructure. This last category allows maintenance, 
pre investment and development studies, training and 
Timing of distribution. FOCAM perquisite began to 
be distributed in April 2005. Distribution indexes are 
determined annually. Transfers are made monthly.  
Distribution rule. 
- For departments of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Ica and 
Lima (excluding Metropolitan Lima and Callao): 
1. 30 percent for regional government, using 
compound index of population and BUN, and length 
of pipeline in each RRGG.  
2. 30 percent for provincial governments, using 
compound index of population and BUN.  
3. 15 percent for district governments through which 
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technical assistance, and environmental and ecological 
preservation.  
- In the case of Ucayali transfers should be used for PIP 
included in the planning instruments of SNG. At least 
20 percent of them should favor native communities 
and sustainable environment. 
Legal base and main changes.  
- Law 28451-2004 creates FOCAM perquisite. Law 
28622-2005 modifies FOCAM to incorporate 
department of Ucayali.  
- SD 042-2005 regulates FOCAM. Modified by SD 065-
2005 and SD 185-2005.  
the pipeline goes through, using compound index of 
population and BUN, and length of pipeline in each 
LLGG.  
4. 15 percent for rest of district governments using 
compound index of population and BUN.  
5. 10 percent equally among public universities.  
- For department of Ucayali:  
1. 60 percent for LLGG of province of Atalaya. 
2. 10 percent for LLGG of province of Portillo.  
3. 10 percent for LLGG of province of Padre Abad. 
4. 3 percent for LLGG of province of Purus.  
5. 13 percent for Regional Government. 
6. 4 percent equally among public universities of the 
department.  
Distribution among district governments of each 
province is determined as the simple average of the 
relative participation of surface and BUN, the latter 
weighted by population.  
Participation 
in custom rent 
Source of funds. 2 percent of the rent collected by each 
of the country’s customs through import operations.  
Restrictions on use of funds. No restrictions on the use 
of funds. Only the Province of Callao has to allocate 10 
percent of the transfer for an “Education Fund”, of which 
20 percent should be used for infrastructure and 
equipment of public schools, with emphasis on 
information technology.  
Legal base and main changes. 
- DL 776-1993 “Municipal tax law”, establishes the 
transfer. Updated by Law 27613-2001 of “Participation 
in custom rent”. Modified by Law 27783-2002 
“Decentralization Bases Law”, and Law 28543 that 
Timing of distribution. Transfers are made monthly. 
Distribution rule.  
- LLGG participate of the 2 percent collected within 
the province where the customs agency is located.  
1. 40 percent proportional to the total population of 
each district. 
2. 10 percent proportional to the territorial extension 
of each district.  
3. 50 percent proportional to the number of LLGG.  
- For the province of Callao:  
1. Until December 2001, allocated to the TCRA of El 
Callao.  
2. Between January 2002 and June 2005, 80 percent 
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modifies the latter.  to TCRA (in 2002) and regional government (since 
2003) of El Callao, including 10 percent of total 
transfers for an Education Fund; 20 percent to 
LLGG.  
3. Since June 2005, 10 percent for an Education 
Fund, and the remaining 90 percent is allocated 50 
percent for the Regional Government of El Callao 
and 50 percent following the rule of the rest of 
LLGG as described above.  
Earmarks and other transfers: Glass of milk; social programs; FONIPREL; PI and PMM; other current and capital 
transfers; current and capital ordinary resources for LLGG  
- Glass of milk. Established in 1985, it is one of the first transfers that were established for LLGG. It has coverage in all LLGG, and 
it is earmarked to provide a daily ration of food to vulnerable population. The distribution is based on vulnerable population 
(children, pregnant women and seniors), which is first weighted by BUN and malnutrition indicators, and later by the differential 
cost of the ration in each department. This provides an index that is multiplied by the program´s budget.  
 
- Social programs. The current decentralization process entailed the gradual transfer between 2003 and 2007 of 4 main social 
programs to LLGG:  
 
1. Road infrastructure – Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MTC). Earmarked for routine secondary road 
maintenance by provincial and/or district LLGG. This function used to be performed by an Agency of the MTC (Rural Provias). 
2. Complementary food programs – Ministry of Women and Social Development. Earmarked for food provision. It includes 
subsidies for cafeterias at shelters, complementary food, senior population at risk, and food and nutrition for patients with 
tuberculosis.  
3. Social and productive infrastructure – Fund for Cooperation for Social Development (FONCODES), Ministry of Women and 
Social Development. Earmarked for small projects identified by LLGG in social, productive and economic infrastructure to 
generate economic opportunities for low-income population through development of productive and investment capacities. 
 
- Investment Fund for Regional and Local Investment (FONIPREL in Spanish). Competitive fund introduced in 2008 whose 
goal is to co-finance pre investment studies and PIP geared towards reducing development gaps in the provision of services and 
basic infrastructure, with the highest possible impact in the reduction of poverty and extreme poverty in the country. SNG present 
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pre investment studies and PIP that compete in each of FONIPREL’s calls. There have been 5 calls since the start of the Fund. In 
turn, SNG are clustered into three different groups according to their BUN (very high need, high need and middle need); and into 
three other different groups according to the “determined resources” they receive (more resources, medium resources and low 
resources); determined resources are FONCOMUN, and natural resources and canon transfers. The groups according to BUN define 
the regional, provincial and district governments that compete with each other for funds in each of FONIPREL’s calls. In turn, the 
groups according to determined resources, combined with the groups according to BUN, define the amount of co-financing given by 
the Fund, which ranges from 50 percent (more resources) to 98 percent (low resources with very high need). Since 2009, the criteria 
that is used to evaluate each proposal to the Fund is (weight among brackets): quality (50 percent); additional funds from SNG (15 
percent); municipal man-community or regional articulation, which are joint proposals by two or more LLGG or RRGG (15 
percent); international border zone (5 percent); priority according to classification of needs and resources (10 percent); and degree of 
financial execution of public investment budget (5 percent). Most of the resources are allocated to LLGG. In order to stimulate 
inclusiveness and compensation among SNG, more resources are allocated to SNG with high/very high need and medium/low 
transfers of determined resources. Once projects are selected in each call, funds are transferred according to the progress of the 
LLGG in the execution of their pre-investment studies and PIP.  
 
- Plan of Incentives for the Improvement in Municipal Management (PI) and Program for Municipal Modernization (PMM). 
The PI and PMM were introduced in 2010 with the goal of boosting reforms by LLGG that contribute to achieve growth and 
sustainable development of the local economy and improve its management, in the context of the decentralization process and 
improvement of competitiveness. The main goal is to stimulate LLGG to modernize and make progress to a results approach to 
public management. Both mechanisms allocate funds according to the achievement of a number of targets that need to be 
accomplished by LLGG, which are geared towards achieving financial self-sustainability (increase tax collection); reducing chronic 
infant malnutrition; improving public services and infrastructure; and streamlining local procedures. The targets change according to 
the characteristics of each municipality; in this regard, LLGG have been classified into three groups according to their size: main 
cities, which for the PMM are divided in turn between larger cities (type A) and rest of cities (type B); LLGG that are not main 
cities with more than 500 houses; and LLGG with less than 500 houses (the PI also uses the classification of needs using BUN of 
FONIPREL). For 2010 the allocation for PI and PMM is of S./ 700 and S./ 600 million, respectively. Starting in 2011, however, the 
funds for the PI are determined by the detractions from the Municipal Promotion Tax that serves as the base for the FONCOMUN 
transfer; and for the PMM the funds are updated every year in the budget law (PMM is a program that lasts until 2013). For the PI, 
the total possible allocation per LLGG is determined following the rules of the FONCOMUN, while for the PMM it is proportional 
to the population of each LLGG. If all targets are accomplished, the LLGG gets the maximum possible amount; otherwise, it gets a 
proportion according to the number of targets accomplished. The undisbursed funds are allocated to those LLGG within each 
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category that accomplished all targets. The targets are evaluated in March and September, with the funds transferred thereafter. 
Similar to FONCOMUN, there are no restrictions on the use of funds for the PI, while for the PMM the transfers need to be used in 
the activities and projects of the targets of the program.  
 
- Other current and capital transfers. Until 2005 it included the “Glass of Milk” transfer and the social programs described above. 
Currently it includes other transfers that tend to be earmarked to current or capital functions/projects. The most significant ones in 
terms of amounts are transfers from municipal enterprises; transfers from RRGG and other national funds; donations by individuals 
and corporations; and donations by bilateral and multilateral organizations.  
 
- Current and capital ordinary resources for LLGG. Since 2006, the municipal budgets do not register this transfer as an income, 
but only report it as expenditure. Hence, it needs to be included as another transfer in the income statements for an adequate 
accounting of municipal finances. It includes since 2006 the “Glass of Milk” transfer and the social programs described above. In 
2009, and to a lower degree in 2010, this transfer increased significantly because the national government authorized, in the context 
of the international financial crisis, additional discretional transfers to LLGG earmarked to social programs. The most important 
functions financed by these transfers are sanitation, urban and rural transport, social assistance, basic education, urban development, 
management and financial intermediation, and irrigation.   
Source: MEF and Congress of Peru 
 
Table A1.4 – Own resources of LLGG in Peru 
Own current resources of LLGG 
Municipal taxes 
1. Property tax (predial). Annual district tax whose base is a fraction of the value of the property. The tax rate and value of the base is 
established by the central government, while the local government is in charge of tax administration. The tax rate is progressive 
increasing with the value of the property from 0.2 percent to 1 percent of the total value. There are a number of exemptions to 
properties that serve a religious, educational and/or public function, as well as national monuments, among other. 5 percent of the 
tax collection should be allocated to develop and maintain the local cadastre, as well as to tax administration functions. 3 per 1000 
of the tax collection should be transferred to the National Ministry of Housing to conduct official valuations of property.  
2. Property transfer tax (Alcabala). It taxes the transfer of properties. The tax base is the value of the transfer, which cannot be less 
than the reported self-assessment of the value of the property. It is paid by the buyer of a property, and the tax rate is 3 percent of 
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the value of the transfer, with a fixed monetary exemption. There are additional exemptions for transfers due to death and/or 
inheritance, as well as for religious, educational and/or public properties, among other. The tax is for the district government, 
except in those provincial governments that have a Municipal Investment Fund (only Lima has one), in which case the provincial 
government collects the tax, with 50 percent allocated back to the corresponding district government and 50 percent allocated to 
the Municipal Investment Fund.   
3. Vehicle property tax (patrimonio vehicular). Annual provincial tax whose base is a fraction of the value of vehicles not older than 
three years. The base is the value of the vehicle, with reference values established annually by MEF, and the rate is 1 percent of 
the total value. There are exemptions for public agencies, public transportation international governments, educational and 
religious entities, among other.  
Other taxes. Tax on gambling (20 percent of the price and 12 percent for horse races), with 60 percent of the proceeds accruing for the 
provincial government and 40 percent for the district government. Tax on lotteries and games (10 percent of the price; it is a district 
tax). Tax on non-sport events (15 percent for most shows and 10 percent for movies, it is a district tax).   
Contributions and municipal fees for service 
1. Contribution for public works. Based on the estimated benefit to neighbors of municipal public works. The fee should never 
exceed the value of the public work.  
2. Fees for public service. Based on the estimated cost of the provision of a municipal service; includes garbage collection, green 
areas, traffic and other infractions and public surveillance, among other.  
3. Fees for administrative services or rights. Based on the cost of administrative procedures and the use or yield of municipal 
property and assets.  
4. Fees for opening a commercial business. One-time fee for opening a new commercial, industrial or services establishment. 
5. Fees for vehicle parking. Fees for parking in commercial areas with high traffic volume. 
6. Public transport fee. Provincial fee for provision of public transportation services.  
Other fees may be authorized by national law. The value of fees should not exceed the value of the provision of the corresponding 
good or service.  




Annex 2 – Compatibility of LLGG fiscal database with 
international standards 
 
The fiscal database of LLGG was provided by MEF’s National Accounting Office 
(NAO), which is the official and most reliable national source of municipal government 
budget information, since it is based on a thorough audit of the information provided by 
LLGG and its compatibility with other sources such as Peru’s IFAS. To assess the fiscal 
position of LLGG it is necessary to use the economic classification of the budget, which 
divides income and expenditure according to their current or capital nature, allowing an 
evaluation of the fiscal result with its corresponding financial sources.  
Until 2009 Peru’s national accounting rules for the economic classification of the 
budget of LLGG did not fully conform to international standards such as IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM). Following a reform in 2008, since 2009 
these rules are much closer to IMF’s GFSM, although they are still not fully compatible.  
In order to make Peru’s fiscal database compatible with IMF’s GFSM and hence 
having an adequate assessment of the fiscal position of LLGG I used the document 
published by MEF (2006), “Public finance manual for regional and local governments”, 
which provides a step by step guide of the necessary transformation to the income, 
expenditure and financing accounts in order to arrive at an economic classification of the 
budget that is compatible with IMF’s GFSM.  
In turn, for years prior to 2009 a few income and expenditure accounts are 
transformed to make them compatible with the new accounting standards that began to be 
enforced that year. The source that was used to make this transformation is the list of 
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equivalences in the budget classification of income and expenditure published by MEF’s 
General Directorate of Public Budgeting (DGPP after its name in Spanish, see MEF, 
2008). Most of these transformations could only be made in specific accounts of income 
and expenditure between 2001 and 2008, since prior to 2001 the available database of 
LLGG is not disaggregated.  
It is important to highlight the analysis that was made for three important 
accounts of LLGG public finances. First, accumulated savings of LLGG grew at a high 
rate in 2008, especially due to the large increase in transfers of mining canon of 2007 (see 
Figure 6.8). In this dissertation, accumulated savings are not included in the current or 
capital income budget of LLGG, since following the classification by MEF’s NAO they 
are a source of finance of municipalities. This is different from the presentation of the 
Institutional Modified Budget (PIM in Spanish), which is used by Peru’s DGPP to track 
yearly budget execution, and includes accumulated savings as another source of income 
of municipalities. This inclusion, in turn, inflates the available budget of LLGG, 
especially those that receive large transfers from natural resources, giving the impression 
that they are inefficient in expenditure execution, since they tend to execute a smaller 
fraction of the total available budget vis-à-vis most other LLGG that did not receive large 
transfers from natural resources; even though, as shown in this dissertation, the growth in 
expenditure displayed by LLGG that received large transfers is much higher than for the 
rest of LLGG. Hence, in the database that is used here, and similar to the classification 
used by MEF’s NAO, total income of LLGG in a given year reflects all the funds they 
collected and/or received in that year, exclusive of accumulated savings, which are 
presented separately as a source of finance.   
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Second, according to the database of Peru’s NAO, ordinary resources transferred 
from the central government to LLGG are presented since 2006 as expenditures but not 
as a source of income. Hence, without correction the database presents a fiscal result of 
LLGG that is worse than their true fiscal position, especially in 2009 and 2010, in which 
the central government increased substantially its transfers of ordinary resources to 
LLGG following the international financial crisis of those years (see Figure 6.8 above). 
Therefore, as a result of interviews with officers from Peru’s DGPP and NAO I 
confirmed the need to include all the expenditure account of ordinary resources as a 
source of income, in order to reflect the true fiscal position of LLGG, with the following 
adjustment: subtract from each provincial government the income account of “transfers to 
local governments”, which includes the income that provincial governments receive due 
to “Program of feeding complement” and “Provincial transport institutes”; this account is 
already included in the income budget of PPGG, so including it again through the 
addition of the expenditure account of ordinary resources would entail double accounting. 
Noteworthy, the income account of “transfers to local governments” is only 1.7 percent 
of total ordinary resources.  
Third and last, the information for debt of LLGG also comes from MEF’s NAO, 
but there are some minor discrepancies in the number of LLGG that report the 
information of this stock vis-à-vis the number of LLGG that report the information of 
budget flows (see Table 3.2). Moreover, the information presented in this dissertation 
shows net debt, following the regulation of the Fiscal Decentralization Legislative Decree 
N° 955, which states that for the assessment of fiscal rules municipal debt should be 
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